@article{46051, author = {{Asenkerschbaumer, Stefan and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1--2}}, title = {{{Editorial: Schmalenbach IMPULSE: Will etwas in Bewegung setzen}}}, volume = {{1}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{46049, author = {{Dyck, Daniel}}, journal = {{Junior Management Science}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{100--148}}, title = {{{Der Einfluss der Besteuerung auf Managementanreize und die Nutzung von Bonusbanken}}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{23400, abstract = {{Die Diskussion über die adäquate Besteuerung von „Reichen“ bzw. „Superreichen“ hat durch die Schulden, die im Zusammenhang mit der Coronakrise zu finanzieren sind, neuen Schwung bekommen. Als ein Instrument der adäquaten „Reichenbesteuerung“ gilt eine jährliche Vermögensteuer. Den fiskalischen und verteilungspolitischen Argumenten zugunsten einer Vermögensbesteuerung stehen negative ökonomische Wirkungen entgegen. In diesem Beitrag soll zur Versachlichung der Debatte ein genauerer Blick auf die zu erwartenden Belastungswirkungen einer Vermögensteuer geworfen werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die (Wieder-)Einführung der Vermögensteuer nicht nur ungelöste Probleme der Bewertung von Sachvermögen mit sich bringt, sondern die Steuerbelastungswirkungen in der jetzigen Niedrigzinsphase zu erheblichen Nebenwirkungen führen. Berücksichtigt man eine Inflationsrate von 2 %, liegt die zur unternehmerischen Realkapitalerhaltung erforderliche Mindestrendite vor Steuern selbst bei einer lediglich 1 %igen Vermögensteuer mit 5,63 % weit über der Inflationsrate. Dies verdeutlicht, dass eine Vermögensteuer in Zeiten niedriger Renditen für Unternehmen eine zukunftssichernde Eigenkapitalerhaltung oder gar -bildung und zugleich wichtige Investitionen erheblich erschwert. Dies gilt auch für private Anlagen in Aktien und Immobilien. Darüber hinaus ist die Vermögensteuer auch in Verlustperioden zu bezahlen, so dass diese Steuer krisenverschärfend wirkt. Auch dies dürfte erhebliche negative Investitionswirkungen nach sich ziehen. Zudem ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Vermögensteuer zumindest in Teilen überwälzt wird, so dass letztlich auch Verbraucher, Arbeitnehmer und Mieter diese tragen werden. Diese und weitere Nebenwirkungen einer Vermögensteuer kommen in der Vermögensteuerdebatte oftmals zu kurz.}}, author = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Steuer und Wirtschaft}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{201--216}}, title = {{{Wiedereinführung der Vermögensteuer – eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{21403, abstract = {{Es werden die Anwendungsvoraussetzungen des § 6a GrEStG unter Berücksichtigung der jüngsten BFH-Rspr. dargestellt und ein tabellarischer Überblick über die einzelnen Entscheidungen gegeben. Ausgehend von den Urteilsfällen wird auf die grunderwerbsteuerliche Behandlung von verschiedenen Umwandlungen eingegangen. In einem Ausblick wird der Bezug zum aktuellen Gesetzgebungsverfahren zur Reform der GrESt hergestellt.}}, author = {{Binder, Sebastian and Lorenz, Johannes}}, journal = {{Der Konzern}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{98--104}}, title = {{{Update zur grunderwerbsteuerlichen Konzernklausel vor dem Hintergrund der jüngsten BFH-Rechtsprechung}}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21406, abstract = {{Previous accounting research shows that taxes affect decision making by individuals and firms. Most studies assume that agents have an accurate perception regarding their tax burden. However, there is a growing body of literature analyzing whether taxes are indeed perceived correctly. We review 127 studies on the measurement of tax misperception and its behavioral implications. The review reveals that many taxpayers have substantial tax misperceptions that lead to biased decision making. We develop a Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model on the impact of provided tax information on tax perception. Besides individual traits, characteristics of the tax information and the decision environment determine the extent of tax misperception. We discuss opportunities for future research and methodological limitations. While there is much evidence on tax misperception at the individual level, we hardly find any research at the firm level. Little is known about the real effects of managers’ tax misperception and on how tax information is strategically managed to impact stakeholders. This research gap is surprising as a large part of the accounting literature analyzes decision making and disclosure of firms. We recommend a mixed-method approach combining experiments, surveys, and archival data analyses to improve the knowledge on tax misperception and its consequences.}}, author = {{Blaufus, Kay and Chirvi, Malte and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Tax Misperception and Its Effects on Decision Making - a Literature Review}}}, volume = {{No. 39}}, year = {{2020}}, } @inbook{21408, abstract = {{This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members, the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases. We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered inherently honest.}}, author = {{Diller, Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}}, booktitle = {{ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}}, editor = {{Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher, Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, Jörn}}, isbn = {{978-3-030-48439-2}}, pages = {{633--639}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Tax Avoidance and Social Control}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21410, abstract = {{We analyze the impact of trust on bargaining behavior between auditor and auditee in a tax setting. We study the effect of interpersonal trust and trust in government on both taxpayer and tax auditor. In an experiment with variation in pairwise trust settings, we find evidence that both kinds of trust affect the bargaining behavior, albeit in different ways. While trust in government increases taxpayers’ tax offers, interpersonal trust may lead to more concessionary behavior of tax auditors moderated by trust in government. Our findings help tax authorities to shape programs to enhance compliance in an atmosphere of trust.}}, author = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Speitmann, Raffael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{How Does Trust Affect Concessionary Behavior in Tax Bargaining?}}}, volume = {{No. 41}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21411, abstract = {{This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms’ financial statements as a distinct disclosure choice. Applying a game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure strategies of firms to a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders “favourable conditions”, for example in terms of higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, decreasing). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm-years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms do not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.}}, author = {{Flagmeier, Vanessa and Müller, Jens and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{When Do Firms Highlight Their Effective Tax Rate?}}}, volume = {{No. 37}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{21412, author = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Deutsches Steuerrecht}}, number = {{42}}, pages = {{2327--2334}}, title = {{{Steuerliche Maßnahmen als nützliches Mittel zur Bewältigung der Corona-Krise? - Ergebnisse einer Unternehmensbefragung}}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21414, author = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Umfrage: Steuerliche Verwaltungskosten, steuerliche Corona-Soforthilfemaßnahmen und Investitionen in der Krise}}}, doi = {{10.52569/RUHF6645}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21416, abstract = {{This article comprehensively reviews Australia’s corporate income tax complexity as faced by multinational corporations (MNCs) and compares it to the average of the remaining OECD countries. Building on unique survey data, I find that the Australian tax code is considerably more complex than the OECD average, which is mainly due to overly complex anti-avoidance legislation, such as regulations on transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance or controlled foreign corporations (CFC). In contrast, Australia’s tax framework, which covers processes and features such as tax law enactment or tax audits, is close to the OECD average. A more granular analysis yields further interesting insights. For example, excessive details in the tax code and the time between the announcement of a tax law change and its enactment turn out to be serious issues in Australia relative to the remaining OECD countries.}}, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas}}, title = {{{Tax Complexity in Australia - A Survey-Based Comparison to the OECD Average}}}, volume = {{No. 14}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21417, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Schipp, Adrian and Siegel, Felix and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{2018 Global MNC Tax Complexity Survey}}}, doi = {{10.52569/RPVO1003}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21418, abstract = {{This paper introduces an index that comprehensively measures the complexity of countries’ corporate income tax systems faced by multinational corporations. It builds on surveys of highly experienced tax consultants of the largest international tax services networks. The index, called the Tax Complexity Index (TCI), is composed of a tax code subindex covering tax regulations and a tax framework subindex covering tax processes and features. For a sample of 100 countries, we find that tax complexity varies considerably across countries, and tax code and framework complexity also vary within countries. Among others, tax complexity is strongly driven by the complexity of transfer pricing regulations in the tax code and tax audits in the tax framework. When analyzing the associations with other country characteristics, we identify different patterns. For example, with regard to GDP, we find a positive association with tax code complexity and a negative association with tax framework complexity, suggesting that highly economically developed countries tend to have more complex tax codes and less complex frameworks. Overall, our tax complexity measures can serve as valuable proxies in future research and supportive tools for a variety of firm decisions and national and international tax policy discussions.}}, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Measuring Tax Complexity Across Countries: A Survey Study on MNCs}}}, volume = {{No. 5}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21419, abstract = {{This paper analyzes the association between tax complexity and foreign direct investments (FDI) based on the newly developed Tax Complexity Index (TCI) and its components. For a sample of 15,607 new foreign subsidiaries, we find no association between total tax complexity, as proxied by the TCI, and the location probability. When we decompose the TCI into tax code complexity and tax framework complexity, we find opposing associations. Tax code complexity is positively related to the location probability, while tax framework complexity is negatively related to it. These associations are, for example, driven by the complexity of transfer pricing and loss offset regulations in the tax code and the dimensions guidance, audits, as well as filing and payments, in the tax framework. In additional analyses, we find that the associations are sensitive to certain characteristics, such as country-specific and firm-specific characteristics. For example, the positive tax code association diminishes when tax rates are high. Overall, we are the first to provide empirical evidence on potential cost-benefit tradeoffs of tax complexity for FDI and thereby enhance prior literature, which has primarily focused on the costs of tax complexity.}}, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Voget, Johannes}}, title = {{{The Relation between Tax Complexity and Foreign Direct Investments: Evidence Across Countries}}}, volume = {{No. 13}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{21422, author = {{Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{AWV-Informationen}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{16--19}}, title = {{{Steuerkomplexität als Standortfaktor. So komplex ist das Steuersystem in Deutschland}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{21539, author = {{Ortmann, Regina and Pelster, Matthias and Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}}, issn = {{1544-6123}}, journal = {{Finance Research Letters}}, title = {{{COVID-19 and investor behavior}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.frl.2020.101717}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{49266, author = {{Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, publisher = {{TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency}}, title = {{{Tax Administrative Burden, Tax Relief and Investment during the Corona Crisis}}}, doi = {{10.52569/DQPH9785}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{14901, abstract = {{This study investigates whether country risk factors, including political and fiscal budget risk, attenuate the effectiveness of tax policy tools that aim to encourage corporate risk-taking. Exploiting a cross-country panel, we predict and find that the effectiveness of loss offset rules and tax rate changes is fully attenuated for firms located in high-risk countries. We document the attenuating effect of country risk is more pronounced in high-tax countries or when countries increase their corporate tax rate. Additional tests around the U.S. federal budget crises from 2011 to 2013 indicate that temporarily heightened fiscal budget risk attenuates the effectiveness of loss offset rules even in countries with low political risk. We identify conditions (low political and low fiscal budget risk) under which targeted tax policy tools effectively stimulate risk-taking. This suggests that ensuring taxpayers receive tax refunds is important in times of economic crises with budgetary or political challenges. }}, author = {{Osswald, Benjamin and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, publisher = {{TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 28}}, title = {{{Do Country Risk Factors Attenuate the Effect of Tax Loss Incentives on Corporate Risk-Taking?}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.3297418}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{21407, author = {{Bornemann, Tobias and Schipp, Adrian and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{ 2018/2019 Umfrage zur Steuerkomplexität in deutschen Finanzverwaltungen}}}, doi = {{10.52569/ILCP9945}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16486, abstract = {{After the introduction of CbCR – pursuant to the BEPS Project (Action 13) in 2015 –, which was established to reduce the information asymmetry between MNEs and tax authorities of the countries they operate in, now public CbCR – as suggested by the EU Commission in 2016 – is discussed as a next step. Here, the objective is to overcome information asymmetries between MNEs and the general public of the countries they operate in. Starting from the assumption that regulators care about the legitimacy of tax laws, this article evaluates pros and cons of public CbCR. The authors find that from the perspective of information asymmetries, public CbCR increases tax transparency only marginally at best. Accordingly, it is concluded that democracies that are based on the rule of law seem to rely on pillories in terms of public CbCR to enforce fair tax payments.}}, author = {{Lagarden, Martin and Schreiber, Ulrich and Simons, Dirk and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{International Transfer Pricing Journal}}, number = {{2}}, title = {{{Country-by-Country Reporting Goes Public - Cui Bono?}}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2020}}, }