---
_id: '80'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential
of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network
formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any
experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally
study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat
by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed
behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer
are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary
who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes,
we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium
network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was
more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness
on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that
while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium
networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment,
predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally,
we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on
whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two
robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify
the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment
observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions
by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Angelika Elfriede
full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede
id: '48794'
last_name: Endres
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption
- An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network
Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157},
DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika
Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019},
pages={708–734} }'
chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta
Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks
Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019):
708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.'
mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment:
Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '179'
- _id: '204'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
file_id: '5723'
file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf
file_size: 1569991
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 157'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 708-734
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization '
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks
too complex?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 157
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '9920'
author:
- first_name: Marlon
full_name: Fritz, Marlon
last_name: Fritz
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Yuanhua
full_name: Feng, Yuanhua
last_name: Feng
citation:
ama: Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence
of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50.
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
apa: Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters,
181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
bibtex: '@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021},
journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng,
Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }'
chicago: 'Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is
There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?”
Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.'
ieee: M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters,
vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019.
mla: Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of
an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol.
181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.
short: M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.
date_created: 2019-05-23T07:55:48Z
date_updated: 2019-05-31T08:18:38Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
intvolume: ' 181'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 47-50
publication: Economics Letters
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0165-1765
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic
decline in growth?
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 181
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6734'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Marlon
full_name: Fritz, Marlon
last_name: Fritz
- first_name: Feng
full_name: Yuanhua, Feng
last_name: Yuanhua
citation:
ama: Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom
and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267
apa: Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81},
DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1},
journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and
Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267.'
ieee: T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns
of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.
mla: Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts
–Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.
short: T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
81 (2019) 62–78.
date_created: 2019-01-15T11:16:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:17Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1111/obes.12267
intvolume: ' 81'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 62-78
publication: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
status: public
title: Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years
of Business Cycle Dynamics
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 81
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10090'
article_number: '056943451984647'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
citation:
ama: 'Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The
American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477'
apa: 'Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.
The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The
Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477},
number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas},
year={2019} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.'
ieee: 'T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The
American Economist, 2019.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.'
short: T. Gries, The American Economist (2019).
date_created: 2019-06-03T07:46:47Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:28Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1177/0569434519846477
language:
- iso: eng
publication: The American Economist
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0569-4345
- 2328-1235
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '15075'
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Bünnings, Christian
last_name: Bünnings
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
- first_name: Harald
full_name: Tauchmann, Harald
last_name: Tauchmann
- first_name: Nicolas R.
full_name: Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
last_name: Ziebarth
citation:
ama: Bünnings C, Schmitz H, Tauchmann H, Ziebarth NR. The Role of Prices Relative
to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal
of Risk and Insurance. 2019;86(2):415-449. doi:10.1111/jori.12219
apa: Bünnings, C., Schmitz, H., Tauchmann, H., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2019). The
Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health
Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2), 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219
bibtex: '@article{Bünnings_Schmitz_Tauchmann_Ziebarth_2019, title={The Role of Prices
Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice},
volume={86}, DOI={10.1111/jori.12219},
number={2}, journal={Journal of Risk and Insurance}, author={Bünnings, Christian
and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}, year={2019},
pages={415–449} }'
chicago: 'Bünnings, Christian, Hendrik Schmitz, Harald Tauchmann, and Nicolas R.
Ziebarth. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality
in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86, no. 2 (2019):
415–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219.'
ieee: 'C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, and N. R. Ziebarth, “The Role of Prices
Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 415–449, 2019, doi:
10.1111/jori.12219.'
mla: Bünnings, Christian, et al. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits
and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance,
vol. 86, no. 2, 2019, pp. 415–49, doi:10.1111/jori.12219.
short: C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, N.R. Ziebarth, Journal of Risk and
Insurance 86 (2019) 415–449.
date_created: 2019-11-21T11:57:56Z
date_updated: 2022-03-10T13:53:25Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/jori.12219
intvolume: ' 86'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 415-449
publication: Journal of Risk and Insurance
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0022-4367
- 1539-6975
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in
Health Plan Choice
type: journal_article
user_id: '53779'
volume: 86
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2727'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Margarete
full_name: Redlin, Margarete
id: '135'
last_name: Redlin
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth
Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace
Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The
Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.
Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy},
volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797},
number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited},
author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect
of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence
and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019,
pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323.
date_created: 2018-05-11T10:11:46Z
date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:22Z
department:
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 309-323
publication: Defence and Peace Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1024-2694
- 1476-8267
publication_status: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
status: public
title: 'Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth
Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy'
type: journal_article
user_id: '135'
volume: 30
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2814'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Rainer
full_name: Grundmann, Rainer
last_name: Grundmann
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506.
doi:10.1002/jid.3104'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development,
30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104},
number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas
and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development
30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30,
no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development,
vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.'
short: T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506.
date_created: 2018-05-18T11:05:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:52Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1002/jid.3104
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 493-506
publication: Journal of International Development
status: public
title: 'Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 30
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4982'
article_number: '89'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation
- An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).
apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games},
publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium
Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).
ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network
Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI,
2018.
short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z
ddc:
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creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
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file_name: games-09-00089.pdf
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intvolume: ' 9'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
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url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/
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project:
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name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
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name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games
publisher: MDPI
status: public
title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...