@techreport{2565,
  abstract     = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}},
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  keywords     = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}},
  volume       = {{112}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{2566,
  abstract     = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  pages        = {{39 -- 41}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033}},
  volume       = {{170}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@inbook{3742,
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  booktitle    = {{Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications}},
  isbn         = {{9783319929873}},
  issn         = {{2363-8516}},
  pages        = {{13--23}},
  publisher    = {{Springer International Publishing}},
  title        = {{{Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@techreport{2933,
  abstract     = {{We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}},
  keywords     = {{Bargaining problem, CES Function, Normalized CES Function, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, Egalitarian Solution.}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}}},
  volume       = {{113}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@inbook{3098,
  abstract     = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results
from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of
theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.
Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing
enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In
this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu
(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution
design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized
game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a
competitive equilibrium of an economy.}},
  author       = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  booktitle    = {{Studies in Economic Design}},
  editor       = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}},
  issn         = {{2510-3970}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}},
  volume       = {{(n.d.)}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5967,
  author       = {{Koch, Alexander}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{4564,
  abstract     = {{  In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to
  determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the
  upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)
  revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider
  cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information.  This means
  that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by
  mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive
  compatibility and/or ex post efficiency.  Assuming two possible types for
  buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is
  regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints
  are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
  solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer
  quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to
  balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in
  place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by
  means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution
  for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with
  the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a
  tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.
}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}},
  journal      = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{905--932}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}},
  volume       = {{27}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{5330,
  abstract     = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.
To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to
reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this
study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries
when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,
a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to
evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is
not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous
rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three
sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality
decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of
receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service
provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation
building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental
design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates
from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation
profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking
strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price
is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then
high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}},
  author       = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}},
  issn         = {{1932-6203}},
  journal      = {{PLoS ONE}},
  number       = {{11}},
  publisher    = {{Public Library of Science}},
  title        = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}},
  doi          = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}},
  volume       = {{13}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{1063,
  author       = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Kaimann, Daniel and Cox, Joe}},
  journal      = {{Entertainment Computing}},
  pages        = {{26--36}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002}},
  volume       = {{25}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{1173,
  author       = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Consumer Behaviour}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{290 -- 301}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  title        = {{{A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/cb.1711}},
  volume       = {{17}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@techreport{15206,
  abstract     = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}},
  volume       = {{111}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@techreport{15207,
  abstract     = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}},
  author       = {{Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}},
  volume       = {{117}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{1031,
  author       = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}},
  issn         = {{0143-6570}},
  journal      = {{Managerial and Decision Economics}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{354 -- 362}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  title        = {{{Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/mde.2909}},
  volume       = {{39}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5963,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5962,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5961,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5958,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5959,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5964,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{5960,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Anreize in Bewertungssysteme}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}