@inproceedings{30939, author = {{Vorbohle, Christian and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 30th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}}, location = {{Timișoara, Romania}}, title = {{{Overcoming Silos: A Review of Business Model Modeling Languages for Business Ecosystems}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @inproceedings{30734, author = {{Althaus, Maike and Poniatowski, Martin and Kundisch, Dennis}}, location = {{Madrid, Spain}}, title = {{{Tackling Crises Together? - An Econometric Analysis of Charitable Crowdfunding During the COVID-19 Pandemic}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @inproceedings{30212, author = {{Vorbohle, Christian and Kundisch, Dennis}}, title = {{{Key Properties of Sustainable Business Ecosystem Relationships}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @inproceedings{28999, author = {{Grieger, Nicole and Seutter, Janina and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{Tagungsband der 17. Internationalen Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik 2022}}, location = {{Nürnberg, Germany}}, title = {{{Rollercoaster of Emotions – A Semantic Analysis of Fundraising Campaigns over the Course of the Covid-19 Pandemic}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{32106, abstract = {{We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}}, keywords = {{Asymmetric bargaining power, Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution}}, pages = {{17}}, title = {{{Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}}}, volume = {{148}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{31881, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, journal = {{International Journal of Game Theory}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{34283, author = {{Gutt, Jana Kim and Thommes, Kirsten}}, issn = {{0065-0668}}, journal = {{Academy of Management Proceedings}}, keywords = {{Microbiology}}, number = {{1}}, publisher = {{Academy of Management}}, title = {{{Speaking of Performance: Evaluating Team Members’ Performance with Open-Ended Audio Comments}}}, doi = {{10.5465/ambpp.2022.16394abstract}}, volume = {{2022}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33250, author = {{Szopinski, Daniel and Massa, Lorenzo and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Tucci, Christopher}}, journal = {{Communications of the Association for Information Systems}}, pages = {{774--841}}, title = {{{Modeling Business Models: A cross-disciplinary Analysis of Business Model Modeling Languages and Directions for Future Research}}}, volume = {{51}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{13147, abstract = {{Employing a unique and hand-collected sample of 648 true sale loan securitization transactions issued by 57 stock-listed banks across the EU-12 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2010, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between true sale loan securitization and the issuing banks’ non-performing loans to total assets ratios. Overall, we provide evidence for a negative impact of securitization on NPL exposures suggesting that banks predominantly used securitization as an instrument of credit risk transfer and diversification. In addition, the analysis at hand reveals a time-sensitive relationship between securitization and NPL exposures. While we observe an even stronger NPL-reducing effect through securitization during the non-crisis periods, the effect reverses during and after the global financial crisis suggesting that banks were forced to provide credit enhancement and employ securitization as a funding management tool. Along with the results from a variety of sensitivity analyses our study provides important implications for the recent debate on reducing NPL exposures of European banks by revitalizing the European securitization market.}}, author = {{Wengerek, Sascha Tobias and Hippert, Benjamin and Uhde, André}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, keywords = {{European Banking, Non-performing Loans, Securitization}}, pages = {{48--64}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Risk allocation through securitization – Evidence from non-performing loans}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2022.06.005}}, volume = {{Vol. 86 (11)}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{21571, abstract = {{The paper investigates the impact of individual attention on investor risk-taking. We analyze a large sample of trading records from a brokerage service that allows its customers to trade contracts-for-differences (CFD), and sends standardized push messages on recent stock performance to its client investors. The advantage of this sample is that it allows us to isolate the "push" messages as individual attention triggers, which we can directly link to the same individuals' risk-taking. A particular advantage of CFD trading is that it allows investors to make use of leverage, which provides us a pure measure of investors' willingness to take risks that is independent of the decision to purchase a particular stock. Leverage is a major catalyst of speculative trading, as it increases the scope of extreme returns, and enables investors to take larger positions than what they can afford with their own capital. We show that investors execute attention-driven trades with higher leverage, compared to their other trades, as well as those of other investors who are not alerted by attention triggers.}}, author = {{Arnold, Marc and Pelster, Matthias and Subrahmanyam, Marti G.}}, journal = {{Journal of Financial Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{ 846--875}}, title = {{{Attention triggers and investors' risk-taking}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.031}}, volume = {{143}}, year = {{2022}}, }