--- _id: '16273' abstract: - lang: eng text: "This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult." author: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer - first_name: Thomas full_name: van Huizen, Thomas last_name: van Huizen - first_name: 'Linda ' full_name: 'Keijzer, Linda ' last_name: Keijzer - first_name: 'Sarah ' full_name: 'Rezaei, Sarah ' last_name: Rezaei - first_name: Stephanie full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie last_name: Rosenkranz - first_name: 'Bastian ' full_name: 'Westbrock, Bastian ' last_name: Westbrock citation: ama: 'Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. 2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815' apa: 'Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., & Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815' bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}, journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }, year={2020} }' chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.' ieee: 'B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock, “Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour Economics, 2020.' mla: 'Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.' short: B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock, Labour Economics (2020). date_created: 2020-03-09T12:35:49Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:47Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815 language: - iso: eng publication: Labour Economics publication_status: epub_ahead status: public title: 'Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field' type: journal_article user_id: '42447' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '16334' abstract: - lang: eng text: We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting. article_type: original author: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer - first_name: Nadja full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja id: '13264' last_name: Stroh-Maraun citation: ama: Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006 apa: Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006 bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }' chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.' ieee: B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020. mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006. short: B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481. date_created: 2020-03-24T08:05:53Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:49Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' - _id: '205' - _id: '368' doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006 intvolume: ' 121' language: - iso: eng page: 453 - 481 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Games and Economic Behavior publication_status: published status: public title: Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse type: journal_article user_id: '42447' volume: 121 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '30234' author: - first_name: Hendrik full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik id: '48879' last_name: Schmitz - first_name: Magdalena A. full_name: Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A. last_name: Stroka‐Wetsch citation: ama: 'Schmitz H, Stroka‐Wetsch MA. Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics. 2020;29(7):766-777. doi:10.1002/hec.4018' apa: 'Schmitz, H., & Stroka‐Wetsch, M. A. (2020). Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics, 29(7), 766–777. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018' bibtex: '@article{Schmitz_Stroka‐Wetsch_2020, title={Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}, volume={29}, DOI={10.1002/hec.4018}, number={7}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}, year={2020}, pages={766–777} }' chicago: 'Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics 29, no. 7 (2020): 766–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018.' ieee: 'H. Schmitz and M. A. Stroka‐Wetsch, “Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?,” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 766–777, 2020, doi: 10.1002/hec.4018.' mla: 'Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, Wiley, 2020, pp. 766–77, doi:10.1002/hec.4018.' short: H. Schmitz, M.A. Stroka‐Wetsch, Health Economics 29 (2020) 766–777. date_created: 2022-03-10T14:27:58Z date_updated: 2022-03-10T14:28:41Z department: - _id: '281' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1002/hec.4018 intvolume: ' 29' issue: '7' keyword: - Health Policy language: - iso: eng page: 766-777 publication: Health Economics publication_identifier: issn: - 1057-9230 - 1099-1050 publication_status: published publisher: Wiley status: public title: 'Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?' type: journal_article user_id: '53779' volume: 29 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '31802' abstract: - lang: eng text: Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. author: - first_name: Sonja full_name: Lück, Sonja id: '950' last_name: Lück orcid: 0000-0003-0380-1965 - first_name: Benjamin full_name: Balsmeier, Benjamin last_name: Balsmeier - first_name: Florian full_name: Seliger, Florian last_name: Seliger - first_name: Lee full_name: Fleming, Lee last_name: Fleming citation: ama: 'Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science. 2020;66(6):2677-2685. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521' apa: 'Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., & Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science, 66(6), 2677–2685. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521' bibtex: '@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}, number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685} }' chicago: 'Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.' ieee: 'S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.' mla: 'Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.' short: S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020) 2677–2685. date_created: 2022-06-08T08:29:59Z date_updated: 2022-06-08T10:08:11Z department: - _id: '200' - _id: '281' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521 intvolume: ' 66' issue: '6' keyword: - Management Science and Operations Research - Strategy and Management language: - iso: eng page: 2677-2685 publication: Management Science publication_identifier: issn: - 0025-1909 - 1526-5501 publication_status: published publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) status: public title: 'Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test' type: journal_article user_id: '950' volume: 66 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '34115' author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Walter full_name: Trockel, Walter last_name: Trockel citation: ama: Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x apa: Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x bibtex: '@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}, volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}, number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.' ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.' mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x. short: C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6. date_created: 2022-11-19T15:44:21Z date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:29:13Z department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x intvolume: ' 37' issue: 1-2 keyword: - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering - Environmental Engineering language: - iso: eng page: 1-6 project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' publication: Homo Oeconomicus publication_identifier: issn: - 0943-0180 - 2366-6161 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC status: public title: Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining” type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 37 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '17350' abstract: - lang: eng text: Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget. article_type: original author: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp - first_name: 'Odvar M. ' full_name: 'Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ' last_name: Kaarbøe citation: ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 177:641-660. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 apa: Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 177, 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 bibtex: '@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }' chicago: 'Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.): 641–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.' ieee: 'B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.' mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026. short: B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.) 641–660. date_created: 2020-07-01T07:50:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-29T17:04:14Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 intvolume: ' 177' language: - iso: eng page: 641-660 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization publication_identifier: unknown: - 0167-2681 publication_status: accepted status: public title: Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets type: journal_article user_id: '37339' volume: 177 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '17086' article_type: original author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Margarete full_name: Redlin, Margarete id: '135' last_name: Redlin citation: ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy. 2020;17:923-944. doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1' apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2020). Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17, 923–944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1' bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2020, title={Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}, volume={17}, DOI={10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2020}, pages={923–944} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020): 923–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.' ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity,” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, pp. 923–944, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.' mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, 2020, pp. 923–44, doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.' short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020) 923–944. date_created: 2020-06-08T07:05:43Z date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:03Z department: - _id: '475' - _id: '200' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1 intvolume: ' 17' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1 oa: '1' page: 923-944 publication: International Economics and Economic Policy publication_identifier: issn: - 1612-4804 - 1612-4812 publication_status: published status: public title: 'Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity' type: journal_article user_id: '135' volume: 17 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '2808' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Stefan full_name: Jungblut, Stefan last_name: Jungblut - first_name: Tim full_name: Krieger, Tim last_name: Krieger - first_name: Henning full_name: Meyer, Henning last_name: Meyer citation: ama: Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140 apa: Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140 bibtex: '@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140}, number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019): 129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.' ieee: T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2019. mla: Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140. short: T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019) 129–170. date_created: 2018-05-18T10:27:14Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:51Z department: - _id: '19' - _id: '200' - _id: '475' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1111/geer.12140 intvolume: ' 20' issue: '2' language: - iso: eng page: 129-170 publication: German Economic Review status: public title: Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change type: journal_article user_id: '186' volume: 20 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '1139' abstract: - lang: eng text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. author: - first_name: Daniel full_name: Kaimann, Daniel id: '18949' last_name: Kaimann - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer citation: ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141' apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141' bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }' chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.' ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.' mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.' short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57. date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '183' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z file_id: '5307' file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf file_size: 625230 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 26' issue: '1' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141 page: 54-57 project: - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4 - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 publication: Applied Economics Letters publication_status: epub_ahead publisher: Taylor and Francis Online status: public title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market' type: journal_article user_id: '18949' volume: 26 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2256' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges." author: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer - first_name: Hans full_name: Haller, Hans last_name: Haller citation: ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }' chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.' ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019. mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011. short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163. date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 intvolume: ' 162' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824 page: 146-163 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization publication_status: published status: public title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 162 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '80' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)." article_type: original author: - first_name: Angelika Elfriede full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede id: '48794' last_name: Endres - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker - first_name: Behnud full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud id: '26032' last_name: Mir Djawadi orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912 - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer citation: ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004' apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004' bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }' chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.' ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.' mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.' short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '179' - _id: '204' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: bhoyer date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z file_id: '5723' file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf file_size: 1569991 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 157' language: - iso: eng page: 708-734 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ' publication_status: epub_ahead status: public title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?' type: journal_article user_id: '42447' volume: 157 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '9920' author: - first_name: Marlon full_name: Fritz, Marlon last_name: Fritz - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Yuanhua full_name: Feng, Yuanhua last_name: Feng citation: ama: Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021 apa: Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters, 181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021 bibtex: '@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}, journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }' chicago: 'Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.' ieee: M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters, vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019. mla: Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol. 181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021. short: M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50. date_created: 2019-05-23T07:55:48Z date_updated: 2019-05-31T08:18:38Z department: - _id: '19' - _id: '200' - _id: '475' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021 intvolume: ' 181' language: - iso: eng page: 47-50 publication: Economics Letters publication_identifier: issn: - 0165-1765 publication_status: published status: public title: Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? type: journal_article user_id: '186' volume: 181 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '6734' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Marlon full_name: Fritz, Marlon last_name: Fritz - first_name: Feng full_name: Yuanhua, Feng last_name: Yuanhua citation: ama: Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267 apa: Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267 bibtex: '@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81}, DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1}, journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267.' ieee: T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019. mla: Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267. short: T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81 (2019) 62–78. date_created: 2019-01-15T11:16:38Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:17Z department: - _id: '19' - _id: '200' - _id: '475' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1111/obes.12267 intvolume: ' 81' issue: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 62-78 publication: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics status: public title: Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics type: journal_article user_id: '186' volume: 81 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '10090' article_number: '056943451984647' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries citation: ama: 'Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477' apa: 'Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477' bibtex: '@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477}, number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas}, year={2019} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.' ieee: 'T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The American Economist, 2019.' mla: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.' short: T. Gries, The American Economist (2019). date_created: 2019-06-03T07:46:47Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:28Z department: - _id: '19' - _id: '200' - _id: '475' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1177/0569434519846477 language: - iso: eng publication: The American Economist publication_identifier: issn: - 0569-4345 - 2328-1235 publication_status: published status: public title: 'A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea' type: journal_article user_id: '186' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '15075' author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Bünnings, Christian last_name: Bünnings - first_name: Hendrik full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik id: '48879' last_name: Schmitz - first_name: Harald full_name: Tauchmann, Harald last_name: Tauchmann - first_name: Nicolas R. full_name: Ziebarth, Nicolas R. last_name: Ziebarth citation: ama: Bünnings C, Schmitz H, Tauchmann H, Ziebarth NR. The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2019;86(2):415-449. doi:10.1111/jori.12219 apa: Bünnings, C., Schmitz, H., Tauchmann, H., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2019). The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2), 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219 bibtex: '@article{Bünnings_Schmitz_Tauchmann_Ziebarth_2019, title={The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}, volume={86}, DOI={10.1111/jori.12219}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Risk and Insurance}, author={Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}, year={2019}, pages={415–449} }' chicago: 'Bünnings, Christian, Hendrik Schmitz, Harald Tauchmann, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86, no. 2 (2019): 415–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219.' ieee: 'C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, and N. R. Ziebarth, “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 415–449, 2019, doi: 10.1111/jori.12219.' mla: Bünnings, Christian, et al. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, 2019, pp. 415–49, doi:10.1111/jori.12219. short: C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, N.R. Ziebarth, Journal of Risk and Insurance 86 (2019) 415–449. date_created: 2019-11-21T11:57:56Z date_updated: 2022-03-10T13:53:25Z department: - _id: '281' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1111/jori.12219 intvolume: ' 86' issue: '2' language: - iso: eng page: 415-449 publication: Journal of Risk and Insurance publication_identifier: issn: - 0022-4367 - 1539-6975 publication_status: published status: public title: The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice type: journal_article user_id: '53779' volume: 86 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2727' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Margarete full_name: Redlin, Margarete id: '135' last_name: Redlin citation: ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797' apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797' bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}, number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.' ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.' mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.' short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323. date_created: 2018-05-11T10:11:46Z date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:22Z department: - _id: '475' - _id: '200' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797 intvolume: ' 30' issue: '3' language: - iso: eng page: 309-323 publication: Defence and Peace Economics publication_identifier: issn: - 1024-2694 - 1476-8267 publication_status: published publisher: Informa UK Limited status: public title: 'Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy' type: journal_article user_id: '135' volume: 30 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2814' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: Gries, Thomas id: '186' last_name: Gries - first_name: Rainer full_name: Grundmann, Rainer last_name: Grundmann citation: ama: 'Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506. doi:10.1002/jid.3104' apa: 'Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development, 30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104' bibtex: '@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104}, number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }' chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.' ieee: 'T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018.' mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.' short: T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506. date_created: 2018-05-18T11:05:19Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:52Z department: - _id: '19' - _id: '200' - _id: '475' - _id: '202' doi: 10.1002/jid.3104 intvolume: ' 30' issue: '3' language: - iso: eng page: 493-506 publication: Journal of International Development status: public title: 'Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries' type: journal_article user_id: '186' volume: 30 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '4564' abstract: - lang: eng text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n \ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n \ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n \ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n \ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n \ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n" article_type: original author: - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker citation: ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }' chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.' ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018. mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8. short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932. date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: stela date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z file_id: '5107' file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf file_size: 636521 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 27' issue: '6' jel: - C78 language: - iso: eng page: 905-932 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Group Decision and Negotiation publication_status: published publisher: Springer quality_controlled: '1' status: public title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 27 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '4982' article_number: '89' author: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer - first_name: Stephanie full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie last_name: Rosenkranz citation: ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4). apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4). bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }' chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018). ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018. mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018. short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018). date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z file_id: '5296' file_name: games-09-00089.pdf file_size: 492018 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 9' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/ oa: '1' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Games publisher: MDPI status: public title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment' type: journal_article user_id: '42447' volume: 9 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '5330' abstract: - lang: eng text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again." article_number: e0207172 article_type: review author: - first_name: Behnud full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud id: '26032' last_name: Mir Djawadi orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912 - first_name: Rene full_name: Fahr, Rene id: '111' last_name: Fahr - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker citation: ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }' chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172. ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018. mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172. short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018). date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: cjhaake date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z file_id: '5542' file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf file_size: 1107189 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z funded_apc: '1' has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 13' issue: '11' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4 - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: PLoS ONE publication_identifier: eissn: - 1932-6203 publication_status: published publisher: Public Library of Science status: public title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 13 year: '2018' ...