---
_id: '16273'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand
tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this
purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a
university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with
a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament
grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty,
we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups.
We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the
tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament
entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and
statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: van Huizen, Thomas
last_name: van Huizen
- first_name: 'Linda '
full_name: 'Keijzer, Linda '
last_name: Keijzer
- first_name: 'Sarah '
full_name: 'Rezaei, Sarah '
last_name: Rezaei
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
- first_name: 'Bastian '
full_name: 'Westbrock, Bastian '
last_name: Westbrock
citation:
ama: 'Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender,
competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics.
2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815'
apa: 'Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., &
Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from
the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815'
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender,
competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815},
journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer,
Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian },
year={2020} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie
Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty:
Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.'
ieee: 'B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock,
“Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour
Economics, 2020.'
mla: 'Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence
from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.'
short: B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock,
Labour Economics (2020).
date_created: 2020-03-09T12:35:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:47Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Labour Economics
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '16334'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data
from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at
a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement
this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated
in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students
act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless,
not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this
is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated
students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus,
we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in
an incomplete information setting.
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under
Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior.
2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
apa: Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and
Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121},
DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and
Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents
under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous
Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.
short: B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481.
date_created: 2020-03-24T08:05:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:49Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '368'
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006
intvolume: ' 121'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 453 - 481
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in
a University Clearinghouse
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 121
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '30234'
author:
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
- first_name: Magdalena A.
full_name: Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
last_name: Stroka‐Wetsch
citation:
ama: 'Schmitz H, Stroka‐Wetsch MA. Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported
quality matter? Health Economics. 2020;29(7):766-777. doi:10.1002/hec.4018'
apa: 'Schmitz, H., & Stroka‐Wetsch, M. A. (2020). Determinants of nursing home
choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics, 29(7), 766–777.
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018'
bibtex: '@article{Schmitz_Stroka‐Wetsch_2020, title={Determinants of nursing home
choice: Does reported quality matter?}, volume={29}, DOI={10.1002/hec.4018},
number={7}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik
and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}, year={2020}, pages={766–777} }'
chicago: 'Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing
Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics 29, no. 7
(2020): 766–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018.'
ieee: 'H. Schmitz and M. A. Stroka‐Wetsch, “Determinants of nursing home choice:
Does reported quality matter?,” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 766–777,
2020, doi: 10.1002/hec.4018.'
mla: 'Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing
Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics, vol. 29,
no. 7, Wiley, 2020, pp. 766–77, doi:10.1002/hec.4018.'
short: H. Schmitz, M.A. Stroka‐Wetsch, Health Economics 29 (2020) 766–777.
date_created: 2022-03-10T14:27:58Z
date_updated: 2022-03-10T14:28:41Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1002/hec.4018
intvolume: ' 29'
issue: '7'
keyword:
- Health Policy
language:
- iso: eng
page: 766-777
publication: Health Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1057-9230
- 1099-1050
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
status: public
title: 'Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '53779'
volume: 29
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '31802'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition
in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such
duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection
Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of
blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication,
through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced
duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides
a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated
to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the
positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper
was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Lück, Sonja
id: '950'
last_name: Lück
orcid: 0000-0003-0380-1965
- first_name: Benjamin
full_name: Balsmeier, Benjamin
last_name: Balsmeier
- first_name: Florian
full_name: Seliger, Florian
last_name: Seliger
- first_name: Lee
full_name: Fleming, Lee
last_name: Fleming
citation:
ama: 'Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and
Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science. 2020;66(6):2677-2685.
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521'
apa: 'Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., & Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure
of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science,
66(6), 2677–2685. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521'
bibtex: '@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of
Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521},
number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier,
Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685}
}'
chicago: 'Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early
Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management
Science 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
ieee: 'S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention
and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” Management Science, vol. 66,
no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
mla: 'Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication:
An Empirical Test.” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
short: S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020)
2677–2685.
date_created: 2022-06-08T08:29:59Z
date_updated: 2022-06-08T10:08:11Z
department:
- _id: '200'
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521
intvolume: ' 66'
issue: '6'
keyword:
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Strategy and Management
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2677-2685
publication: Management Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
status: public
title: 'Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test'
type: journal_article
user_id: '950'
volume: 66
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '34115'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo
Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.”
Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”},
volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x},
number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business
Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special
Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’”
Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue
‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and
Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.
short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6.
date_created: 2022-11-19T15:44:21Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:29:13Z
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x
intvolume: ' 37'
issue: 1-2
keyword:
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Environmental Engineering
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1-6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
publication: Homo Oeconomicus
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0943-0180
- 2366-6161
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
status: public
title: Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 37
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '17350'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit
providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated
and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a
public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically
locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition.
Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism
of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare
is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality
levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal
for the regulator not to use the full budget.
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: 'Odvar M. '
full_name: 'Kaarbøe, Odvar M. '
last_name: Kaarbøe
citation:
ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital
Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 177:641-660.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026
apa: Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
177, 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026
bibtex: '@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hehenkamp,
Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }'
chicago: 'Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality
Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 177 (n.d.): 641–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.'
ieee: 'B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.'
mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.
short: B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
177 (n.d.) 641–660.
date_created: 2020-07-01T07:50:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-29T17:04:14Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026
intvolume: ' 177'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 641-660
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_identifier:
unknown:
- 0167-2681
publication_status: accepted
status: public
title: Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
type: journal_article
user_id: '37339'
volume: 177
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '17086'
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Margarete
full_name: Redlin, Margarete
id: '135'
last_name: Redlin
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Trade and economic development: global causality and development-
and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy.
2020;17:923-944. doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2020). Trade and economic development: global
causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International
Economics and Economic Policy, 17, 923–944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2020, title={Trade and economic development: global
causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}, volume={17}, DOI={10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1},
journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, author={Gries, Thomas and
Redlin, Margarete}, year={2020}, pages={923–944} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development:
Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International
Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020): 923–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Trade and economic development: global causality
and development- and openness-related heterogeneity,” International Economics
and Economic Policy, vol. 17, pp. 923–944, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global
Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International
Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, 2020, pp. 923–44, doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.'
short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020)
923–944.
date_created: 2020-06-08T07:05:43Z
date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:03Z
department:
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1
intvolume: ' 17'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1
oa: '1'
page: 923-944
publication: International Economics and Economic Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1612-4804
- 1612-4812
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related
heterogeneity'
type: journal_article
user_id: '135'
volume: 17
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '2808'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Jungblut, Stefan
last_name: Jungblut
- first_name: Tim
full_name: Krieger, Tim
last_name: Krieger
- first_name: Henning
full_name: Meyer, Henning
last_name: Meyer
citation:
ama: Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong
Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change.
German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140
apa: Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement
Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased
technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement
Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased
technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140},
number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut,
Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic
Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous
Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019):
129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.'
ieee: T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age
and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased
technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170,
2019.
mla: Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical
Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic
Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140.
short: T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019)
129–170.
date_created: 2018-05-18T10:27:14Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:51Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1111/geer.12140
intvolume: ' 20'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 129-170
publication: German Economic Review
status: public
title: Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous
labor and biased technical change
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 20
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '1139'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms.
Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing
behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information
of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical
evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal
to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands
lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects
even after price increase.
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57.
doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model:
The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters,
26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand
model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141},
number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis
Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand
Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics
Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model:
The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters,
vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.
date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '183'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
file_id: '5307'
file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf
file_size: 625230
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 26'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
page: 54-57
project:
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
publication: Applied Economics Letters
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Taylor and Francis Online
status: public
title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile
discount market'
type: journal_article
user_id: '18949'
volume: 26
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2256'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat
members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise
have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information
network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris
paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within
the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto
this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections
model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation
and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external
threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect.
For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network
can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat
whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat,
a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected
networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Hans
full_name: Haller, Hans
last_name: Haller
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta
and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.
162, pp. 146–163, 2019.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network
Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.
short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162
(2019) 146–163.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
intvolume: ' 162'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824
page: 146-163
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 162
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '80'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential
of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network
formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any
experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally
study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat
by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed
behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer
are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary
who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes,
we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium
network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was
more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness
on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that
while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium
networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment,
predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally,
we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on
whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two
robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify
the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment
observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions
by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Angelika Elfriede
full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede
id: '48794'
last_name: Endres
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption
- An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network
Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157},
DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika
Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019},
pages={708–734} }'
chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta
Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks
Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019):
708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.'
mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment:
Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '179'
- _id: '204'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
file_id: '5723'
file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf
file_size: 1569991
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 157'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 708-734
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization '
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks
too complex?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 157
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '9920'
author:
- first_name: Marlon
full_name: Fritz, Marlon
last_name: Fritz
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Yuanhua
full_name: Feng, Yuanhua
last_name: Feng
citation:
ama: Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence
of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50.
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
apa: Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters,
181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
bibtex: '@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021},
journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng,
Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }'
chicago: 'Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is
There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?”
Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.'
ieee: M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical
evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters,
vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019.
mla: Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of
an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol.
181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.
short: M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.
date_created: 2019-05-23T07:55:48Z
date_updated: 2019-05-31T08:18:38Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021
intvolume: ' 181'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 47-50
publication: Economics Letters
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0165-1765
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic
decline in growth?
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 181
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6734'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Marlon
full_name: Fritz, Marlon
last_name: Fritz
- first_name: Feng
full_name: Yuanhua, Feng
last_name: Yuanhua
citation:
ama: Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom
and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267
apa: Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81},
DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1},
journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and
Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic
Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267.'
ieee: T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns
of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.
mla: Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts
–Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.
short: T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
81 (2019) 62–78.
date_created: 2019-01-15T11:16:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:17Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1111/obes.12267
intvolume: ' 81'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 62-78
publication: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
status: public
title: Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years
of Business Cycle Dynamics
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 81
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10090'
article_number: '056943451984647'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
citation:
ama: 'Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The
American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477'
apa: 'Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.
The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The
Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477},
number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas},
year={2019} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.'
ieee: 'T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The
American Economist, 2019.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.'
short: T. Gries, The American Economist (2019).
date_created: 2019-06-03T07:46:47Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:28Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1177/0569434519846477
language:
- iso: eng
publication: The American Economist
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0569-4345
- 2328-1235
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '15075'
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Bünnings, Christian
last_name: Bünnings
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
- first_name: Harald
full_name: Tauchmann, Harald
last_name: Tauchmann
- first_name: Nicolas R.
full_name: Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
last_name: Ziebarth
citation:
ama: Bünnings C, Schmitz H, Tauchmann H, Ziebarth NR. The Role of Prices Relative
to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal
of Risk and Insurance. 2019;86(2):415-449. doi:10.1111/jori.12219
apa: Bünnings, C., Schmitz, H., Tauchmann, H., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2019). The
Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health
Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2), 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219
bibtex: '@article{Bünnings_Schmitz_Tauchmann_Ziebarth_2019, title={The Role of Prices
Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice},
volume={86}, DOI={10.1111/jori.12219},
number={2}, journal={Journal of Risk and Insurance}, author={Bünnings, Christian
and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}, year={2019},
pages={415–449} }'
chicago: 'Bünnings, Christian, Hendrik Schmitz, Harald Tauchmann, and Nicolas R.
Ziebarth. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality
in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86, no. 2 (2019):
415–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219.'
ieee: 'C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, and N. R. Ziebarth, “The Role of Prices
Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 415–449, 2019, doi:
10.1111/jori.12219.'
mla: Bünnings, Christian, et al. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits
and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance,
vol. 86, no. 2, 2019, pp. 415–49, doi:10.1111/jori.12219.
short: C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, N.R. Ziebarth, Journal of Risk and
Insurance 86 (2019) 415–449.
date_created: 2019-11-21T11:57:56Z
date_updated: 2022-03-10T13:53:25Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/jori.12219
intvolume: ' 86'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 415-449
publication: Journal of Risk and Insurance
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0022-4367
- 1539-6975
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in
Health Plan Choice
type: journal_article
user_id: '53779'
volume: 86
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2727'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Margarete
full_name: Redlin, Margarete
id: '135'
last_name: Redlin
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth
Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace
Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The
Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.
Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy},
volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797},
number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited},
author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect
of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence
and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019,
pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323.
date_created: 2018-05-11T10:11:46Z
date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:22Z
department:
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 309-323
publication: Defence and Peace Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1024-2694
- 1476-8267
publication_status: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
status: public
title: 'Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth
Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy'
type: journal_article
user_id: '135'
volume: 30
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2814'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Rainer
full_name: Grundmann, Rainer
last_name: Grundmann
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506.
doi:10.1002/jid.3104'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development,
30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104},
number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas
and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development
30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30,
no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development,
vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.'
short: T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506.
date_created: 2018-05-18T11:05:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:52Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1002/jid.3104
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 493-506
publication: Journal of International Development
status: public
title: 'Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 30
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4982'
article_number: '89'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation
- An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).
apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games},
publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium
Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).
ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network
Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI,
2018.
short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
file_id: '5296'
file_name: games-09-00089.pdf
file_size: 492018
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games
publisher: MDPI
status: public
title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...