TY - JOUR
AB - Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Schneider, Martin
ID - 34114
JF - Journal of International Management
KW - Qualitative comparative analysis
KW - Banzhaf power index
KW - causality
KW - explanatory power
TI - Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Streck, Thomas
ID - 32106
KW - Asymmetric bargaining power
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
TI - Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power
VL - 148
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42326
TI - Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42322
TI - An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42324
TI - Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42318
TI - Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42319
TI - Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42323
TI - Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42320
TI - School choice with reserves and quotas
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42325
TI - Organisation von Zeitbörsen
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 30940
IS - 2
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
KW - Labour market negotiations
KW - efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - sequential bargaining
KW - restricted bargaining games
TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
VL - 125
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 29152
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42317
TI - Die Aufteilung der Barentsseegebiete mithilfe des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42315
TI - Versionisierung von Serviceleistungen auf Videoplattformen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42321
TI - Kindergarten Allocation through Matching Mechanisms
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42309
TI - Faire Profitverteilung in Energienetzwerken - eine spieltheoretische Analyse von Microgrids
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42311
TI - "First-Party-Content" auf zweiseitigen Märkten
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42314
TI - Stability in many-to-many matchings with contracts
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42313
TI - Preissetzungsstrategien für Neuprodukte
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42310
TI - Co-opetition in Two-Sided Markets
ER -