@article{5112,
  author       = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Lukas, Elmar and Heimann, Christian}},
  journal      = {{Jahrbücher für Nationalokonomie 6 Statistik}},
  title        = {{{Technologiestandort Deutschland und internationale Wissensspillover.}}},
  volume       = {{233}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{5114,
  author       = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Heimann, Anastasia and Schopf, Mark}},
  journal      = {{Basic Income Studies}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{43--70}},
  publisher    = {{De Gruyter}},
  title        = {{{Basic income and labour supply: The German case}}},
  volume       = {{8}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{5115,
  author       = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Nguyen, Birke Thuy Duong}},
  journal      = {{WiSt-Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{134--140}},
  publisher    = {{Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH}},
  title        = {{{Ist Fairer Handel Wirklich Fair?}}},
  volume       = {{42}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{5117,
  author       = {{Gilroy, Bernard Michael and Schreckenberg, Heike and Seiler, Volker}},
  title        = {{{Water as an alternative asset}}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{5146,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  keywords     = {{Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}},
  volume       = {{64}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@misc{536,
  author       = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application}}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{554,
  abstract     = {{We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{224 -- 227}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2961,
  author       = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Health Economics}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{1240--1249}},
  title        = {{{Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.013}},
  volume       = {{32}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{3084,
  author       = {{Augurzky, Boris and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{The European Journal of Health Economics}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{615--627}},
  title        = {{{What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10198-012-0407-6}},
  volume       = {{14}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2962,
  author       = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka, Magdalena A}},
  journal      = {{Labour Economics}},
  pages        = {{305--322}},
  title        = {{{Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2013.09.006}},
  volume       = {{24}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{56304,
  author       = {{Bachmann, Ronald and Baumgarten, Daniel}},
  issn         = {{2193-9012}},
  journal      = {{IZA Journal of European Labor Studies}},
  number       = {{1}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{How do the unemployed search for a job? – Evidence from the EU Labour Force Survey}}},
  doi          = {{10.1186/2193-9012-2-22}},
  volume       = {{2}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{56306,
  author       = {{Baumgarten, Daniel}},
  issn         = {{0022-1996}},
  journal      = {{Journal of International Economics}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{201--217}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Exporters and the rise in wage inequality: Evidence from German linked employer–employee data}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.10.001}},
  volume       = {{90}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{56305,
  author       = {{Baumgarten, Daniel and Geishecker, Ingo and Görg, Holger}},
  issn         = {{0014-2921}},
  journal      = {{European Economic Review}},
  pages        = {{132--152}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Offshoring, tasks, and the skill-wage pattern}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.007}},
  volume       = {{61}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2519,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}},
  issn         = {{0926-2644}},
  journal      = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{657--680}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Negotiating Transfer Prices}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}},
  volume       = {{22}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@article{2521,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}},
  issn         = {{1612-4804}},
  journal      = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{583--612}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3}},
  volume       = {{10}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@article{2949,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha  and Pilichowski, Margarethe}},
  journal      = {{Labour Economics}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{706 -- 717}},
  title        = {{{Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.005}},
  volume       = {{19}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@inbook{2950,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Xue, Jinjun}},
  booktitle    = {{ Rising China in the Changing World Economy}},
  editor       = {{Wang, Liming}},
  isbn         = {{9781138816732}},
  pages        = {{396 -- 412}},
  title        = {{{Poverty in Shenzhen}}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@article{2951,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}},
  journal      = {{Defence and Peace Economics}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{447 -- 470}},
  title        = {{{Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10242694.2012.656945}},
  volume       = {{23}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@techreport{2249,
  abstract     = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent,
although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy
effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build
a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links
within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the
network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of
stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}},
  title        = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}},
  volume       = {{12-06}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}

@techreport{578,
  abstract     = {{This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our set-up, countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze stability by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as long as the size of the largest coalition does not change. Our main results are: (1) singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate, (2) the stability of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante.}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition}}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}