---
_id: '445'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with
non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to payoffs of competitive
equilibria of markets that are induced by NTU games. An NTU game is an NTU market
game if there exists a market such that the set of utility allocations a coalition
can achieve in the market coincides with the set of utility allocations the coalition
can achieve in the game. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a market
based on a closed subset of the inner core which satisfies a strict positive separability.
We show that the constructed market represents the NTU game and, further, has
the given closed set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. It
turns out that this market is not uniquely determined, and thus, we obtain a class
of markets. Our results generalize those relating to competitive outcomes of NTU
market games in the literature.
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Jan-Philip
full_name: Gamp, Jan-Philip
last_name: Gamp
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market
games. Economic Theory. 2014;(3):529-554. doi:10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Gamp, J.-P. (2014). Competitive outcomes and the inner
core of NTU market games. Economic Theory, (3), 529–554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7
bibtex: '@article{Brangewitz_Gamp_2014, title={Competitive outcomes and the inner
core of NTU market games}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7},
number={3}, journal={Economic Theory}, publisher={Springer}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}, year={2014}, pages={529–554} }'
chicago: 'Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Competitive Outcomes and the
Inner Core of NTU Market Games.” Economic Theory, no. 3 (2014): 529–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7.'
ieee: S. Brangewitz and J.-P. Gamp, “Competitive outcomes and the inner core of
NTU market games,” Economic Theory, no. 3, pp. 529–554, 2014.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Competitive Outcomes and the Inner
Core of NTU Market Games.” Economic Theory, no. 3, Springer, 2014, pp.
529–54, doi:10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7.
short: S. Brangewitz, J.-P. Gamp, Economic Theory (2014) 529–554.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:18Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:27:32Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:27:32Z
file_id: '1349'
file_name: 445-Brangewitz_and_Gamp__2014__-_Competitive_outcomes_and_the_inner_core_of_NTU_market_games.pdf
file_size: 391317
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:27:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 529-554
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Economic Theory
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '410'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: One goal of service-oriented computing is to realize future markets of composed
services. In such markets, service providers offer services that can be flexibly
combined with each other. However, although crucial for decision-making, market
participants are usually not able to individually estimate the quality of traded
services in advance. To overcome this problem, we present a conceptual design
for a reputation system that collects and processes user feedback on transactions,
and provides this information as a signal for quality to participants in the market.
Based on our proposed concept, we describe the incorporation of reputation information
into distinct decision-making processes that are crucial in such service markets.
In this context, we present a fuzzy service matching approach that takes reputation
information into account. Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive service composition
approach, and investigate the impact of exchanging immediate user feedback by
reputation information. Last but not least, we describe the importance of reputation
information for economic decisions of different market participants. The overall
output of this paper is a comprehensive view on managing and exploiting reputation
information in markets of composed services using the example of On-The-Fly Computing.
author:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Jungmann, Alexander
last_name: Jungmann
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Ronald
full_name: Petrlic, Ronald
last_name: Petrlic
- first_name: Marie Christin
full_name: Platenius, Marie Christin
last_name: Platenius
citation:
ama: Jungmann A, Brangewitz S, Petrlic R, Platenius MC. Incorporating Reputation
Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services. International
Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys). 2014;7(3&4):572--594.
apa: Jungmann, A., Brangewitz, S., Petrlic, R., & Platenius, M. C. (2014). Incorporating
Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services.
International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys), 7(3&4),
572--594.
bibtex: '@article{Jungmann_Brangewitz_Petrlic_Platenius_2014, title={Incorporating
Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services},
volume={7}, number={3&4}, journal={International Journal On Advances in Intelligent
Systems (IntSys)}, publisher={IARIA}, author={Jungmann, Alexander and Brangewitz,
Sonja and Petrlic, Ronald and Platenius, Marie Christin}, year={2014}, pages={572--594}
}'
chicago: 'Jungmann, Alexander, Sonja Brangewitz, Ronald Petrlic, and Marie Christin
Platenius. “Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes
in Markets of Composed Services.” International Journal On Advances in Intelligent
Systems (IntSys) 7, no. 3&4 (2014): 572--594.'
ieee: A. Jungmann, S. Brangewitz, R. Petrlic, and M. C. Platenius, “Incorporating
Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services,”
International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys), vol.
7, no. 3&4, pp. 572--594, 2014.
mla: Jungmann, Alexander, et al. “Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making
Processes in Markets of Composed Services.” International Journal On Advances
in Intelligent Systems (IntSys), vol. 7, no. 3&4, IARIA, 2014, pp. 572--594.
short: A. Jungmann, S. Brangewitz, R. Petrlic, M.C. Platenius, International Journal
On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys) 7 (2014) 572--594.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
file_id: '1362'
file_name: 410-intsys_v7_n34_2014_18.pdf
file_size: 2590608
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7'
issue: 3&4
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iariajournals.org/intelligent_systems/intsys_v7_n34_2014_paged.pdf
page: 572--594
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '10'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt B2
- _id: '13'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt C1
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '3'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area B
publication: International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)
publisher: IARIA
status: public
title: Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets
of Composed Services
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 7
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '440'
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D. Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions.
Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
apa: 'Kaimann, D. (2014). Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions.
Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Kaimann_2014, title={Decision Making under Asymmetric Information
in Markets for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer
Perceptions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kaimann, Daniel}, year={2014}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel. Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann, Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel. Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
short: 'D. Kaimann, Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions,
Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:01Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '183'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dkaimann
date_created: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
date_updated: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
file_id: '5424'
file_name: Dissertation_2014_Kaimann.pdf
file_size: 531139
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bernd
full_name: Frick, Bernd
last_name: Frick
title: 'Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for Experience Goods:
Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions'
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2543'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Jan-Philip
full_name: Gamp, Jan-Philip
last_name: Gamp
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs. Economics Letters. 2013;121(2):224-227. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Gamp, J.-P. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs. Economics Letters, 121(2), 224–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
bibtex: '@article{Brangewitz_Gamp_2013, title={Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs}, volume={121}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013},
number={2}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}, year={2013}, pages={224–227} }'
chicago: 'Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters 121, no. 2 (2013): 224–27.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.'
ieee: S. Brangewitz and J.-P. Gamp, “Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs,” Economics Letters, vol. 121, no. 2, pp. 224–227, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters, vol. 121, no. 2, Elsevier,
2013, pp. 224–27, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.
short: S. Brangewitz, J.-P. Gamp, Economics Letters 121 (2013) 224–227.
date_created: 2018-04-26T11:29:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
file_id: '3869'
file_name: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs.pdf
file_size: 374977
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 121'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 224-227
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Economics Letters
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0165-1765
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 121
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '474'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Suppose some individuals are allowed to engage in different groups at the
same time and they generate a certain welfare by cooperation. Finding appropriate
ways for distributing this welfare is a non-trivial issue. The purpose of this
work is to analyze two-stage allocation procedures where first each group receives
a share of the welfare which is then, subsequently, distributed among the corresponding
members. To study these procedures in a structured way, cooperative games and
network games are combined in a general framework by using mathematical hypergraphs.
Moreover, several convincing requirements on allocation procedures are discussed
and formalized. Thereby it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value
and iteratively applying the Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations.
author:
- first_name: Nils
full_name: Röhl, Nils
last_name: Röhl
citation:
ama: Röhl N. Two-Stage Allocation Procedures. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
apa: Röhl, N. (2013). Two-Stage Allocation Procedures. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Röhl_2013, title={Two-Stage Allocation Procedures}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Röhl, Nils}, year={2013} }'
chicago: Röhl, Nils. Two-Stage Allocation Procedures. Universität Paderborn,
2013.
ieee: N. Röhl, Two-Stage Allocation Procedures. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
mla: Röhl, Nils. Two-Stage Allocation Procedures. Universität Paderborn,
2013.
short: N. Röhl, Two-Stage Allocation Procedures, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:24Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:20Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
file_id: '1329'
file_name: 474-WP73.pdf
file_size: 424301
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Two-Stage Allocation Procedures
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '5146'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an
intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining
problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's)
costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private
information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish
that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency
constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem
and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated
transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the
models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete
Information. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Haake, C.-J. (2013). Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative
Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price
Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
file_id: '5148'
file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 430826
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 64'
keyword:
- Transfer Pricing
- Negotiation
- Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
- Incomplete Information
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 64
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '536'
author:
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Stroh-Maraun N. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application.
Universität Paderborn; 2013.'
apa: 'Stroh-Maraun, N. (2013). Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job
Market Application. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Stroh-Maraun_2013, title={Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and
a Job Market Application}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja}, year={2013} }'
chicago: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job
Market Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
ieee: 'N. Stroh-Maraun, Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market
Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
mla: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market
Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
short: 'N. Stroh-Maraun, Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application,
Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
department:
- _id: '205'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: 'Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '13264'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '554'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every
possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists
a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive
payoff vector.
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Jan-Philip
full_name: Gamp, Jan-Philip
last_name: Gamp
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs. Economics Letters. 2013;(2):224-227. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Gamp, J.-P. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs. Economics Letters, (2), 224–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
bibtex: '@article{Brangewitz_Gamp_2013, title={Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013},
number={2}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}, year={2013}, pages={224–227} }'
chicago: 'Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters, no. 2 (2013): 224–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.'
ieee: S. Brangewitz and J.-P. Gamp, “Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs,” Economics Letters, no. 2, pp. 224–227, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters, no. 2, Elsevier, 2013, pp.
224–27, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.
short: S. Brangewitz, J.-P. Gamp, Economics Letters (2013) 224–227.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
file_id: '1284'
file_name: 554-Asymmetric_Nash_bargaining_solutions_and_competitive_payoffs.pdf
file_size: 374965
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 224 - 227
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Economics Letters
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2519'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Jan Thomas
full_name: Martini, Jan Thomas
last_name: Martini
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Martini JT. Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2012;22(4):657-680. doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Martini, J. T. (2012). Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 22(4), 657–680. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Martini_2012, title={Negotiating Transfer Prices}, volume={22},
DOI={10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6},
number={4}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}, year={2012}, pages={657–680}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation 22, no. 4 (2012): 657–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012,
pp. 657–80, doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.
short: C.-J. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation 22 (2012) 657–680.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:49:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:54Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
file_id: '3870'
file_name: Negotiating Transfer Prices.pdf
file_size: 407410
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 22'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 657-680
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0926-2644
- 1572-9907
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Negotiating Transfer Prices
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 22
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2521'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Tim
full_name: Krieger, Tim
last_name: Krieger
- first_name: Steffen
full_name: Minter, Steffen
last_name: Minter
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Krieger T, Minter S. On the institutional design of burden sharing
when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International Economics
and Economic Policy. 2012;10(4):583-612. doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
apa: Haake, C.-J., Krieger, T., & Minter, S. (2012). On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International
Economics and Economic Policy, 10(4), 583–612. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Krieger_Minter_2012, title={On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}, volume={10},
DOI={10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3},
number={4}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}, year={2012},
pages={583–612} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Tim Krieger, and Steffen Minter. “On the Institutional
Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.”
International Economics and Economic Policy 10, no. 4 (2012): 583–612.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, and S. Minter, “On the institutional design of burden
sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,” International
Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 583–612, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing
When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.” International Economics
and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 583–612, doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic
Policy 10 (2012) 583–612.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:51:03Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
file_id: '3871'
file_name: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external
border enforcement in the EU.pdf
file_size: 442955
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 10'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 583-612
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: International Economics and Economic Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1612-4804
- 1612-4812
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border
enforcement in the EU
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 10
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '578'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements
in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common
tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability
of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our set-up,
countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze stability
by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we
allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given
form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures
as long as the size of the largest coalition does not change. Our main results
are: (1) singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate, (2) the stability
of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante.'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Sarah
full_name: Brockhoff, Sarah
last_name: Brockhoff
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Brockhoff S. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Brockhoff, S. (2012). Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Brockhoff_2012, title={Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within
Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition, Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
file_id: '1267'
file_name: 578-WP48Brangewitz.pdf
file_size: 876927
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '602'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption
in a standard infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and real collateralized
assets, together with one additional ingredient: information among players is
asymmetric and monitoring is incomplete. The key insight is that trading assets
is not only a way to hedge oneself against uncertainty and to smooth consumption
across time: It also enables learning information. Conversely, defaulting now
becomes strategic: Certain players may manipulate prices so as to provoke a default
in order to prevent their opponents from learning. We focus on learning equilibria,
at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs — not because those players
with heterogeneous beliefs were eliminated from the market (although default is
possible at equilibrium) but because they have taken time to update their prior
belief. We prove a partial Folk theorem à la Wiseman (2011) of the following form:
For any function that maps each state of the world to a sequence of feasible and
strongly individually rational allocations, and for any degree of precision, there
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which patient players learn the realized
state with this degree of precision and achieve a payoff close to the one specified
for each state.'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games
with Default. Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S. (2012). Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_2012, title={Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market
Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market
Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games
with Default, Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
file_id: '1251'
file_name: 602-12062_01.pdf
file_size: 1284802
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '34169'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games.; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S. (2012). Coalitional and Strategic Market Games.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_2012, place={Universität Bielefeld}, title={Coalitional
and Strategic Market Games}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. Universität
Bielefeld, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. Universität
Bielefeld, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, Coalitional and Strategic Market Games, Universität Bielefeld,
2012.
date_created: 2022-11-30T14:43:16Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:47:46Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
file_id: '34170'
file_name: Dissertation-Brangewitz.pdf
file_size: 1277591
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Universität Bielefeld
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Coalitional and Strategic Market Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2512'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that
is meant\r\nto combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first
source is based\r\non the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority
coalition and it is typically\r\nmodeled using a cooperative simple game. The
second source takes into account\r\nparties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative
game and it is displayed by a vector\r\nof exogenously given weights. We adopt
a normative point of view and provide an\r\naxiomatic characterization of a specific
overall power function, in which the weights\r\nenter in a proportional fashion."
author:
- first_name: Dinko
full_name: Dimitrov, Dinko
last_name: Dimitrov
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Proportionality and the power of unequal parties. International
Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;7(2):189-200. doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
apa: Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J. (2011). Proportionality and the power of unequal
parties. International Journal of Economic Theory, 7(2), 189–200.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
bibtex: '@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2011, title={Proportionality and the power of unequal
parties}, volume={7}, DOI={10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x},
number={2}, journal={International Journal of Economic Theory}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell},
author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2011}, pages={189–200}
}'
chicago: 'Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power
of Unequal Parties.” International Journal of Economic Theory 7, no. 2
(2011): 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x.'
ieee: D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Proportionality and the power of unequal parties,”
International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 189–200, 2011.
mla: Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power of
Unequal Parties.” International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no.
2, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 189–200, doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x.
short: D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (2011)
189–200.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:43:43Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
file_id: '5408'
file_name: Proportionality and the power of unequal parties.pdf
file_size: 152349
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7'
issue: '2'
jel:
- C71
- D72
language:
- iso: eng
page: 189-200
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: International Journal of Economic Theory
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1742-7355
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
status: public
title: Proportionality and the power of unequal parties
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 7
year: '2011'
...
---
_id: '651'
author:
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Stroh-Maraun N. Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme.
Universität Paderborn; 2011.
apa: Stroh-Maraun, N. (2011). Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler
Verhandlungsprobleme. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Stroh-Maraun_2011, title={Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler
Verhandlungsprobleme}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja}, year={2011} }'
chicago: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler
Verhandlungsprobleme. Universität Paderborn, 2011.
ieee: N. Stroh-Maraun, Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme.
Universität Paderborn, 2011.
mla: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme.
Universität Paderborn, 2011.
short: N. Stroh-Maraun, Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme,
Universität Paderborn, 2011.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:58Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:08Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '13264'
year: '2011'
...
---
_id: '2510'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bettina
full_name: Klaus, Bettina
last_name: Klaus
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with
couples. Theory and Decision. 2010;69(4):537-554. doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B. (2010). Stability and Nash implementation in
matching markets with couples. Theory and Decision, 69(4), 537–554.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Klaus_2010, title={Stability and Nash implementation in
matching markets with couples}, volume={69}, DOI={10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2},
number={4}, journal={Theory and Decision}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2010}, pages={537–554} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Couples.” Theory and Decision 69, no. 4 (2010):
537–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Stability and Nash implementation in matching
markets with couples,” Theory and Decision, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 537–554,
2010, doi: 10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Couples.” Theory and Decision, vol. 69, no. 4,
Springer Nature, 2010, pp. 537–54, doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.
short: C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Theory and Decision 69 (2010) 537–554.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:42:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
file_id: '5121'
file_name: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples.pdf
file_size: 243144
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 69'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 537-554
publication: Theory and Decision
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0040-5833
- 1573-7187
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 69
year: '2010'
...
---
_id: '2508'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bettina
full_name: Klaus, Bettina
last_name: Klaus
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Klaus B. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets
with contracts. Economic Theory. 2009;41(3):393-410. doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B. (2009). Monotonicity and Nash implementation
in matching markets with contracts. Economic Theory, 41(3), 393–410.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Klaus_2009, title={Monotonicity and Nash implementation
in matching markets with contracts}, volume={41}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8},
number={3}, journal={Economic Theory}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2009}, pages={393–410} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Contracts.” Economic Theory 41, no. 3 (2009):
393–410. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching
markets with contracts,” Economic Theory, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 393–410,
2009, doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Contracts.” Economic Theory, vol. 41, no. 3, Springer
Nature, 2009, pp. 393–410, doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Economic Theory 41 (2009) 393–410.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:38:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:50Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
file_id: '5120'
file_name: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts.pdf
file_size: 260275
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 41'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 393-410
publication: Economic Theory
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0938-2259
- 1432-0479
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 41
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '2531'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects
among\r\nthemselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure.
Depending on the\r\nspecifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining
solutions such as the discrete\r\nRaiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
and the Perles-Maschler solution. The\r\nlatter is axiomatized using the superadditivity
axiom, which in the present context is\r\nreadily interpreted as resolving a specific
source of conflict potential."
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J. DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.
International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(01):15-32. doi:10.1142/s0219198909002121'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J. (2009). DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES. International Game Theory Review, 11(01), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121'
bibtex: '@article{Haake_2009, title={DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH
MARKET PROCEDURES}, volume={11}, DOI={10.1142/s0219198909002121},
number={01}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific
Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2009}, pages={15–32} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES.” International Game Theory Review 11, no. 01 (2009): 15–32.
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,”
International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES.” International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, no. 01, World Scientific
Pub Co Pte Lt, 2009, pp. 15–32, doi:10.1142/s0219198909002121.'
short: C.-J. Haake, International Game Theory Review 11 (2009) 15–32.
date_created: 2018-04-26T11:08:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:00Z
ddc:
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doi: 10.1142/s0219198909002121
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language:
- iso: eng
page: 15-32
publication: International Game Theory Review
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0219-1989
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publication_status: published
publisher: World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
status: public
title: 'DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES'
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 11
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '2502'
author:
- first_name: Dinko
full_name: Dimitrov, Dinko
last_name: Dimitrov
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. Games
and Economic Behavior. 2008;62(2):460-475. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
apa: Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict
core. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), 460–475. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
bibtex: '@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2008, title={Stable governments and the semistrict
core}, volume={62}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003},
number={2}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Dimitrov,
Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2008}, pages={460–475} }'
chicago: 'Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict
Core.” Games and Economic Behavior 62, no. 2 (2008): 460–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003.'
ieee: D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core,”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 460–475, 2008.
mla: Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict
Core.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, no. 2, Elsevier BV, 2008,
pp. 460–75, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003.
short: D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 460–475.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:26:50Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:43Z
ddc:
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issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 460-475
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0899-8256
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: Stable governments and the semistrict core
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 62
year: '2008'
...
---
_id: '2503'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Akemi
full_name: Kashiwada, Akemi
last_name: Kashiwada
- first_name: Francis Edward
full_name: Su, Francis Edward
last_name: Su
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Kashiwada A, Su FE. The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees. Journal
of Mathematical Biology. 2008;56(4):479-497. doi:10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
apa: Haake, C.-J., Kashiwada, A., & Su, F. E. (2008). The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 56(4), 479–497. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Kashiwada_Su_2008, title={The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees}, volume={56}, DOI={10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2},
number={4}, journal={Journal of Mathematical Biology}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Kashiwada, Akemi and Su, Francis Edward}, year={2008},
pages={479–497} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Akemi Kashiwada, and Francis Edward Su. “The Shapley
Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” Journal of Mathematical Biology 56, no. 4
(2008): 479–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, and F. E. Su, “The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 479–497, 2008.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “The Shapley Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” Journal
of Mathematical Biology, vol. 56, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2008, pp. 479–97,
doi:10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2.
short: C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, F.E. Su, Journal of Mathematical Biology 56 (2008)
479–497.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:29:59Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:44Z
ddc:
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department:
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doi: 10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
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creator: stela
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file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:37:33Z
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intvolume: ' 56'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 479-497
publication: Journal of Mathematical Biology
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0303-6812
- 1432-1416
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 56
year: '2008'
...