@misc{292, author = {{Osburg, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fusionen von gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen zu den Effizienz- und Wechselwirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{294, author = {{Materna, GinaJoanna}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - Eine neue Perspektive in der internationalen Handelspolitik}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{295, author = {{Goronczewski, Patricia}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - An economic investigation of benefits and drawbacks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{298, author = {{Plonka, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entwicklung von Ablösesummen und Gehälter in der Fußball-Bundesliga - Salary Caps als mögliches Modell der Chancengleichheit}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{306, author = {{Kunisch, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{309, author = {{Topal, Barlas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{314, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market we allow for vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries cannot arise just from distinct product qualities, but also from different production technologies. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Considering product innovation for symmetric productivities we derive equilibrium conditions on the investment costs and compare price and quantity competition. It turns out that on the one hand there exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for complements such that asymmetric investment equilibria fail to exist. On the other hand we find that there also exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for substitutes such that existence can be guaranteed if the investment costs are chosen accordingly.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Competition and Product Innovation of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{2730, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, pages = {{100}}, title = {{{Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? - A review of major concepts and findings}}}, volume = {{2015-044}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{234, author = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{229, author = {{Schulz, Hannah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5930, author = {{Mikroökonomie, Lehrstuhl}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bilateral matching and bargaining games}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{4592, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Forstinger, Sarah and Peitz, Christian}}, issn = {{0094-9655}}, journal = {{Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation}}, number = {{12}}, pages = {{2291--2307}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{On the iterative plug-in algorithm for estimating diurnal patterns of financial trade durations}}}, doi = {{10.1080/00949655.2015.1107908}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{4593, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Zhou, Chen}}, issn = {{0169-2070}}, journal = {{International Journal of Forecasting}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{349--363}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Forecasting financial market activity using a semiparametric fractionally integrated Log-ACD}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.09.001}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2015}}, } @book{4649, editor = {{Beran, Jan and Feng, Yuanhua and Hebbel, Hartmut}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Empirical Economic and Financial Research - Theory, Methods and Practice}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @inbook{4650, author = {{Beran, Jan and Feng, Yuanhua and Hebbel, Hartmut}}, booktitle = {{Empirical Economic and Financial Research}}, isbn = {{9783319031217}}, issn = {{1570-5811}}, pages = {{1--6}}, publisher = {{Springer International Publishing}}, title = {{{Introduction}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-03122-4_1}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{4656, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Zhou, Chen}}, title = {{{An iterative plug-in algorithm for realized kernels}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5090, author = {{Streck, Thomas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Praktikabilität des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei variablem Status Quo- Punkt und exogenen Einflüssen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{5109, author = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Seiler, Volker}}, journal = {{WiSt-Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium}}, number = {{8}}, pages = {{449--455}}, publisher = {{Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH}}, title = {{{Event-Studien in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung: Das Beispiel der Übernahme von Scania durch Volkswagen}}}, volume = {{44}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{5239, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten}}, publisher = {{Quintessenz Verlags-GmbH}}, title = {{{Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? }}}, year = {{2015}}, }