@techreport{29316,
  abstract     = {{Employing a unique and hand-collected dataset of securitization transactions by European banks, this paper analyzes the relationship between true sale loan securitization and the issuing banks’ non-performing loans to total assets ratios (NPLRs). We provide evidence for an NPLR-reducing effect during the boom phase of securitizations suggesting that banks (partly) securitized NPLs as the most risky junior tranche. In contrast, we find the reverse effect during the crises period indicating that issuing banks demonstrated `skin in the game'. A variety of sensitivity analyses provides further important implications for the vital debate on reducing NPL exposures and regulating securitization markets.}},
  author       = {{Hippert, Benjamin and Uhde, André and Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}},
  keywords     = {{European Banking, Non-performing Loans, Risk Allocation, Securitization}},
  title        = {{{Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{49277,
  author       = {{Fochmann, Martin and Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Tax Burden on German Companies – Income Tax Burden and Administrative Costs}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/NCAI8648}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@phdthesis{37396,
  author       = {{Fiedler, Moritz}},
  publisher    = {{Dr. Kovac}},
  title        = {{{Development of a Strategic Controlling Concept}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{41197,
  author       = {{Ortmann, Regina and Warkulat, Sonja and Krull, Sebastian and Klocke, Nina and Pelster, Matthias}},
  title        = {{{COVID-19 Reporting and Willingness to Pay for Leisure Activities}}},
  volume       = {{83}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{41184,
  author       = {{Ortmann, Regina and Simons, Dirk and Voeller, Dennis}},
  title        = {{{Real effects of an international tax reform for MNEs}}},
  volume       = {{64}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{36077,
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Müller, Jens and Wittek, Katharina and Weinrich, Arndt}},
  journal      = {{iStR}},
  title        = {{{Eine ökonomische Einordnung des öffentlichen Country-by-Country Reporting in der EU}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{45855,
  author       = {{Asenkerschbaumer, Stefan and Buhl, Hans-Ulrich and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Weißenberger, Barbara E.}},
  booktitle    = {{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}},
  number       = {{101}},
  pages        = {{20}},
  title        = {{{Georg Giersberg: die Stimme für die BWL}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{21401,
  author       = {{Bornemann, Tobias and Schipp, Adrian and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Deutsches Steuerrecht}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{182--190}},
  title        = {{{Was treibt die Komplexität der Ertragsbesteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen? – Ergebnisse einer Befragung in der deutschen Finanzverwaltung}}},
  volume       = {{59}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{46051,
  author       = {{Asenkerschbaumer, Stefan and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{1--2}},
  title        = {{{Editorial: Schmalenbach IMPULSE: Will etwas in Bewegung setzen}}},
  volume       = {{1}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{46049,
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel}},
  journal      = {{Junior Management Science}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{100--148}},
  title        = {{{Der Einfluss der Besteuerung auf Managementanreize und die Nutzung von Bonusbanken}}},
  volume       = {{6}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{23400,
  abstract     = {{Die Diskussion über die adäquate Besteuerung von „Reichen“ bzw. „Superreichen“ hat durch die Schulden, die im Zusammenhang mit der Coronakrise zu finanzieren sind, neuen Schwung bekommen. Als ein Instrument der adäquaten „Reichenbesteuerung“ gilt eine jährliche Vermögensteuer. Den fiskalischen und verteilungspolitischen Argumenten zugunsten einer Vermögensbesteuerung stehen negative ökonomische Wirkungen entgegen. In diesem Beitrag soll zur Versachlichung der Debatte ein genauerer Blick auf die zu erwartenden Belastungswirkungen einer Vermögensteuer geworfen werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die (Wieder-)Einführung der Vermögensteuer nicht nur ungelöste Probleme der Bewertung von Sachvermögen mit sich bringt, sondern die Steuerbelastungswirkungen in der jetzigen Niedrigzinsphase zu erheblichen Nebenwirkungen führen. Berücksichtigt man eine Inflationsrate von 2 %, liegt die zur unternehmerischen Realkapitalerhaltung erforderliche Mindestrendite vor Steuern selbst bei einer lediglich 1 %igen Vermögensteuer mit 5,63 % weit über der Inflationsrate. Dies verdeutlicht, dass eine Vermögensteuer in Zeiten niedriger Renditen für Unternehmen eine zukunftssichernde Eigenkapitalerhaltung oder gar -bildung und zugleich wichtige Investitionen erheblich erschwert. Dies gilt auch für private Anlagen in Aktien und Immobilien. Darüber hinaus ist die Vermögensteuer auch in Verlustperioden zu bezahlen, so dass diese Steuer krisenverschärfend wirkt. Auch dies dürfte erhebliche negative Investitionswirkungen nach sich ziehen. Zudem ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Vermögensteuer zumindest in Teilen überwälzt wird, so dass letztlich auch Verbraucher, Arbeitnehmer und Mieter diese tragen werden. Diese und weitere Nebenwirkungen einer Vermögensteuer kommen in der Vermögensteuerdebatte oftmals zu kurz.}},
  author       = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Steuer und Wirtschaft}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{201--216}},
  title        = {{{Wiedereinführung der Vermögensteuer – eine ökonomische Analyse}}},
  volume       = {{98}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{65864,
  author       = {{Gassen, Joachim and Kosi, Urska}},
  booktitle    = {{Bankruptcies: A victim of the corona crisis?}},
  title        = {{{Bankruptcies: A victim of the corona crisis? TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency.}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{19895,
  author       = {{Steiger, Sören and Pelster, Matthias}},
  issn         = {{0167-2681}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{503--522}},
  title        = {{{Social interactions and asset pricing bubbles}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.020}},
  volume       = {{179}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{21403,
  abstract     = {{Es werden die Anwendungsvoraussetzungen des § 6a GrEStG unter Berücksichtigung der jüngsten BFH-Rspr. dargestellt und ein tabellarischer Überblick über die einzelnen Entscheidungen gegeben. Ausgehend von den Urteilsfällen wird auf die grunderwerbsteuerliche Behandlung von verschiedenen Umwandlungen eingegangen. In einem Ausblick wird der Bezug zum aktuellen Gesetzgebungsverfahren zur Reform der GrESt hergestellt.}},
  author       = {{Binder, Sebastian and Lorenz, Johannes}},
  journal      = {{Der Konzern}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{98--104}},
  title        = {{{Update zur grunderwerbsteuerlichen Konzernklausel vor dem Hintergrund der jüngsten BFH-Rechtsprechung}}},
  volume       = {{18}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21406,
  abstract     = {{Previous accounting research shows that taxes affect decision making by individuals and firms. Most studies assume that agents have an accurate perception regarding their tax burden. However, there is a growing body of literature analyzing whether taxes are indeed perceived correctly. We review 127 studies on the measurement of tax misperception and its behavioral implications. The review reveals that many taxpayers have substantial tax misperceptions that lead to biased decision making. We develop a Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model on the impact of provided tax information on tax perception. Besides individual traits, characteristics of the tax information and the decision environment determine the extent of tax misperception. We discuss opportunities for future research and methodological limitations. While there is much evidence on tax misperception at the individual level, we hardly find any research at the firm level. Little is known about the real effects of managers’ tax misperception and on how tax information is strategically managed to impact stakeholders. This research gap is surprising as a large part of the accounting literature analyzes decision making and disclosure of firms. We recommend a mixed-method approach combining experiments, surveys, and archival data analyses to improve the knowledge on tax misperception and its consequences.}},
  author       = {{Blaufus, Kay and Chirvi, Malte and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Tax Misperception and Its Effects on Decision Making - a Literature Review}}},
  volume       = {{No. 39}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inbook{21408,
  abstract     = {{This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members, the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases. We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered inherently honest.}},
  author       = {{Diller, Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}},
  booktitle    = {{ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}},
  editor       = {{Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher, Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, Jörn}},
  isbn         = {{978-3-030-48439-2}},
  pages        = {{633--639}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{Tax Avoidance and Social Control}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21410,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the impact of trust on bargaining behavior between auditor and auditee in a tax setting. We study the effect of interpersonal trust and trust in government on both taxpayer and tax auditor. In an experiment with variation in pairwise trust settings, we find evidence that both kinds of trust affect the bargaining behavior, albeit in different ways. While trust in government increases taxpayers’ tax offers, interpersonal trust may lead to more concessionary behavior of tax auditors moderated by trust in government. Our findings help tax authorities to shape programs to enhance compliance in an atmosphere of trust.}},
  author       = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Speitmann, Raffael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{How Does Trust Affect Concessionary Behavior in Tax Bargaining?}}},
  volume       = {{No. 41}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21411,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms’ financial statements as a distinct disclosure choice. Applying a game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure strategies of firms to a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders “favourable conditions”, for example in terms of higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, decreasing). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm-years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms do not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.}},
  author       = {{Flagmeier, Vanessa and Müller, Jens and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{When Do Firms Highlight Their Effective Tax Rate?}}},
  volume       = {{No. 37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{21412,
  author       = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Deutsches Steuerrecht}},
  number       = {{42}},
  pages        = {{2327--2334}},
  title        = {{{Steuerliche Maßnahmen als nützliches Mittel zur Bewältigung der Corona-Krise? - Ergebnisse einer Unternehmensbefragung}}},
  volume       = {{58}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21414,
  author       = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Umfrage: Steuerliche Verwaltungskosten, steuerliche Corona-Soforthilfemaßnahmen und Investitionen in der Krise}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/RUHF6645}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

