TY - JOUR
AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - van Huizen, Thomas
AU - Keijzer, Linda
AU - Rezaei, Sarah
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
AU - Westbrock, Bastian
ID - 16273
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 16334
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
ID - 30234
IS - 7
JF - Health Economics
KW - Health Policy
SN - 1057-9230
TI - Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?
VL - 29
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Seliger, Florian
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31802
IS - 6
JF - Management Science
KW - Management Science and Operations Research
KW - Strategy and Management
SN - 0025-1909
TI - Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test
VL - 66
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 34115
IS - 1-2
JF - Homo Oeconomicus
KW - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
KW - Environmental Engineering
SN - 0943-0180
TI - Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
VL - 37
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M.
ID - 17350
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
VL - 177
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 17086
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity
VL - 17
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meyer, Henning
ID - 2808
IS - 2
JF - German Economic Review
TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.
AU - Kaimann, Daniel
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1139
IS - 1
JF - Applied Economics Letters
TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Haller, Hans
ID - 2256
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
VL - 162
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.
We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).
AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Recker, Sonja
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 80
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
VL - 157
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 9920
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?
VL - 181
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Yuanhua, Feng
ID - 6734
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics
VL - 81
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 10090
JF - The American Economist
SN - 0569-4345
TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15075
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance
SN - 0022-4367
TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2727
IS - 3
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 2814
IS - 3
JF - Journal of International Development
TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to
determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the
upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)
revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider
cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means
that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by
mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive
compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for
buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is
regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints
are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer
quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to
balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in
place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by
means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution
for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with
the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a
tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 4564
IS - 6
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
ID - 4982
IS - 4
JF - Games
TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment
VL - 9
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.
To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to
reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this
study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries
when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,
a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to
evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is
not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous
rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three
sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality
decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of
receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service
provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation
building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental
design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates
from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation
profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking
strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price
is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then
high quality is chosen until the price increases again.
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Fahr, Rene
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 5330
IS - 11
JF - PLoS ONE
TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
VL - 13
ER -