[{"author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"van Huizen, Thomas","last_name":"van Huizen"},{"last_name":"Keijzer","full_name":"Keijzer, Linda ","first_name":"Linda "},{"last_name":"Rezaei","first_name":"Sarah ","full_name":"Rezaei, Sarah "},{"full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","first_name":"Stephanie","last_name":"Rosenkranz"},{"last_name":"Westbrock","first_name":"Bastian ","full_name":"Westbrock, Bastian "}],"publication":"Labour Economics","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","status":"public","date_created":"2020-03-09T12:35:49Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult."}],"title":"Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field","user_id":"42447","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock, “Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour Economics, 2020.","short":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock, Labour Economics (2020).","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}, journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }, year={2020} }","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","apa":"Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., & Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","ama":"Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. 2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815"},"year":"2020","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"16273","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:47Z","doi":"10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815"},{"intvolume":" 121","_id":"16334","year":"2020","type":"journal_article","citation":{"mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","ama":"Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","ieee":"B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020.","short":"B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481."},"page":"453 - 481","article_type":"original","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"42447","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","id":"13264","first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja"}],"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":121,"status":"public","date_created":"2020-03-24T08:05:53Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:49Z","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"368"}],"publication_status":"published","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]},{"volume":29,"status":"public","date_created":"2022-03-10T14:27:58Z","publisher":"Wiley","author":[{"last_name":"Schmitz","id":"48879","first_name":"Hendrik","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik"},{"full_name":"Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.","first_name":"Magdalena A.","last_name":"Stroka‐Wetsch"}],"keyword":["Health Policy"],"publication":"Health Economics","user_id":"53779","year":"2020","type":"journal_article","citation":{"mla":"Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, Wiley, 2020, pp. 766–77, doi:10.1002/hec.4018.","bibtex":"@article{Schmitz_Stroka‐Wetsch_2020, title={Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}, volume={29}, DOI={10.1002/hec.4018}, number={7}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}, year={2020}, pages={766–777} }","ama":"Schmitz H, Stroka‐Wetsch MA. Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics. 2020;29(7):766-777. doi:10.1002/hec.4018","apa":"Schmitz, H., & Stroka‐Wetsch, M. A. (2020). Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics, 29(7), 766–777. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018","chicago":"Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics 29, no. 7 (2020): 766–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018.","ieee":"H. Schmitz and M. A. Stroka‐Wetsch, “Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?,” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 766–777, 2020, doi: 10.1002/hec.4018.","short":"H. Schmitz, M.A. Stroka‐Wetsch, Health Economics 29 (2020) 766–777."},"page":"766-777","issue":"7","intvolume":" 29","_id":"30234","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1057-9230","1099-1050"]},"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1002/hec.4018","date_updated":"2022-03-10T14:28:41Z"},{"citation":{"ieee":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.","short":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020) 2677–2685.","mla":"Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.","bibtex":"@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}, number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685} }","ama":"Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science. 2020;66(6):2677-2685. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","apa":"Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., & Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science, 66(6), 2677–2685. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","chicago":"Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521."},"year":"2020","type":"journal_article","page":"2677-2685","_id":"31802","intvolume":" 66","issue":"6","author":[{"full_name":"Lück, Sonja","orcid":"0000-0003-0380-1965","first_name":"Sonja","id":"950","last_name":"Lück"},{"full_name":"Balsmeier, Benjamin","first_name":"Benjamin","last_name":"Balsmeier"},{"last_name":"Seliger","full_name":"Seliger, Florian","first_name":"Florian"},{"first_name":"Lee","full_name":"Fleming, Lee","last_name":"Fleming"}],"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","publication":"Management Science","keyword":["Management Science and Operations Research","Strategy and Management"],"status":"public","date_created":"2022-06-08T08:29:59Z","volume":66,"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":" Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. "}],"user_id":"950","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-06-08T10:08:11Z","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","department":[{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]},"title":"Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test"},{"user_id":"477","status":"public","date_created":"2022-11-19T15:44:21Z","volume":37,"author":[{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"}],"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","publication":"Homo Oeconomicus","keyword":["Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering","Environmental Engineering"],"issue":"1-2","_id":"34115","intvolume":" 37","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","short":"C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}, volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}, number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","ama":"Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x"},"year":"2020","page":"1-6","title":"Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0943-0180","2366-6161"]},"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"doi":"10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x","date_updated":"2022-11-30T13:29:13Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"year":"2020","type":"journal_article","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 177, 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 177:641-660. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.): 641–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.) 641–660."},"page":"641-660","_id":"17350","intvolume":" 177","status":"public","date_created":"2020-07-01T07:50:45Z","volume":177,"author":[{"id":"37339","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard"},{"last_name":"Kaarbøe","first_name":"Odvar M. ","full_name":"Kaarbøe, Odvar M. "}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","user_id":"37339","article_type":"original","abstract":[{"text":"Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","date_updated":"2022-01-29T17:04:14Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_identifier":{"unknown":["0167-2681"]},"publication_status":"accepted","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets"},{"type":"journal_article","year":"2020","citation":{"short":"T. Gries, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020) 923–944.","ieee":"T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity,” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, pp. 923–944, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020): 923–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.","ama":"Gries T, Redlin M. Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy. 2020;17:923-944. doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","apa":"Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2020). Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17, 923–944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Redlin_2020, title={Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}, volume={17}, DOI={10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2020}, pages={923–944} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, 2020, pp. 923–44, doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1."},"page":"923-944","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","open_access":"1"}],"intvolume":" 17","_id":"17086","volume":17,"status":"public","date_created":"2020-06-08T07:05:43Z","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"id":"135","last_name":"Redlin","full_name":"Redlin, Margarete","first_name":"Margarete"}],"publication":"International Economics and Economic Policy","user_id":"135","article_type":"original","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","oa":"1","date_updated":"2022-08-23T08:25:03Z","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1612-4804","1612-4812"]},"department":[{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"202"}],"title":"Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity"},{"volume":20,"status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-18T10:27:14Z","author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","last_name":"Gries","id":"186"},{"full_name":"Jungblut, Stefan","first_name":"Stefan","last_name":"Jungblut"},{"first_name":"Tim","full_name":"Krieger, Tim","last_name":"Krieger"},{"last_name":"Meyer","full_name":"Meyer, Henning","first_name":"Henning"}],"publication":"German Economic Review","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"title":"Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change","user_id":"186","citation":{"ieee":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019) 129–170.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140}, number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140.","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019): 129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.","apa":"Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140","ama":"Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140"},"year":"2019","type":"journal_article","page":"129-170","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1111/geer.12140","issue":"2","_id":"2808","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:51Z","intvolume":" 20"},{"_id":"1139","intvolume":" 26","issue":"1","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}],"page":"54-57","type":"journal_article","year":"2019","citation":{"ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","apa":"Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase."}],"user_id":"18949","ddc":["000"],"file":[{"file_id":"5307","creator":"ups","file_size":625230,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","access_level":"closed"}],"publication":"Applied Economics Letters","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","author":[{"last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949","first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"}],"date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":26,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead"},{"intvolume":" 162","_id":"2256","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","page":"146-163","abstract":[{"text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","author":[{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"},{"first_name":"Hans","full_name":"Haller, Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","volume":162,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publication_status":"published"},{"_id":"80","intvolume":" 157","type":"journal_article","citation":{"mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734."},"year":"2019","page":"708-734","article_type":"original","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."}],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"42447","author":[{"first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres","id":"48794"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker"},{"last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032","first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912"},{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","creator":"bhoyer","file_id":"5723","file_size":1569991}],"volume":157,"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}]},{"intvolume":" 181","_id":"9920","date_updated":"2019-05-31T08:18:38Z","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters, vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019.","short":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.","mla":"Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol. 181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","bibtex":"@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}, journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }","chicago":"Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","apa":"Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters, 181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","ama":"Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021"},"year":"2019","page":"47-50","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?","user_id":"186","author":[{"first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","last_name":"Fritz"},{"last_name":"Gries","id":"186","first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas"},{"last_name":"Feng","first_name":"Yuanhua","full_name":"Feng, Yuanhua"}],"department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Economics Letters","volume":181,"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-1765"]},"publication_status":"published","status":"public","date_created":"2019-05-23T07:55:48Z"},{"doi":"10.1111/obes.12267","issue":"1","intvolume":" 81","_id":"6734","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:17Z","year":"2019","citation":{"ieee":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81 (2019) 62–78.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81}, DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1}, journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }","ama":"Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267","apa":"Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267."},"type":"journal_article","page":"62-78","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics","user_id":"186","volume":81,"status":"public","date_created":"2019-01-15T11:16:38Z","author":[{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"},{"full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","first_name":"Marlon","last_name":"Fritz"},{"last_name":"Yuanhua","full_name":"Yuanhua, Feng","first_name":"Feng"}],"publication":"Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}]},{"author":[{"last_name":"Gries","id":"186","first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas"}],"department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"The American Economist","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0569-4345","2328-1235"]},"publication_status":"published","status":"public","date_created":"2019-06-03T07:46:47Z","title":"A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea","user_id":"186","year":"2019","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The American Economist, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, The American Economist (2019).","mla":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477}, number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas}, year={2019} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.","apa":"Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477","ama":"Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477"},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:28Z","_id":"10090","article_number":"056943451984647","doi":"10.1177/0569434519846477"},{"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Bünnings_Schmitz_Tauchmann_Ziebarth_2019, title={The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}, volume={86}, DOI={10.1111/jori.12219}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Risk and Insurance}, author={Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}, year={2019}, pages={415–449} }","mla":"Bünnings, Christian, et al. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, 2019, pp. 415–49, doi:10.1111/jori.12219.","ama":"Bünnings C, Schmitz H, Tauchmann H, Ziebarth NR. The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2019;86(2):415-449. doi:10.1111/jori.12219","apa":"Bünnings, C., Schmitz, H., Tauchmann, H., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2019). The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2), 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219","chicago":"Bünnings, Christian, Hendrik Schmitz, Harald Tauchmann, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86, no. 2 (2019): 415–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219.","ieee":"C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, and N. R. Ziebarth, “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 415–449, 2019, doi: 10.1111/jori.12219.","short":"C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, N.R. Ziebarth, Journal of Risk and Insurance 86 (2019) 415–449."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","page":"415-449","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1111/jori.12219","issue":"2","date_updated":"2022-03-10T13:53:25Z","_id":"15075","intvolume":" 86","volume":86,"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0022-4367","1539-6975"]},"status":"public","date_created":"2019-11-21T11:57:56Z","author":[{"last_name":"Bünnings","first_name":"Christian","full_name":"Bünnings, Christian"},{"id":"48879","last_name":"Schmitz","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik","first_name":"Hendrik"},{"full_name":"Tauchmann, Harald","first_name":"Harald","last_name":"Tauchmann"},{"full_name":"Ziebarth, Nicolas R.","first_name":"Nicolas R.","last_name":"Ziebarth"}],"publication":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice","user_id":"53779"},{"title":"Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy","department":[{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1024-2694","1476-8267"]},"date_updated":"2022-08-23T08:25:22Z","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"135","publication":"Defence and Peace Economics","publisher":"Informa UK Limited","author":[{"last_name":"Gries","id":"186","first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas"},{"id":"135","last_name":"Redlin","full_name":"Redlin, Margarete","first_name":"Margarete"}],"date_created":"2018-05-11T10:11:46Z","status":"public","volume":30,"_id":"2727","intvolume":" 30","issue":"3","page":"309-323","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}, number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","apa":"Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","ama":"Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","ieee":"T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","short":"T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323."},"year":"2019","type":"journal_article"},{"page":"493-506","year":"2018","type":"journal_article","citation":{"apa":"Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development, 30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104","ama":"Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506. doi:10.1002/jid.3104","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104}, number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }","short":"T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506.","ieee":"T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018."},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"2814","intvolume":" 30","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:52Z","doi":"10.1002/jid.3104","issue":"3","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Journal of International Development","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"full_name":"Grundmann, Rainer","first_name":"Rainer","last_name":"Grundmann"}],"volume":30,"date_created":"2018-05-18T11:05:19Z","status":"public","title":"Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries","user_id":"186"},{"page":"905-932","type":"journal_article","year":"2018","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8."},"issue":"6","_id":"4564","intvolume":" 27","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":27,"jel":["C78"],"file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"file_size":636521,"file_id":"5107","creator":"stela","access_level":"closed","file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf","date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","publisher":"Springer","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"}],"quality_controlled":"1","user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":" In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"}],"article_type":"original","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information"},{"user_id":"42447","ddc":["000"],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","file_name":"games-09-00089.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5296","creator":"ups","file_size":492018,"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z"}],"publication":"Games","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","publisher":"MDPI","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","first_name":"Stephanie","last_name":"Rosenkranz"}],"date_created":"2018-10-29T10:27:40Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":9,"intvolume":" 9","_id":"4982","issue":"4","article_number":"89","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/"}],"type":"journal_article","year":"2018","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.","short":"B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }","ama":"Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018)."},"title":" Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:33Z","oa":"1","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"publication_status":"published","project":[{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","abstract":[{"text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again.","lang":"eng"}],"article_type":"review","volume":13,"date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","publication":"PLoS ONE","file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","first_name":"Behnud","id":"26032","last_name":"Mir Djawadi"},{"id":"111","last_name":"Fahr","full_name":"Fahr, Rene","first_name":"Rene"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","file":[{"file_size":1107189,"creator":"cjhaake","file_id":"5542","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"article_number":"e0207172","issue":"11","intvolume":" 13","_id":"5330","citation":{"apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2018","funded_apc":"1"}]