@techreport{7630,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}},
  volume       = {{118}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{8873,
  abstract     = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}},
  volume       = {{119}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{9920,
  author       = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}},
  issn         = {{0165-1765}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  pages        = {{47--50}},
  title        = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}},
  volume       = {{181}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{6734,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}},
  journal      = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{62--78}},
  title        = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/obes.12267}},
  volume       = {{81}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{16882,
  author       = {{Atkins, Marc and Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Seiler, Volker}},
  journal      = {{Intereconomics}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{120--126}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{New Dimensions of Service Offshoring in World Trade}}},
  volume       = {{54}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@inbook{16883,
  author       = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Golderbein, Alexander and Peitz, Christian and Stöckmann, Nico}},
  booktitle    = {{Operations Research Proceedings 2018}},
  editor       = {{Fortz, B. and Labbé, M.}},
  pages        = {{201--208}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{The Impact of Monetary Policy on Investment Bank Profitability in Unequal Economies}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{16884,
  author       = {{Krimphove, Dieter and Peitz, Christian}},
  journal      = {{Fintechs: Rechtliche Grundlagen moderner Finanztechnologien}},
  pages        = {{287}},
  publisher    = {{Sch{\"a}ffer-Poeschel}},
  title        = {{{Social-Trading und Copy-Trading}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{15202,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}},
  volume       = {{128}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{15204,
  abstract     = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}},
  author       = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  keywords     = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{13148,
  abstract     = {{This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions.}},
  author       = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}},
  issn         = {{0167-2681}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{469--485}},
  title        = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{10332,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{15075,
  author       = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}},
  issn         = {{0022-4367}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{415--449}},
  title        = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/jori.12219}},
  volume       = {{86}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{39056,
  author       = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}},
  title        = {{{"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{39059,
  author       = {{Memon, Uzair Ahmed}},
  title        = {{{On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{39067,
  author       = {{Milczarek, André}},
  title        = {{{Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{37684,
  author       = {{Heinrichs, Fabian}},
  title        = {{{Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{38042,
  author       = {{Fortmeier, Julia}},
  title        = {{{Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{38045,
  author       = {{Hagedorn, Carolin}},
  title        = {{{The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{38097,
  author       = {{Ayyildiz, Berfin}},
  title        = {{{Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@misc{38093,
  author       = {{Shelepova, Ekaterina}},
  title        = {{{Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}