@article{107, abstract = {{Consumer ratings play a decisive role in purchases by online shoppers. Although the effect of the average and the number of consumer ratings on future product pricing and demand have been studied with some conclusive results, the effects of the variance of these ratings are less well understood. We develop a model which considers durable goods that are characterized by three types of attributes: search attributes, experience attributes, and transformed attributes the latter are conventional experience attributes that are transformed by consumer ratings into attributes that can be searched. Using informed search attributes to refer to the combination of search attributes and transformed attributes, we consider two sources of variance of consumer ratings: taste differences about informed search attributes and quality differences in the form of product failure representing experience attributes. We find that (i) optimal price increases and demand decreases in variance caused by informed search attributes, (ii) optimal price and demand decrease in variance caused by experience attributes, and (iii) by holding the average rating as well as the total variance constant, for products with low total variance price and demand increase in the relative share of variance caused by informed search attributes. Counter to intuition, we demonstrate that risk averse consumers may prefer a higher priced product with a higher variance in ratings when deciding between two similar products with the same average rating. Finally, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed j-shaped distribution of consumer ratings in e-commerce that differs from established explanations.}}, author = {{Zimmermann , Steffen and Herrmann, Philipp and Kundisch, Dennis and Nault, Barry}}, journal = {{Information Systems Research}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{984--1002}}, publisher = {{INFORMS}}, title = {{{Decomposing the Variance of Consumer Ratings and the Impact on Price and Demand}}}, doi = {{10.1287/isre.2017.0764}}, volume = {{29}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{10788, author = {{Trier, Matthias}}, issn = {{2198-2775}}, journal = {{HMD Praxis der Wirtschaftsinformatik}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{714--724}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Wissensarbeit mit Social Media Plattformen – Unsicherheitsfaktoren als Managementansatz}}}, doi = {{0.1365/s40702-018-0427-5}}, volume = {{55}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{1171, author = {{Müller, Michelle and Gutt, Dominik and Neumann, Jürgen}}, booktitle = {{Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2018}}, location = {{Lüneburg}}, title = {{{Beschreib mir deine Wohnung und ich sag dir wer du bist - Eine explorative Analyse von Gastgeberpersönlichkeiten auf Airbnb}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1173, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, journal = {{Journal of Consumer Behaviour}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{290 -- 301}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}}}, doi = {{10.1002/cb.1711}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{14856, author = {{Hallmann, Corinna and Burmeister, Sascha Christian and Wissing, Michaela and Suhl, Leena}}, booktitle = {{Communications in Computer and Information Science}}, isbn = {{9783319962702}}, issn = {{1865-0929}}, title = {{{Heuristics and Simulation for Water Tank Optimization}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-96271-9_5}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{14861, author = {{Hallmann, Corinna and Kuhlemann, Stefan}}, booktitle = {{Operations Research Proceedings}}, isbn = {{9783319899190}}, issn = {{0721-5924}}, title = {{{Model Generator for Water Distribution Systems}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-89920-6_34}}, year = {{2018}}, } @book{15177, editor = {{Dieter, Euler and Sloane, Peter F. E. and Collenberg, Michèle and Daniel, Desiree and Janssen, Elmar and Jenert, Tobias and Meier, Karin and Menke, Ilka and Schröder, Helmut}}, publisher = {{EUSL}}, title = {{{Innovationsförderung durch Transferagenturen - Erfahrungen im Aufbau von Transferagenturen zur Förderung eines datenbasierten kommunalen Bildungsmanagements}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{15270, abstract = {{Consultative participation of citizens in political decision-making processes has been increasing in order to facilitate democratic legitimacy and responsiveness. Consequently, participatory budgets have been established as a 'best practice' for consultative participation of citizens in political decision-making processes. The authors compare participatory budgets of 31 German municipalities. An analysis of differences between successfully and unsuccessfully rated participatory budgeting processes provides informative insights and allows for in-depth comparison on a municipal level. The authors show that external service providers and electronic participation channels significantly increase the number of participatory citizens and are positively connected with pursued objectives of dialog processes and public responsiveness as well as efficient and effective decisions. Furthermore, the acceptance of all participants proved to be a key factor for a successful public participation process. The authors' analysis opens up new starting points for further research.}}, author = {{Weber, Henriette I. and Vogt, Sebastian and Eberz-Weber, Lisa-Marie and Steinmetz, Holger and Wagner, Sascha A. and Walther, Falko and Weber, Patrick and Kabst, Rüdiger}}, booktitle = {{Civic Engagement and Politics: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications}}, isbn = {{9781522576693}}, title = {{{Participatory Budgeting: Findings From Germany}}}, doi = {{10.4018/978-1-5225-7669-3.ch054}}, year = {{2018}}, } @book{13967, author = {{Krimphove, Dieter and Kruse, Oliver}}, pages = {{455}}, publisher = {{C. H. Beck}}, title = {{{Kommentar: MaGo – Aufsichtsrechtliche Mindestanforderungen an die Geschäftsorganisation von Versicherungsunternehmen}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1447, author = {{Köster, Hannes and Pelster, Matthias}}, issn = {{1526-5943}}, journal = {{The Journal of Risk Finance}}, pages = {{00--00}}, publisher = {{Emerald}}, title = {{{Financial penalties and banks’ systemic risk}}}, doi = {{10.1108/jrf-04-2017-0069}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1449, author = {{Pelster, Matthias and Irresberger, Felix and Weiß, Gregor N.F.}}, issn = {{1351-847X}}, journal = {{The European Journal of Finance}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{77--113}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Bank stock performance and bank regulation around the globe}}}, doi = {{10.1080/1351847x.2016.1226189}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1451, author = {{Breitmayer, Bastian and Pelster, Matthias}}, issn = {{2214-6350}}, journal = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Affect and stock returns}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jbef.2018.01.009}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{13201, author = {{Trier, Matthias and Jensen, Christopher}}, booktitle = {{The 26th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}}, location = {{Portsmouth}}, title = {{{SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT METRICS FOR BUSINESS ANALYTICS–INVESTIGATING MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{13305, author = {{Trier, Matthias and Jensen, Christoffer}}, title = {{{SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT METRICS FOR BUSINESS ANALYTICS-INVESTIGATING MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1031, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, issn = {{0143-6570}}, journal = {{Managerial and Decision Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{354 -- 362}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}}}, doi = {{10.1002/mde.2909}}, volume = {{39}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3081, author = {{Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health services research}}, number = {{4}}, title = {{{New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}}}, doi = {{10.111/1475-6773.12840}}, volume = {{53}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5235, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Winkler, Svenja}}, booktitle = {{Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}, title = {{{Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics}}}, year = {{2018}}, }