@misc{42312, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching mit Minderheiten}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42316, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Piracy and Visioning}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42303, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Revenue Sharing Contracts: Horizontale Koordination in der E-Commerce-Logistik}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{45640, abstract = {{I study a dynamic variant of the Dixit–Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, issn = {{1573-2878}}, journal = {{Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Dynamic Monopolistic Competition}}}, volume = {{189}}, year = {{2021}}, } @phdthesis{20240, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, title = {{{Essays on Cooperation in Differential Games}}}, doi = {{ 10.17619/UNIPB/1-1047}}, year = {{2020}}, } @phdthesis{16910, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-958}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{34115, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{0943-0180}}, journal = {{Homo Oeconomicus}}, keywords = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}}, number = {{1-2}}, pages = {{1--6}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42278, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42307, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42308, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42301, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42299, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42304, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42298, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42306, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42300, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42302, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42292, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42294, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}}, year = {{2020}}, }