@inbook{21426, abstract = {{This chapter examines the drivers of corporate income tax complexity for multinational corporations in South Africa. Based on unique data from a global survey of tax consultants which was conducted in 2016 by Hoppe et al, novel insights can be provided into the complexity of the South African tax system. The data enable a comparison of South Africa with the global mean of tax complexity, as well as with its major trade and investment partners. It is further possible to distinguish between different areas of tax complexity, ie, tax code complexity (complexity inherent in the different regulations of the tax code) and tax framework complexity (complexity that arises from the features and processes of a tax system). Frequent changes in tax regulations, ambiguity and interpretation, as well as record-keeping, are found to be the most important complexity drivers in the tax code of South Africa. The analysis further highlights that anti-avoidance provisions, such as transfer pricing and controlled foreign corporation rules, are perceived as most complex. With respect to tax framework complexity, the poor disclosure of audit selection criteria, the lack of experience or technical skills of tax officers in the audit process and problems associated with tax refunds appear to be serious concerns. Even though South Africa’s overall tax system complexity does not seem to differ very much from other related countries, a closer look into the details reveals a number of future challenges.}}, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Safaei, Reyhaneh and Singleton, Amanda and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, booktitle = {{Tax Simplification - An African Perspective}}, editor = {{Evans, Chris and Franzsen, Riël and Stack, Elizabeth}}, isbn = {{978-1-920538-96-5}}, pages = {{267--293}}, publisher = {{Pretoria University Law Press}}, title = {{{Tax Complexity for Multinational Corporations in South Africa - Evidence from a Global Survey}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{20875, author = {{Sievers, Sönke and Kengelbach, Jens and Keienburg, Georg and Bader, Maximilian and Degen, Dominik and Gell, Jeff and Nielsen, Jesper}}, publisher = {{The Boston Consulting Group, Inc., M&A Report}}, title = {{{Downturns Are a Better Time For Deal Hunting}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{8954, author = {{Kliensieck, Katrin and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{11th Biennial Procrastination Research Conference}}, location = {{Sheffield, United Kingdom}}, title = {{{Applied procrastination research: Tackling procrastination by gamification}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{9261, author = {{Szopinski, Daniel}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 32nd Bled eConference}}, location = {{Bled, Slovenia}}, title = {{{Jumping, dumping, and pumping: Three mental principles for idea generation to activate software-based tools in business model innovation}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{9263, author = {{Szopinski, Daniel and Schoormann, T. and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 27th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}}, location = {{Stockholm, Sweden}}, title = {{{Because your taxonomy is worth it: Towards a framework for taxonomy evaluation}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{9267, author = {{Kremer, H.-Hugo and Rüsing, Peter}}, journal = {{berufsbildung Zeitschrift für Theorie-Praxis-Dialog}}, pages = {{17 -- 19}}, publisher = {{Eusl}}, title = {{{Digitale Transformation – Rezeption aus Sicht der Akteure in der Fachschule am Berufskolleg}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{5674, abstract = {{In disaster operations management, a challenging task for rescue organizations occurs when they have to assign and schedule their rescue units to emerging incidents under time pressure in order to reduce the overall resulting harm. Of particular importance in practical scenarios is the need to consider collaboration of rescue units. This task has hardly been addressed in the literature. We contribute to both modeling and solving this problem by (1) conceptualizing the situation as a type of scheduling problem, (2) modeling it as a binary linear minimization problem, (3) suggesting a branch-and-price algorithm, which can serve as both an exact and heuristic solution procedure, and (4) conducting computational experiments - including a sensitivity analysis of the effects of exogenous model parameters on execution times and objective value improvements over a heuristic suggested in the literature - for different practical disaster scenarios. The results of our computational experiments show that most problem instances of practically feasible size can be solved to optimality within ten minutes. Furthermore, even when our algorithm is terminated once the first feasible solution has been found, this solution is in almost all cases competitive to the optimal solution and substantially better than the solution obtained by the best known algorithm from the literature. This performance of our branch-and-price algorithm enables rescue organizations to apply our procedure in practice, even when the time for decision making is limited to a few minutes. By addressing a very general type of scheduling problem, our approach applies to various scheduling situations.}}, author = {{Rauchecker, Gerhard and Schryen, Guido}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, keywords = {{OR in disaster relief, disaster operations management, scheduling, branch-and-price}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{352 -- 363}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{An Exact Branch-and-Price Algorithm for Scheduling Rescue Units during Disaster Response}}}, volume = {{272}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{4517, author = {{Wolf, Verena and Bartelheimer, Christian and Beverungen, Daniel}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-52)}}, location = {{Maui, Hawaii}}, title = {{{Digitalization of Work Systems—An Organizational Routines’ Perspective}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{4561, abstract = {{We exploit a unique sample of structured financial products (SFPs) to analyze pricing and issuance dependencies among different types of such market‐linked investment vehicles. Our study provides evidence of cross‐pricing between products with complementary payoff profiles. Such dependencies may be explained by issuers’ efforts to generate order flow for products that supplement their current SFP risk exposure. Additionally, we observe issuance patterns in line with the argument that issuers exploit the complementarity payout profiles when bringing SFPs to market. Our study emphasizes cross‐pricing from a perspective not previously considered in the literature.}}, author = {{Pelster, Matthias and Schertler, Andrea}}, journal = {{Journal of Futures Markets}}, keywords = {{cross‐pricing, discount certificate, hedging, issuance decisions, put warrants, structured financial products}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{342--365}}, title = {{{Pricing and issuance dependencies in SFP portfolios}}}, doi = {{10.1002/fut.21978}}, volume = {{39}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{7413, author = {{Gutt, Dominik and Neumann, Jürgen and Zimmermann, Steffen and Kundisch, Dennis and Chen, J.}}, journal = {{Journal of Strategic Information Systems}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{104--117}}, title = {{{Design of Review Systems – A Strategic Instrument to shape Online Reviewing Behavior and Economic Outcomes}}}, volume = {{28}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inbook{7465, author = {{Kremer, H.-Hugo}}, booktitle = {{Berufsbildung zwischen Tradition und Moderne}}, editor = {{Pilz, M. and Breuing, K. and Schumann, S.}}, title = {{{Praxissemester und Professionalisierung - Überlegungen zur Gestaltung einer universitären Begleitkonzeption}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7622, author = {{Kundisch, Dennis and Beverungen, Daniel}}, pages = {{22--26}}, title = {{{Als Wirtschaftsinformatiker die digitale Transformation in Organisationen gestalten}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{8520, author = {{Jenert, Tobias}}, location = {{Gießen }}, title = {{{Wie unterrichten wir Wirtschaft? Förderung fachbezogener Reflexion angehender Wirtschaftslehrender}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{8854, author = {{Szopinski, Daniel}}, booktitle = {{3rd Business Model Conference}}, location = {{New York, USA}}, title = {{{Activate software-based business model development tools: An exploratory study}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{8856, author = {{Szopinski, Daniel and Schoormann, T. and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}}, location = {{Worcester, USA}}, title = {{{The long tail of taxonomy evaluation criteria: A structured overview}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{8892, author = {{Pelster, Matthias and Breitmayer, Bastian}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{158--179}}, title = {{{Attracting attention from peers: Excitement in social trading}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.010}}, volume = {{161}}, year = {{2019}}, }