TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Upmann, Thorsten AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 15202 KW - Labor market negotiations KW - Efficient bargains KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - Sequential bargaining KW - Restricted bargaining games TI - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets VL - 128 ER - TY - GEN AB - We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations. AU - Aslan, Fatma AU - Duman, Papatya AU - Trockel, Walter ID - 15204 KW - TU-games KW - duality KW - core KW - c-Core KW - cohesive games KW - complete game efficiency TI - Duality for General TU-games Redefined VL - 121 ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42296 TI - Intermediaries in Networks ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42286 TI - Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42290 TI - Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42289 TI - Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42291 TI - Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42288 TI - Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42295 TI - Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42293 TI - Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42284 TI - Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42280 TI - Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42285 TI - Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42281 TI - A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 41926 TI - Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42277 TI - Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42283 TI - Student's school matching mechanisms in the US ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete. AU - Feldotto, Matthias AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Skopalik, Alexander AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 2831 SN - 978-1-4503-5916-0 T2 - Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) TI - Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value ER - TY - GEN AB - This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game. AU - Hoof, Simon ID - 2565 KW - NTU differential games KW - variable Pareto weights KW - agreeability TI - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games VL - 112 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 2566 JF - Economics Letters TI - Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences VL - 170 ER -