TY - JOUR
AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - van Huizen, Thomas
AU - Keijzer, Linda
AU - Rezaei, Sarah
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
AU - Westbrock, Bastian
ID - 16273
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 16334
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
ID - 30234
IS - 7
JF - Health Economics
KW - Health Policy
SN - 1057-9230
TI - Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?
VL - 29
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Seliger, Florian
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31802
IS - 6
JF - Management Science
KW - Management Science and Operations Research
KW - Strategy and Management
SN - 0025-1909
TI - Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test
VL - 66
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 34115
IS - 1-2
JF - Homo Oeconomicus
KW - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
KW - Environmental Engineering
SN - 0943-0180
TI - Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
VL - 37
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M.
ID - 17350
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
VL - 177
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 17086
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity
VL - 17
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meyer, Henning
ID - 2808
IS - 2
JF - German Economic Review
TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.
AU - Kaimann, Daniel
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1139
IS - 1
JF - Applied Economics Letters
TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Haller, Hans
ID - 2256
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
VL - 162
ER -