TY - JOUR AB - Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Schneider, Martin ID - 34114 JF - Journal of International Management KW - Qualitative comparative analysis KW - Banzhaf power index KW - causality KW - explanatory power TI - Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index ER - TY - GEN AB - We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Streck, Thomas ID - 32106 KW - Asymmetric bargaining power KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution TI - Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power VL - 148 ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42326 TI - Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42322 TI - An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42324 TI - Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42318 TI - Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42319 TI - Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42323 TI - Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42320 TI - School choice with reserves and quotas ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42325 TI - Organisation von Zeitbörsen ER - TY - JOUR AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Upmann, Thorsten AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 30940 IS - 2 JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics KW - Labour market negotiations KW - efficient bargains KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - sequential bargaining KW - restricted bargaining games TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining VL - 125 ER - TY - JOUR AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Trockel, Walter ID - 29152 JF - Review of Economic Design SN - 1434-4742 TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42317 TI - Die Aufteilung der Barentsseegebiete mithilfe des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42315 TI - Versionisierung von Serviceleistungen auf Videoplattformen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42321 TI - Kindergarten Allocation through Matching Mechanisms ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42309 TI - Faire Profitverteilung in Energienetzwerken - eine spieltheoretische Analyse von Microgrids ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42311 TI - "First-Party-Content" auf zweiseitigen Märkten ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42314 TI - Stability in many-to-many matchings with contracts ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42313 TI - Preissetzungsstrategien für Neuprodukte ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42310 TI - Co-opetition in Two-Sided Markets ER -