@misc{51, author = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{5236, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Schiele, Valentin}}, journal = {{Atlas of Science}}, title = {{{Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inbook{5238, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, booktitle = {{Krankenversicherung im Rating}}, editor = {{Adolph, T.}}, publisher = {{Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH}}, title = {{{Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1055, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1056, author = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1057, author = {{Sürücü, Oktay and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Brangewitz, Sonja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1069, author = {{Petersen, Henning Cornelius}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1070, author = {{Turan, Alparslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1071, author = {{Iding, Jerome}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1072, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1075, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1076, author = {{Goebel, Marion}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1077, author = {{Wagemeyer, Marleen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1078, author = {{Shabani, Albana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1079, author = {{Hamacher, Dustin Stefan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1083, abstract = {{In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, volume = {{110}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1372, author = {{Gries, T. and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{293--351}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-016-0371-1}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{15260, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-166X}}, journal = {{Journal of Human Resources}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{88--127}}, title = {{{Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice?}}}, doi = {{10.3368/jhr.52.1.0814-6540r1}}, volume = {{52}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2635, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{1--18}}, title = {{{Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.09.002}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2017}}, }