[{"abstract":[{"text":"This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-05-03T07:50:57Z","file":[{"success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"4382","date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":263766,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games.pdf","date_created":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","creator":"stela"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"working_paper","keyword":["NTU differential games","variable Pareto weights","agreeability"],"author":[{"id":"59676","full_name":"Hoof, Simon","first_name":"Simon","last_name":"Hoof"}],"title":"Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games","year":"2018","intvolume":"       112","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:09Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"citation":{"chicago":"Hoof, Simon. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol. 112. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","apa":"Hoof, S. (2018). <i>Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games</i> (Vol. 112). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"S. Hoof, <i>Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games</i>, vol. 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Hoof S. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Hoof_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}, volume={112}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Hoof, Simon. <i>Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games</i>. Vol. 112, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"file_date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"2565","volume":112,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"]},{"year":"2018","title":"Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"first_name":"Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","id":"13264"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:09Z","intvolume":"       170","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033","publication":"Economics Letters","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior."}],"file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_size":261888,"file_name":"1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:15:07Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"3854","title":"Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences","creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:08:17Z"}],"date_created":"2018-05-03T07:53:56Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","page":"39 - 41","urn":"25669","_id":"2566","publisher":"Elsevier","user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"volume":170,"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:15:07Z","citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. <i>Economics Letters</i>. 2018;170:39-41. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 170, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 39–41, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” <i>Economics Letters</i> 170 (2018): 39–41. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. <i>Economics Letters</i>, <i>170</i>, 39–41. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences,” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018."},"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]},{"type":"book_chapter","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"file":[{"creator":"ups","date_created":"2018-11-02T16:10:34Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:10:34Z","file_name":"Hoof2018_Chapter_DynamicVoluntaryProvisionOfPub.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":199568,"file_id":"5325","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1}],"date_created":"2018-08-01T09:51:57Z","publication":"Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:34Z","year":"2018","title":"Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution","author":[{"full_name":"Hoof, Simon","first_name":"Simon","last_name":"Hoof","id":"59676"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2363-8516","2363-8524"],"isbn":["9783319929873","9783319929880"]},"place":"Cham","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:10:34Z","citation":{"apa":"Hoof, S. (2018). Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution. In <i>Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications</i> (pp. 13–23). Cham: Springer International Publishing. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2</a>","ieee":"S. Hoof, “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution,” in <i>Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications</i>, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 13–23.","chicago":"Hoof, Simon. “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution.” In <i>Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications</i>, 13–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2</a>.","short":"S. Hoof, in: Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 13–23.","mla":"Hoof, Simon. “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution.” <i>Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications</i>, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 13–23, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2\">10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2</a>.","ama":"Hoof S. Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution. In: <i>Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications</i>. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:13-23. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2\">10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2</a>","bibtex":"@inbook{Hoof_2018, place={Cham}, title={Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2\">10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2</a>}, booktitle={Static &#38; Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &#38; Applications}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, pages={13–23} }"},"user_id":"477","ddc":["000"],"page":"13-23","publisher":"Springer International Publishing","_id":"3742","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public"},{"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"2933","urn":"29332","volume":113,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","place":"Paderborn University","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, <i>On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem</i>, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Qin, C.-Z. (2018). <i>On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem</i> (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Qin","first_name":"Cheng-Zhong","full_name":"Qin, Cheng-Zhong"}],"year":"2018","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","intvolume":"       113","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:48Z","date_created":"2018-05-28T07:00:28Z","file":[{"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:15:31Z","access_level":"closed","file_size":469001,"file_name":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"3855","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"working_paper","keyword":["Bargaining problem","CES Function","Normalized CES Function","Nash solution","Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution","Egalitarian Solution."],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions."}]},{"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive equilibrium of an economy."}],"publication":"Studies in Economic Design","type":"book_chapter","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:36:24Z","file_name":"WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf","file_size":141983,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","file_id":"3857","content_type":"application/pdf","title":"Thoughts on Social Design"}],"date_created":"2018-06-06T17:07:28Z","publication_status":"accepted","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z","year":"2018","title":"Thoughts on Social Design","publication_identifier":{"issn":["2510-3970"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Trockel, Walter","first_name":"Walter","last_name":"Trockel"},{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Studies in Economic Design","quality_controlled":"1","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","citation":{"chicago":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” In <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin, Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer, n.d.","short":"W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.","ieee":"W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.","apa":"Trockel, W., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, &#38; W. Zwicker (Eds.), <i>Studies in Economic Design</i> (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.","bibtex":"@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }","ama":"Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>. Vol (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.","mla":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer."},"place":"Heidelberg","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"volume":"(n.d.)","editor":[{"full_name":"Laslier, Jean-Francois","last_name":"Laslier","first_name":"Jean-Francois"},{"first_name":"Herve","last_name":"Moulin","full_name":"Moulin, Herve"},{"first_name":"Remzi","last_name":"Sanver","full_name":"Sanver, Remzi"},{"full_name":"Zwicker, William","first_name":"William","last_name":"Zwicker"}],"publisher":"Springer","_id":"3098","urn":"30987"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:02:48Z","status":"public","title":"Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung","year":"2018","author":[{"last_name":"Koch","first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Koch, Alexander"}],"user_id":"65453","_id":"5967","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"citation":{"chicago":"Koch, Alexander. <i>Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","short":"A. Koch, Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","ama":"Koch A. <i>Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Koch_2018, title={Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Koch, Alexander}, year={2018} }","apa":"Koch, A. (2018). <i>Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung</i>. Universität Paderborn.","mla":"Koch, Alexander. <i>Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","ieee":"A. Koch, <i>Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018."},"type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"date_created":"2018-11-28T12:07:30Z"},{"volume":27,"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","_id":"4564","publisher":"Springer","page":"905-932","has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["C78"],"status":"public","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"quality_controlled":"1","citation":{"short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i> 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, <i>27</i>(6), 905–932. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>."},"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"intvolume":"        27","article_type":"original","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","publication_status":"published","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"},{"first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"}],"title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","year":"2018","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","file":[{"date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","creator":"stela","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5107","date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":636521,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf"}],"abstract":[{"text":"  In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n  determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n  upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n  revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n  cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information.  This means\r\n  that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n  mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n  compatibility and/or ex post efficiency.  Assuming two possible types for\r\n  buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n  regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n  are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n  solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n  quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n  balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n  place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n  means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n  for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n  the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n  tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","issue":"6"},{"project":[{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"citation":{"mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>. 2018;13(11). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>","bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., &#38; Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>, <i>13</i>(11). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>","ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018.","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i> 13, no. 11 (2018). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018)."},"file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":13,"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","funded_apc":"1","_id":"5330","publisher":"Public Library of Science","abstract":[{"text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again.","lang":"eng"}],"issue":"11","publication":"PLoS ONE","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","creator":"cjhaake","file_id":"5542","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","file_size":1107189,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z"}],"intvolume":"        13","article_type":"review","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","publication_status":"published","author":[{"full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","first_name":"Behnud","id":"26032"},{"id":"111","first_name":"Rene","last_name":"Fahr","full_name":"Fahr, Rene"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker"}],"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"year":"2018","title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"article_number":"e0207172"},{"author":[{"id":"13264","first_name":"Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja"},{"id":"18949","first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel"},{"full_name":"Cox, Joe","first_name":"Joe","last_name":"Cox"}],"title":"More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games","year":"2018","intvolume":"        25","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:49Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002","publication":"Entertainment Computing","date_created":"2017-12-18T10:35:17Z","file":[{"file_name":"More than skills - A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games.pdf","file_size":297649,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:14:40Z","file_id":"3906","content_type":"application/pdf","title":"More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games","creator":"nmaraun","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:14:40Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"183"}],"type":"journal_article","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"1063","publisher":"Elsevier","page":"26-36","volume":25,"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"13264","citation":{"ieee":"N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, and J. Cox, “More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games,” <i>Entertainment Computing</i>, vol. 25, pp. 26–36, 2018.","apa":"Stroh-Maraun, N., Kaimann, D., &#38; Cox, J. (2018). More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games. <i>Entertainment Computing</i>, <i>25</i>, 26–36. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002</a>","short":"N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing 25 (2018) 26–36.","chicago":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, Daniel Kaimann, and Joe Cox. “More than Skills: A Novel Matching Proposal for Multiplayer Video Games.” <i>Entertainment Computing</i> 25 (2018): 26–36. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002</a>.","mla":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, et al. “More than Skills: A Novel Matching Proposal for Multiplayer Video Games.” <i>Entertainment Computing</i>, vol. 25, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 26–36, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002\">10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Stroh-Maraun_Kaimann_Cox_2018, title={More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games}, volume={25}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002\">10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002</a>}, journal={Entertainment Computing}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Kaimann, Daniel and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={26–36} }","ama":"Stroh-Maraun N, Kaimann D, Cox J. More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games. <i>Entertainment Computing</i>. 2018;25:26-36. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002\">10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:14:40Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"}]},{"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Stroh-Maraun_Cox_2018, title={A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}, volume={17}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711\">10.1002/cb.1711</a>}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Consumer Behaviour}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={290–301} }","ama":"Kaimann D, Stroh-Maraun N, Cox J. A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption. <i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i>. 2018;17(3):290-301. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711\">10.1002/cb.1711</a>","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, et al. “A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption.” <i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i>, vol. 17, no. 3, Wiley Online Library, 2018, pp. 290–301, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711\">10.1002/cb.1711</a>.","short":"D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour 17 (2018) 290–301.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, Nadja Stroh-Maraun, and Joe Cox. “A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption.” <i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i> 17, no. 3 (2018): 290–301. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711\">https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711</a>.","ieee":"D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, and J. Cox, “A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption,” <i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i>, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 290–301, 2018.","apa":"Kaimann, D., Stroh-Maraun, N., &#38; Cox, J. (2018). A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption. <i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i>, <i>17</i>(3), 290–301. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711\">https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:23:38Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","publisher":"Wiley Online Library","_id":"1173","page":"290 - 301","volume":17,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"publication":"Journal of Consumer Behaviour","issue":"3","date_created":"2018-02-14T12:30:36Z","file":[{"creator":"nmaraun","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:23:38Z","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:23:38Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"closed","file_size":425823,"file_name":"A duration model analysis of consumer preferences and determinants of video game consumption.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"3908"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"183"}],"type":"journal_article","author":[{"first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","id":"18949"},{"first_name":"Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","id":"13264"},{"first_name":"Joe","last_name":"Cox","full_name":"Cox, Joe"}],"title":"A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption","year":"2018","intvolume":"        17","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:08Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1002/cb.1711"},{"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"15206","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","volume":111,"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i> (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018."},"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","first_name":"Nadja"}],"title":"A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","year":"2018","intvolume":"       111","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:03:40Z","file":[{"file_id":"15209","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_name":"WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":328319,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","creator":"stela"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"working_paper"},{"citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game}, volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","short":"P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Duman P. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","chicago":"Duman, Papatya. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"P. Duman, <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","mla":"Duman, Papatya. <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i>. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","apa":"Duman, P. (2018). <i>Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game</i> (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"15207","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","volume":117,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"text":"The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:11Z","file":[{"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","creator":"stela","file_id":"15208","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_name":"WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":678790,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["Chain Store Game","reputation building","entry deterrence","Trockel's game"],"type":"working_paper","author":[{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman","first_name":"Papatya"}],"title":"Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game","year":"2018","intvolume":"       117","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:18Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"year":"2018","title":"Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0143-6570"]},"author":[{"last_name":"Kaimann","first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","id":"18949"},{"last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","id":"13264"},{"full_name":"Cox, Joe","last_name":"Cox","first_name":"Joe"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:36Z","intvolume":"        39","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1002/mde.2909","publication":"Managerial and Decision Economics","issue":"3","file":[{"creator":"nmaraun","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:21:08Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:21:08Z","file_name":"Variety in the video game industry - An empirical study of the Wundt curve.pdf","file_size":434901,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"3907","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1}],"date_created":"2017-12-06T15:16:58Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"183"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","page":"354 - 362","publisher":"Wiley-Blackwell","_id":"1031","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"volume":39,"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:21:08Z","citation":{"mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, et al. “Variety in the Video Game Industry: An Empirical Study of the Wundt Curve.” <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, vol. 39, no. 3, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 354–62, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909\">10.1002/mde.2909</a>.","ama":"Kaimann D, Stroh-Maraun N, Cox J. Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>. 2018;39(3):354-362. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909\">10.1002/mde.2909</a>","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Stroh-Maraun_Cox_2018, title={Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}, volume={39}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909\">10.1002/mde.2909</a>}, number={3}, journal={Managerial and Decision Economics}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={354–362} }","apa":"Kaimann, D., Stroh-Maraun, N., &#38; Cox, J. (2018). Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve. <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, <i>39</i>(3), 354–362. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909\">https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909</a>","ieee":"D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, and J. Cox, “Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve,” <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i>, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 354–362, 2018.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, Nadja Stroh-Maraun, and Joe Cox. “Variety in the Video Game Industry: An Empirical Study of the Wundt Curve.” <i>Managerial and Decision Economics</i> 39, no. 3 (2018): 354–62. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909\">https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909</a>.","short":"D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics 39 (2018) 354–362."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"}]},{"date_created":"2018-11-28T12:00:49Z","type":"mastersthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"citation":{"short":"N. N, Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","ieee":"N. N, <i>Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries</i>. Universität Paderborn.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018.","mla":"N, N. <i>Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018."},"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","_id":"5963","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","title":"Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries","status":"public","year":"2018","author":[{"full_name":"N, N","first_name":"N","last_name":"N"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:16:03Z"},{"citation":{"ieee":"N. N, <i>Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains</i>. Universität Paderborn.","short":"N. N, Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","mla":"N, N. <i>Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018."},"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_created":"2018-11-28T11:58:25Z","type":"mastersthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"year":"2018","status":"public","title":"Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains","author":[{"last_name":"N","first_name":"N","full_name":"N, N"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:15:43Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"5962","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","user_id":"477"},{"date_created":"2018-11-28T11:55:27Z","type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"citation":{"chicago":"N, N. <i>School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich  Effizienz Und Schwachstellen Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","short":"N. N, School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich  Effizienz Und Schwachstellen Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","ieee":"N. N, <i>School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis</i>. Universität Paderborn.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich  Effizienz Und Schwachstellen Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018.","mla":"N, N. <i>School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich  Effizienz Und Schwachstellen Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018."},"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"5961","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","user_id":"477","year":"2018","status":"public","title":"School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis","author":[{"full_name":"N, N","first_name":"N","last_name":"N"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:18:52Z"},{"year":"2018","title":"Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"N","last_name":"N","full_name":"N, N"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:17:55Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"5958","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","user_id":"477","supervisor":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"citation":{"mla":"N, N. <i>Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme Als Lösungsansatz</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme Als Lösungsansatz</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018.","ieee":"N. N, <i>Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz</i>. Universität Paderborn.","short":"N. N, Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme Als Lösungsansatz, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme Als Lösungsansatz</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_created":"2018-11-28T11:48:06Z","type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}]},{"date_created":"2018-11-28T11:50:46Z","type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"citation":{"ieee":"N. N, <i>Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent</i>. Universität Paderborn.","short":"N. N, Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information about Opponent, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information about Opponent</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","mla":"N, N. <i>Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information about Opponent</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information about Opponent</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018."},"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"_id":"5959","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","user_id":"477","title":"Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent","year":"2018","status":"public","author":[{"full_name":"N, N","first_name":"N","last_name":"N"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:18:11Z"},{"type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"date_created":"2018-11-28T12:02:55Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"citation":{"ieee":"N. N, <i>Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie</i>. Universität Paderborn.","short":"N. N, Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie, Universität Paderborn, 2018.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","mla":"N, N. <i>Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018."},"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"user_id":"477","_id":"5964","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:19:08Z","status":"public","year":"2018","title":"Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie","author":[{"full_name":"N, N","last_name":"N","first_name":"N"}]},{"user_id":"477","_id":"5960","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-11-30T14:18:31Z","author":[{"full_name":"N, N","first_name":"N","last_name":"N"}],"status":"public","title":"Anreize in Bewertungssysteme","year":"2018","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","date_created":"2018-11-28T11:53:06Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"citation":{"mla":"N, N. <i>Anreize in Bewertungssysteme</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{N_2018, title={Anreize in Bewertungssysteme}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }","ama":"N N. <i>Anreize in Bewertungssysteme</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2018.","ieee":"N. N, <i>Anreize in Bewertungssysteme</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","apa":"N, N. (2018). <i>Anreize in Bewertungssysteme</i>. Universität Paderborn.","chicago":"N, N. <i>Anreize in Bewertungssysteme</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2018.","short":"N. N, Anreize in Bewertungssysteme, Universität Paderborn, 2018."},"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}]}]