@article{17074,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}},
  issn         = {{1363-6669}},
  journal      = {{Review of Development Economics}},
  pages        = {{644--667}},
  title        = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/rode.12663}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@phdthesis{15824,
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16273,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda  and Rezaei, Sarah  and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }},
  journal      = {{Labour Economics}},
  title        = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16334,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  journal      = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  pages        = {{453 -- 481}},
  title        = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{30234,
  author       = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}},
  issn         = {{1057-9230}},
  journal      = {{Health Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Health Policy}},
  number       = {{7}},
  pages        = {{766--777}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/hec.4018}},
  volume       = {{29}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{31802,
  abstract     = {{<jats:p> Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. </jats:p><jats:p> This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. </jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}},
  issn         = {{0025-1909}},
  journal      = {{Management Science}},
  keywords     = {{Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{2677--2685}},
  publisher    = {{Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}},
  title        = {{{Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}}},
  doi          = {{10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}},
  volume       = {{66}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{34115,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}},
  issn         = {{0943-0180}},
  journal      = {{Homo Oeconomicus}},
  keywords     = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}},
  number       = {{1-2}},
  pages        = {{1--6}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}},
  volume       = {{37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17350,
  abstract     = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}},
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{641--660}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}},
  volume       = {{177}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17086,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}},
  issn         = {{1612-4804}},
  journal      = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}},
  pages        = {{923--944}},
  title        = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}},
  volume       = {{17}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17064,
  author       = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}},
  issn         = {{1048-5252}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}},
  pages        = {{510--533}},
  title        = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39070,
  author       = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39072,
  author       = {{Schlegel, Manuela}},
  title        = {{{Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39079,
  author       = {{Neibert, Katharina}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39077,
  author       = {{Naseri, Gitti}},
  title        = {{{Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39073,
  author       = {{Laudage, Felix}},
  title        = {{{Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39081,
  author       = {{Posmetni, Lena}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39346,
  author       = {{Hensel, Jason}},
  title        = {{{Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39347,
  author       = {{Multani, Manjinder Singh}},
  title        = {{{Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{38098,
  author       = {{Bellouchi, Houda}},
  title        = {{{Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42278,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}