@misc{5942,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kooperative Standortspiele}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5944,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Wie können Aufteilungsprobleme gelöst werden? Prozedurale Ansätze zur Konfliktlösung}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5947,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Produkte und Dienstleistungen im Paket - Eine Analyse der strategischen Preissetzung -}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5945,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Simultane bilatrale Verhandlungen - Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5952,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Netzwerkeffekte auf zweiseitigen Märkten - Eine ökonomische Betrachtung der Modelle}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5953,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Optimale Projektverträge unter Kostenunsicherheit}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5951,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{How do differentiated goods affect coopetition?}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@article{2527,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{1554-8597}},
  journal      = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{377 -- 384}},
  publisher    = {{Walter de Gruyter GmbH}},
  title        = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}},
  doi          = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}},
  volume       = {{22}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@article{2540,
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}},
  issn         = {{0176-2680}},
  journal      = {{European Journal of Political Economy}},
  pages        = {{1--23}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}},
  volume       = {{49}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@techreport{2570,
  abstract     = {{On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.}},
  author       = {{Manegold, Jochen}},
  keywords     = {{Input Market, Product Quality, Quantity Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Product Innovation}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}}},
  volume       = {{98}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@article{211,
  abstract     = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}},
  journal      = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{1341--1362}},
  publisher    = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}},
  title        = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}},
  doi          = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}},
  volume       = {{6}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@phdthesis{212,
  author       = {{Manegold, Jochen}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Competition in Markets with Intermediaries}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@inproceedings{203,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the economic interaction on the market for composed services. Typically, as providers of composed services, intermediaries interact on the sales side with users and on the procurement side with providers of single services. Thus, in how far a user request can be met often crucially depends on the prices and qualities of the different single services used in the composition. We study an intermediary who purchases two complementary single services and combines them. The prices paid to the service providers are determined by simultaneous multilateral Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the respective service provider. By using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to determine the quality of the composed service, we allow for complementary as well as substitutable degrees of the providers' service qualities. We investigate quality investments of service providers and the corresponding evolution of the single service quality within a differential game framework. }},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Hoof, Simon}},
  booktitle    = {{Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing: 5th IFIP WG 2.14 European Conference, ESOCC 2016, Vienna, Austria, September 5-7, 2016, Proceedings}},
  editor       = {{Marco Aiello, Einar Broch Johnsen, Schahram Dustdar, and Georgievski, Ilche}},
  pages        = {{201--215}},
  title        = {{{Economic Aspects of Service Composition: Price Negotiations and Quality Investments}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-44482-6_13}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@techreport{8836,
  abstract     = {{While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.}},
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  keywords     = {{terrorism, civil war, conflict duration, game theory, stochastic process, ideology}},
  title        = {{{An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'}}},
  volume       = {{95}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5934,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Renegotiable vs. Non-Renegotiable Agreements - Theory and Applications}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5932,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Wie wertvoll ist der Einzelne für das Team? - Performancemessung der Bundesligaspieler anhand der kooperativen Spieltheorie der Saison 2014/2015}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5940,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Automatisiertes Matching von Angebot und Nachfrage in der Kunststoffindustrie Ein Fallbeispiel in Kooperation mit der PINPOOLS GmbH}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5935,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Der Einfluss von Netzwerken auf Gleichgewichtspreise - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5931,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Hat vertikale Integration einen Einfluss auf die allgemeine Wohlfahrt?}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{5941,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Stabile Supply-Chains - Basierend auf der Theorie der Matching-Märkte}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}