@article{445, abstract = {{We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to payoffs of competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by NTU games. An NTU game is an NTU market game if there exists a market such that the set of utility allocations a coalition can achieve in the market coincides with the set of utility allocations the coalition can achieve in the game. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a market based on a closed subset of the inner core which satisfies a strict positive separability. We show that the constructed market represents the NTU game and, further, has the given closed set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not uniquely determined, and thus, we obtain a class of markets. Our results generalize those relating to competitive outcomes of NTU market games in the literature.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{529--554}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{410, abstract = {{One goal of service-oriented computing is to realize future markets of composed services. In such markets, service providers offer services that can be flexibly combined with each other. However, although crucial for decision-making, market participants are usually not able to individually estimate the quality of traded services in advance. To overcome this problem, we present a conceptual design for a reputation system that collects and processes user feedback on transactions, and provides this information as a signal for quality to participants in the market. Based on our proposed concept, we describe the incorporation of reputation information into distinct decision-making processes that are crucial in such service markets. In this context, we present a fuzzy service matching approach that takes reputation information into account. Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive service composition approach, and investigate the impact of exchanging immediate user feedback by reputation information. Last but not least, we describe the importance of reputation information for economic decisions of different market participants. The overall output of this paper is a comprehensive view on managing and exploiting reputation information in markets of composed services using the example of On-The-Fly Computing.}}, author = {{Jungmann, Alexander and Brangewitz, Sonja and Petrlic, Ronald and Platenius, Marie Christin}}, journal = {{International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)}}, number = {{3&4}}, pages = {{572----594}}, publisher = {{IARIA}}, title = {{{Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services}}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2014}}, } @phdthesis{440, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2543, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{224--227}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{474, abstract = {{Suppose some individuals are allowed to engage in different groups at the same time and they generate a certain welfare by cooperation. Finding appropriate ways for distributing this welfare is a non-trivial issue. The purpose of this work is to analyze two-stage allocation procedures where first each group receives a share of the welfare which is then, subsequently, distributed among the corresponding members. To study these procedures in a structured way, cooperative games and network games are combined in a general framework by using mathematical hypergraphs. Moreover, several convincing requirements on allocation procedures are discussed and formalized. Thereby it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value and iteratively applying the Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations.}}, author = {{Röhl, Nils}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Two-Stage Allocation Procedures}}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{5146, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, keywords = {{Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, volume = {{64}}, year = {{2013}}, } @misc{536, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application}}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{554, abstract = {{We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{224 -- 227}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2519, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}}, issn = {{0926-2644}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{657--680}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Negotiating Transfer Prices}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2521, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{583--612}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2012}}, } @techreport{578, abstract = {{This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our set-up, countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze stability by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as long as the size of the largest coalition does not change. Our main results are: (1) singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate, (2) the stability of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @techreport{602, abstract = {{We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption in a standard infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and real collateralized assets, together with one additional ingredient: information among players is asymmetric and monitoring is incomplete. The key insight is that trading assets is not only a way to hedge oneself against uncertainty and to smooth consumption across time: It also enables learning information. Conversely, defaulting now becomes strategic: Certain players may manipulate prices so as to provoke a default in order to prevent their opponents from learning. We focus on learning equilibria, at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs — not because those players with heterogeneous beliefs were eliminated from the market (although default is possible at equilibrium) but because they have taken time to update their prior belief. We prove a partial Folk theorem à la Wiseman (2011) of the following form: For any function that maps each state of the world to a sequence of feasible and strongly individually rational allocations, and for any degree of precision, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which patient players learn the realized state with this degree of precision and achieve a payoff close to the one specified for each state.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @phdthesis{34169, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja}}, title = {{{Coalitional and Strategic Market Games}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2512, abstract = {{In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant to combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based on the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically modeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account parties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector of exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights enter in a proportional fashion.}}, author = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{1742-7355}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{189--200}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Proportionality and the power of unequal parties}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2011}}, } @misc{651, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme}}}, year = {{2011}}, } @article{2510, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}}, issn = {{0040-5833}}, journal = {{Theory and Decision}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{537--554}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2}}, volume = {{69}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{2508, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}}, issn = {{0938-2259}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{393--410}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2009}}, } @article{2531, abstract = {{We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{01}}, pages = {{15--32}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198909002121}}, volume = {{11}}, year = {{2009}}, } @article{2502, author = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{0899-8256}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{460--475}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Stable governments and the semistrict core}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003}}, volume = {{62}}, year = {{2008}}, } @article{2503, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Kashiwada, Akemi and Su, Francis Edward}}, issn = {{0303-6812}}, journal = {{Journal of Mathematical Biology}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{479--497}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2008}}, }