@article{30940, abstract = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, issn = {{0347-0520}}, journal = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}}, keywords = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{403--440}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}}, volume = {{125}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33458, abstract = {{We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.}}, author = {{Freise, Diana and Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, title = {{{Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102689}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30235, author = {{Westphal, Matthias and Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Economic Journal}}, number = {{646}}, pages = {{2231--2272}}, title = {{{Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment}}}, doi = {{10.1093/ej/ueac021}}, volume = {{132}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{15073, abstract = {{ In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime. }}, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schiele, Valentin}}, issn = {{0034-6535}}, journal = {{The Review of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{165--176}}, title = {{{Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety}}}, doi = {{10.1162/rest_a_00873}}, volume = {{103}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{29152, abstract = {{AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{1434-4742}}, journal = {{Review of Economic Design}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{22715, abstract = {{AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Zehra, Moonum}}, issn = {{1488-3473}}, journal = {{Journal of International Migration and Integration}}, title = {{{Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s12134-021-00863-9}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{23594, abstract = {{AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.}}, author = {{Redlin, Margarete and Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, title = {{{Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-021-03764-0}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{45640, abstract = {{I study a dynamic variant of the Dixit–Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, issn = {{1573-2878}}, journal = {{Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Dynamic Monopolistic Competition}}}, volume = {{189}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{17072, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}}, issn = {{1048-5252}}, journal = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}}, pages = {{510--533}}, title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17074, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, issn = {{1363-6669}}, journal = {{Review of Development Economics}}, pages = {{644--667}}, title = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}}, doi = {{10.1111/rode.12663}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16273, abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{30234, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}}, issn = {{1057-9230}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{766--777}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4018}}, volume = {{29}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{31802, abstract = {{ Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. }}, author = {{Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{0025-1909}}, journal = {{Management Science}}, keywords = {{Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{2677--2685}}, publisher = {{Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}}, title = {{{Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}}}, doi = {{10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}}, volume = {{66}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{34115, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{0943-0180}}, journal = {{Homo Oeconomicus}}, keywords = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}}, number = {{1-2}}, pages = {{1--6}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17350, abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{641--660}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}}, volume = {{177}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17086, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, pages = {{923--944}}, title = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{2808, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{129--170}}, title = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12140}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, }