TY - JOUR
AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 30940
IS - 2
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
KW - Labour market negotiations
KW - efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - sequential bargaining
KW - restricted bargaining games
TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
VL - 125
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.
AU - Freise, Diana
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 33458
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Westphal, Matthias
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 30235
IS - 646
JF - Economic Journal
TI - Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment
VL - 132
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime.
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 15073
IS - 1
JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics
SN - 0034-6535
TI - Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety
VL - 103
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 29152
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Zehra, Moonum
ID - 22715
JF - Journal of International Migration and Integration
SN - 1488-3473
TI - Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 23594
JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology
SN - 0177-798X
TI - Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - I study a dynamic variant of the DixitâStiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.
AU - Hoof, Simon
ID - 45640
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
SN - 1573-2878
TI - Dynamic Monopolistic Competition
VL - 189
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
ID - 17072
JF - Journal of Nonparametric Statistics
SN - 1048-5252
TI - Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 17074
JF - Review of Development Economics
SN - 1363-6669
TI - Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - van Huizen, Thomas
AU - Keijzer, Linda
AU - Rezaei, Sarah
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
AU - Westbrock, Bastian
ID - 16273
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 16334
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
ID - 30234
IS - 7
JF - Health Economics
KW - Health Policy
SN - 1057-9230
TI - Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?
VL - 29
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Seliger, Florian
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31802
IS - 6
JF - Management Science
KW - Management Science and Operations Research
KW - Strategy and Management
SN - 0025-1909
TI - Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test
VL - 66
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 34115
IS - 1-2
JF - Homo Oeconomicus
KW - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
KW - Environmental Engineering
SN - 0943-0180
TI - Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
VL - 37
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M.
ID - 17350
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
VL - 177
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 17086
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity
VL - 17
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meyer, Henning
ID - 2808
IS - 2
JF - German Economic Review
TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.
AU - Kaimann, Daniel
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1139
IS - 1
JF - Applied Economics Letters
TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Haller, Hans
ID - 2256
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
VL - 162
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.
We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).
AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Recker, Sonja
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 80
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
VL - 157
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 9920
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?
VL - 181
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Yuanhua, Feng
ID - 6734
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics
VL - 81
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 10090
JF - The American Economist
SN - 0569-4345
TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15075
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance
SN - 0022-4367
TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2727
IS - 3
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 2814
IS - 3
JF - Journal of International Development
TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to
determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the
upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)
revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider
cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means
that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by
mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive
compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for
buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is
regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints
are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer
quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to
balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in
place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by
means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution
for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with
the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a
tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 4564
IS - 6
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
ID - 4982
IS - 4
JF - Games
TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment
VL - 9
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.
To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to
reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this
study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries
when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,
a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to
evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is
not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous
rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three
sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality
decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of
receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service
provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation
building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental
design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates
from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation
profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking
strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price
is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then
high quality is chosen until the price increases again.
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Fahr, Rene
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 5330
IS - 11
JF - PLoS ONE
TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
VL - 13
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1029
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves
VL - 63
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK
AU - Reichert, Arndt R
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3081
IS - 4
JF - Health services research
TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe
VL - 53
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa
ID - 2728
JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology
SN - 0177-798X
TI - Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years.
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Assaf, Mohamad
AU - Chesebro, Tyler
AU - Fierro, Gabe
AU - Johnson, Kevin
AU - Johnson, Scott
AU - Li, Guan‐Cheng
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - O'Reagan, Doug
AU - Yeh, Bill
AU - Zang, Guangzheng
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31807
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
KW - Management of Technology and Innovation
KW - Strategy and Management
KW - Economics and Econometrics
KW - General Business
KW - Management and Accounting
KW - General Medicine
SN - 1058-6407
TI - Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 3070
IS - 2
JF - Review of Economics
TI - Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain
VL - 68
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 5236
JF - Atlas of Science
TI - Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition.
AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kokot, Johanna
ID - 1054
IS - 53
JF - Health Economics
TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, T.
AU - Grundmann, R.
AU - Palnau, Irene
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 1372
IS - 2
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings
VL - 14
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15260
IS - 1
JF - Journal of Human Resources
SN - 0022-166X
TI - Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice?
VL - 52
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 2635
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes
VL - 56
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Büyükdurmus, Tugba
AU - Kopetsch, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
ID - 3082
IS - 2
JF - Health Economics Review
TI - On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system
VL - 7
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, R.
AU - Palnau, Irene
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 1371
IS - 1
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings
VL - 15
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID - 2527
IS - 4
JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
SN - 1554-8597
TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Brockhoff, Sarah
ID - 2540
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
TI - Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
VL - 49
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Kraft, Manfred
AU - Simon, Manuel
ID - 2810
IS - 95
JF - Papers in Regional Science
TI - Explaining inter-provincial migration in China
VL - 4
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID - 2811
IS - 4
JF - Peace Economics and Peace Science
TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 2813
IS - 2
JF - International Journal of Economic Theory
TI - The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve
VL - 12
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2687
IS - 5
JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics
SN - 0883-7252
TI - Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany
VL - 31
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Manegold, Jochen
ID - 211
IS - 6
JF - Theoretical Economics Letters
TI - Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly
VL - 6
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
ID - 1919
IS - 5
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
SN - 1097-3923
TI - Strategic Network Disruption and Defense
VL - 18
ER -