@misc{42278,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42307,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42308,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42301,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42299,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42304,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42298,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42306,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42300,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42302,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42292,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42294,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{35953,
  author       = {{Schwabl, Franziska and Janssen, Elmar A. and Sloane, Peter F. E.}},
  issn         = {{0172-2875}},
  journal      = {{Zeitschrift für Berufs- und Wirtschaftspädagogik}},
  keywords     = {{Applied Mathematics, General Mathematics}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{138--152}},
  publisher    = {{Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft mbH}},
  title        = {{{Sprachsensible Formulierung von Erhebungsinstrumenten}}},
  doi          = {{10.25162/zbw-2020-0005}},
  volume       = {{116}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{46541,
  abstract     = {{Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.}},
  author       = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  keywords     = {{prudence, risk preferences, prevention, vaccination, screening}},
  publisher    = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}},
  title        = {{{Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}}},
  volume       = {{863}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inproceedings{46689,
  author       = {{Garnefeld, I. and Krah, T. and Böhm, Eva and Gremler, D. D.}},
  booktitle    = {{2020 AMA Winter Academic Conference, San Diego, CA}},
  location     = {{San Diego, CA}},
  title        = {{{Do product testing programs lead to more favorable online reviews? (ausgezeichnet mit Best Paper Award)}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inproceedings{46690,
  author       = {{Eggert, A. and Böhm, Eva and Akalan, R. and Gebauer, H.}},
  booktitle    = {{2020 AMA Winter Academic Conference, San Diego, CA}},
  location     = {{San Diego, CA}},
  title        = {{{Manufacturers’ service growth through mergers and acquisitions – An event study}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{46636,
  author       = {{Böhm, Eva and Eggert, Andreas and Terho, Harri and Ulaga, Wolfgang and Haas, Alexander}},
  issn         = {{0885-3134}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management}},
  keywords     = {{Management of Technology and Innovation, Human Factors and Ergonomics}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{180--197}},
  publisher    = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  title        = {{{Drivers and outcomes of salespersons’ value opportunity recognition competence in solution selling}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/08853134.2020.1778484}},
  volume       = {{40}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{56295,
  abstract     = {{<jats:p>Using rich linked employer–employee data for (West) Germany between 1996 and 2014, we conduct a decomposition analysis based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions to analyze the relative contributions of various plant and worker characteristics to the rise in German wage dispersion. Moreover, we separately investigate the sources of between‐plant and within‐plant wage dispersion. We find that industry effects and the collective bargaining regime contribute the most to rising wage inequality. In the case of collective bargaining, both the decline in collective bargaining coverage and the increase in wage dispersion among the group of covered plants have played important roles.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Baumgarten, Daniel and Felbermayr, Gabriel and Lehwald, Sybille}},
  issn         = {{0019-8676}},
  journal      = {{Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{85--122}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Dissecting between-plant and within-plant wage inequality – Evidence from Germany}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/irel.12249}},
  volume       = {{59}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{56294,
  author       = {{Baumgarten, Daniel and Irlacher, Michael and Koch, Michael}},
  issn         = {{0014-2921}},
  journal      = {{European Economic Review}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Offshoring and non-monotonic employment effects across industries in general equilibrium}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103583}},
  volume       = {{130}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{49467,
  author       = {{Trang, Simon Thanh-Nam and Trenz, M. and Weiger, W. and Tarafdar, M. and Cheung, C.}},
  journal      = {{European Journal of Information Systems (VHB Jourqual 3 A)}},
  pages        = {{415--428}},
  title        = {{{One app to trace them all? Examining app specifications for mass acceptance of contact-tracing apps}}},
  volume       = {{29}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}