@techreport{21414,
  author       = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Umfrage: Steuerliche Verwaltungskosten, steuerliche Corona-Soforthilfemaßnahmen und Investitionen in der Krise}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/RUHF6645}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{21415,
  abstract     = {{This article comprehensively reviews Australia’s corporate income tax complexity as faced by multinational corporations (MNCs) and compares it to the average of the remaining OECD countries. Building on unique survey data, I find that the Australian tax code is considerably more complex than the OECD average, which is mainly due to overly complex anti-avoidance legislation, such as regulations on transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance or controlled foreign corporations (CFC). In contrast, Australia’s tax framework, which covers processes and features such as tax law enactment or tax audits, is close to the OECD average. A more detailed analysis yields further interesting insights. For example, excessive details in the tax code and the time between the announcement of a tax law change and its enactment turn out to be serious issues in Australia relative to the remaining OECD countries. }},
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas}},
  journal      = {{Australian Tax Forum}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{451--475}},
  title        = {{{Tax Complexity in Australia – a Survey-Based Comparison to the OECD Average}}},
  volume       = {{35}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21416,
  abstract     = {{This article comprehensively reviews Australia’s corporate income tax complexity as faced by multinational corporations (MNCs) and compares it to the average of the remaining OECD countries. Building on unique survey data, I find that the Australian tax code is considerably more complex than the OECD average, which is mainly due to overly complex anti-avoidance legislation, such as regulations on transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance or controlled foreign corporations (CFC). In contrast, Australia’s tax framework, which covers processes and features such as tax law enactment or tax audits, is close to the OECD average. A more granular analysis yields further interesting insights. For example, excessive details in the tax code and the time between the announcement of a tax law change and its enactment turn out to be serious issues in Australia relative to the remaining OECD countries.}},
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas}},
  title        = {{{Tax Complexity in Australia - A Survey-Based Comparison to the OECD Average}}},
  volume       = {{No. 14}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21417,
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Schipp, Adrian and Siegel, Felix and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{2018 Global MNC Tax Complexity Survey}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/RPVO1003}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21418,
  abstract     = {{This paper introduces an index that comprehensively measures the complexity of countries’ corporate income tax systems faced by multinational corporations. It builds on surveys of highly experienced tax consultants of the largest international tax services networks. The index, called the Tax Complexity Index (TCI), is composed of a tax code subindex covering tax regulations and a tax framework subindex covering tax processes and features. For a sample of 100 countries, we find that tax complexity varies considerably across countries, and tax code and framework complexity also vary within countries. Among others, tax complexity is strongly driven by the complexity of transfer pricing regulations in the tax code and tax audits in the tax framework. When analyzing the associations with other country characteristics, we identify different patterns. For example, with regard to GDP, we find a positive association with tax code complexity and a negative association with tax framework complexity, suggesting that highly economically developed countries tend to have more complex tax codes and less complex frameworks. Overall, our tax complexity measures can serve as valuable proxies in future research and supportive tools for a variety of firm decisions and national and international tax policy discussions.}},
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Measuring Tax Complexity Across Countries: A Survey Study on MNCs}}},
  volume       = {{No. 5}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21419,
  abstract     = {{This paper analyzes the association between tax complexity and foreign direct investments (FDI) based on the newly developed Tax Complexity Index (TCI) and its components. For a sample of 15,607 new foreign subsidiaries, we find no association between total tax complexity, as proxied by the TCI, and the location probability. When we decompose the TCI into tax code complexity and tax framework complexity, we find opposing associations. Tax code complexity is positively related to the location probability, while tax framework complexity is negatively related to it. These associations are, for example, driven by the complexity of transfer pricing and loss offset regulations in the tax code and the dimensions guidance, audits, as well as filing and payments, in the tax framework. In additional analyses, we find that the associations are sensitive to certain characteristics, such as country-specific and firm-specific characteristics. For example, the positive tax code association diminishes when tax rates are high. Overall, we are the first to provide empirical evidence on potential cost-benefit tradeoffs of tax complexity for FDI and thereby enhance prior literature, which has primarily focused on the costs of tax complexity.}},
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Voget, Johannes}},
  title        = {{{The Relation between Tax Complexity and Foreign Direct Investments: Evidence Across Countries}}},
  volume       = {{No. 13}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{21422,
  author       = {{Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{AWV-Informationen}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{16--19}},
  title        = {{{Steuerkomplexität als Standortfaktor. So komplex ist das Steuersystem in Deutschland}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{21539,
  author       = {{Ortmann, Regina and Pelster, Matthias and Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}},
  issn         = {{1544-6123}},
  journal      = {{Finance Research Letters}},
  title        = {{{COVID-19 and investor behavior}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.frl.2020.101717}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{17703,
  abstract     = {{Employing a unique sample of 2,849 tariff imposition announcements by and against the United States (U.S.) over the period from 2018 to 2019, this study analyzes the impact of recent tariff announcements on share prices from 859 U.S. companies. We provide evidence for negative (cumulative) average abnormal stock returns due to tariff announcements during a symmetric three-day event window. We suggest that stock market investors expect adverse impacts of tariff impositions, e.g. a decrease in the companies' future cash flows and a threat of retaliation. The negative wealth effects are observed irrespective of whether the Trump administration announces safeguard tariffs to protect domestic firms or a retaliation is declared by foreign countries. Moreover, building several subsamples, we find that the adverse impact is mostly driven by announcements involving China and is associated with a variety of sector, tariff, trade and firm characteristics.}},
  author       = {{Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}},
  keywords     = {{event study, international relations, protectionism, strategic trade policy, tariffs, trade conflict}},
  pages        = {{63}},
  title        = {{{Share price reactions to tariff imposition announcements in the Trump era - An event study of the trade conflict}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17730,
  author       = {{Ortmann, Regina and Pelster, Matthias and Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}},
  issn         = {{1544-6123}},
  journal      = {{Finance Research Letters}},
  title        = {{{COVID-19 and investor behavior}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.frl.2020.101717}},
  volume       = {{37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{19043,
  author       = {{Hasso, Tim and Pelster, Matthias and Breitmayer, Bastian}},
  issn         = {{2214-6350}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance}},
  title        = {{{Terror attacks and individual investor behavior: Evidence from the 2015–2017 European terror attacks}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100397}},
  volume       = {{28}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{20873,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Keienburg, Georg and Degen, Dominik and Söllner, Tobias and Kashyrkin, Anton}},
  publisher    = {{The Boston Consulting Group, Inc., M&A Report}},
  title        = {{{Alternative Deals Gain Traction}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{20874,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Degen, Dominik and Kim, Daniel and Kengelbach, Jens}},
  journal      = {{M&A Review}},
  pages        = {{266--271}},
  title        = {{{Downturn M&A: Die Erfolgsstrategie der Stunde?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16486,
  abstract     = {{After the introduction of CbCR – pursuant to the BEPS Project (Action 13) in 2015 –, which was established to reduce the information asymmetry between MNEs and tax authorities of the countries they operate in, now public CbCR – as suggested by the EU Commission in 2016 – is discussed as a next step. Here, the objective is to overcome information asymmetries between MNEs and the general public of the countries they operate in. Starting from the assumption that regulators care about the legitimacy of tax laws, this article evaluates pros and cons of public CbCR. The authors find that from the perspective of information asymmetries, public CbCR increases tax transparency only marginally at best. Accordingly, it is concluded that democracies that are based on the rule of law seem to rely on pillories in terms of public CbCR to enforce fair tax payments.}},
  author       = {{Lagarden, Martin and Schreiber, Ulrich and Simons, Dirk and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{International Transfer Pricing Journal}},
  number       = {{2}},
  title        = {{{Country-by-Country Reporting Goes Public - Cui Bono?}}},
  volume       = {{27}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17051,
  author       = {{Liêu, Minh-Lý and Pelster, Matthias}},
  issn         = {{2352-3409}},
  journal      = {{Data in Brief}},
  title        = {{{The disposition effect in a scopic regime: Data from a laboratory experiment}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.dib.2020.105680}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{15306,
  author       = {{Pelster, Matthias}},
  issn         = {{0165-1765}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  title        = {{{The gambler’s and hot-hand fallacies: Empirical evidence from trading data}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108887}},
  volume       = {{187}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{15744,
  author       = {{Liêu, Minh Ly and Pelster, Matthias}},
  issn         = {{1062-9769}},
  journal      = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}},
  pages        = {{175--185}},
  title        = {{{Framing and the disposition effect in a scopic regime}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.qref.2020.01.008}},
  volume       = {{78}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{35089,
  author       = {{Ebert, Michael and Kadane, Joseph (Jay) B. and Simons, Dirk and Stecher, Jack Douglas}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  title        = {{{Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3564451}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{47919,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual‐based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non‐SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non‐PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non‐PCEs.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Wang, Zhi and Braam, Geert and Reimsbach, Daniel and Wang, Jiaxin}},
  issn         = {{0810-5391}},
  journal      = {{Accounting &amp; Finance}},
  keywords     = {{Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous), Finance, Accounting}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{4723--4755}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/acfi.12690}},
  volume       = {{60}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{47918,
  author       = {{Hahn, Rüdiger and Reimsbach, Daniel}},
  issn         = {{2168-1007}},
  journal      = {{Academy of Management Discoveries}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{155--157}},
  publisher    = {{Academy of Management}},
  title        = {{{Bringing Signaling Theory to Intermediated Voluntary Disclosure. Commentary on “Detecting False Accounts in Intermediated Voluntary Disclosure” by Patrick Callery and Jessica Perkins}}},
  doi          = {{10.5465/amd.2020.0015}},
  volume       = {{7}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

