---
_id: '2565'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential
games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient
cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights
fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept
is applied to an adverting differential game.
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Hoof, Simon
id: '59676'
last_name: Hoof
citation:
ama: Hoof S. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games.
Vol 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.
apa: Hoof, S. (2018). Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential
games (Vol. 112). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Hoof_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Feedback Pareto weights
in cooperative NTU differential games}, volume={112}, publisher={CIE Working Paper
Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, collection={Working
Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential
Games. Vol. 112. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
ieee: S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games,
vol. 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
mla: Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games.
Vol. 112, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
short: S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games, CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-03T07:50:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
date_updated: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
file_id: '4382'
file_name: WP - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games.pdf
file_size: 263766
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 112'
keyword:
- NTU differential games
- variable Pareto weights
- agreeability
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 112
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2566'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal
Preferences. Economics Letters. 2018;170:39-41. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters, 170, 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033},
journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences,” Economics Letters, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters, vol. 170, Elsevier,
2018, pp. 39–41, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41.
date_created: 2018-05-03T07:53:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:08:17Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
file_id: '3854'
file_name: 1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf
file_size: 261888
relation: main_file
title: Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 170'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 39 - 41
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Economics Letters
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: journal_article
urn: '25669'
user_id: '477'
volume: 170
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3742'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Hoof, Simon
id: '59676'
last_name: Hoof
citation:
ama: 'Hoof S. Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining
Solution. In: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications.
Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:13-23. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2'
apa: 'Hoof, S. (2018). Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive
Nash Bargaining Solution. In Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations
& Applications (pp. 13–23). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2'
bibtex: '@inbook{Hoof_2018, place={Cham}, title={Dynamic Voluntary Provision of
Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2},
booktitle={Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications},
publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018},
pages={13–23} }'
chicago: 'Hoof, Simon. “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive
Nash Bargaining Solution.” In Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations
& Applications, 13–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2.'
ieee: 'S. Hoof, “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash
Bargaining Solution,” in Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations &
Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 13–23.'
mla: 'Hoof, Simon. “Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash
Bargaining Solution.” Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications,
Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 13–23, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2.'
short: 'S. Hoof, in: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications,
Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 13–23.'
date_created: 2018-08-01T09:51:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:34Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T16:10:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:10:34Z
file_id: '5325'
file_name: Hoof2018_Chapter_DynamicVoluntaryProvisionOfPub.pdf
file_size: 199568
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:10:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 13-23
place: Cham
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: 'Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications'
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783319929873'
- '9783319929880'
issn:
- 2363-8516
- 2363-8524
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer International Publishing
status: public
title: 'Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining
Solution'
type: book_chapter
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2933'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the
maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution
and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which
includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider
a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining
solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique
up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters.
We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining
theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great
variety of new bargaining solutions.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Cheng-Zhong
full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong
last_name: Qin
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the
bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.'
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers
CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions
to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining
problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to
the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
file_id: '3855'
file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf
file_size: 469001
relation: main_file
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 113'
keyword:
- Bargaining problem
- CES Function
- Normalized CES Function
- Nash solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Egalitarian Solution.
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
type: working_paper
urn: '29332'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 113
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3098'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom
mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically
established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz
(2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement
of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis
note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952)
is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign
is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame
or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive
equilibrium of an economy."
author:
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H,
Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies
in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.'
apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F.
Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic
Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic
Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies
in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi
and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }'
chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.”
In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin,
Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg:
Springer, n.d.'
ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in
Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W.
Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.'
mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies
in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.
short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker
(Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.'
date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: Jean-Francois
full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois
last_name: Laslier
- first_name: Herve
full_name: Moulin, Herve
last_name: Moulin
- first_name: Remzi
full_name: Sanver, Remzi
last_name: Sanver
- first_name: William
full_name: Zwicker, William
last_name: Zwicker
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
file_id: '3857'
file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf
file_size: 141983
relation: main_file
title: Thoughts on Social Design
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Heidelberg
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Studies in Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2510-3970
publication_status: accepted
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: Studies in Economic Design
status: public
title: Thoughts on Social Design
type: book_chapter
urn: '30987'
user_id: '477'
volume: (n.d.)
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5967'
author:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Koch, Alexander
last_name: Koch
citation:
ama: Koch A. Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Koch, A. (2018). Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels
Koalitionsbildung. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Koch_2018, title={Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid
mittels Koalitionsbildung}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Koch, Alexander},
year={2018} }'
chicago: Koch, Alexander. Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels
Koalitionsbildung. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: A. Koch, Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Koch, Alexander. Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels
Koalitionsbildung. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: A. Koch, Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung,
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T12:07:30Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:48Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '65453'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1063'
author:
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Joe
full_name: Cox, Joe
last_name: Cox
citation:
ama: 'Stroh-Maraun N, Kaimann D, Cox J. More than skills: A novel matching proposal
for multiplayer video games. Entertainment Computing. 2018;25:26-36. doi:10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002'
apa: 'Stroh-Maraun, N., Kaimann, D., & Cox, J. (2018). More than skills: A novel
matching proposal for multiplayer video games. Entertainment Computing,
25, 26–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002'
bibtex: '@article{Stroh-Maraun_Kaimann_Cox_2018, title={More than skills: A novel
matching proposal for multiplayer video games}, volume={25}, DOI={10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002},
journal={Entertainment Computing}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja and Kaimann, Daniel and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={26–36} }'
chicago: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, Daniel Kaimann, and Joe Cox. “More than Skills: A
Novel Matching Proposal for Multiplayer Video Games.” Entertainment Computing
25 (2018): 26–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002.'
ieee: 'N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, and J. Cox, “More than skills: A novel matching
proposal for multiplayer video games,” Entertainment Computing, vol. 25,
pp. 26–36, 2018.'
mla: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, et al. “More than Skills: A Novel Matching Proposal for
Multiplayer Video Games.” Entertainment Computing, vol. 25, Elsevier, 2018,
pp. 26–36, doi:10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002.'
short: N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing 25 (2018) 26–36.
date_created: 2017-12-18T10:35:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:49Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '183'
doi: 10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:14:40Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:14:40Z
file_id: '3906'
file_name: More than skills - A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games.pdf
file_size: 297649
relation: main_file
title: 'More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games'
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:14:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 25'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 26-36
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
publication: Entertainment Computing
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: 'More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games'
type: journal_article
user_id: '13264'
volume: 25
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1173'
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
- first_name: Joe
full_name: Cox, Joe
last_name: Cox
citation:
ama: Kaimann D, Stroh-Maraun N, Cox J. A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences
and Determinants of Video Game Consumption. Journal of Consumer Behaviour.
2018;17(3):290-301. doi:10.1002/cb.1711
apa: Kaimann, D., Stroh-Maraun, N., & Cox, J. (2018). A Duration Model Analysis
of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption. Journal
of Consumer Behaviour, 17(3), 290–301. https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Stroh-Maraun_Cox_2018, title={A Duration Model Analysis
of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}, volume={17},
DOI={10.1002/cb.1711}, number={3},
journal={Journal of Consumer Behaviour}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Kaimann,
Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={290–301} }'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, Nadja Stroh-Maraun, and Joe Cox. “A Duration Model Analysis
of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption.” Journal
of Consumer Behaviour 17, no. 3 (2018): 290–301. https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1711.'
ieee: D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, and J. Cox, “A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer
Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption,” Journal of Consumer
Behaviour, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 290–301, 2018.
mla: Kaimann, Daniel, et al. “A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences
and Determinants of Video Game Consumption.” Journal of Consumer Behaviour,
vol. 17, no. 3, Wiley Online Library, 2018, pp. 290–301, doi:10.1002/cb.1711.
short: D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour 17 (2018)
290–301.
date_created: 2018-02-14T12:30:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:08Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '183'
doi: 10.1002/cb.1711
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:23:38Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:23:38Z
file_id: '3908'
file_name: A duration model analysis of consumer preferences and determinants of
video game consumption.pdf
file_size: 425823
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:23:38Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 17'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 290 - 301
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
publication: Journal of Consumer Behaviour
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
status: public
title: A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video
Game Consumption
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 17
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15206'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note
on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability
in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE.
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice
with Reciprocal Preferences, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:03:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
file_id: '15209'
file_name: WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf
file_size: 328319
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 111'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 111
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15207'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the
classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine
whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally
tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With
complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze
the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed
in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively
derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible,
alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative
game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which
the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’
equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium
is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this
study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the
same purpose.'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University; 2018.
apa: Duman, P. (2018). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational
Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game},
volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman,
Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
mla: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
file_id: '15208'
file_name: WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game.pdf
file_size: 678790
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 117'
keyword:
- Chain Store Game
- reputation building
- entry deterrence
- Trockel's game
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 117
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1031'
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
- first_name: Joe
full_name: Cox, Joe
last_name: Cox
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D, Stroh-Maraun N, Cox J. Variety in the video game industry: An empirical
study of the Wundt curve. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2018;39(3):354-362.
doi:10.1002/mde.2909'
apa: 'Kaimann, D., Stroh-Maraun, N., & Cox, J. (2018). Variety in the video
game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve. Managerial and Decision
Economics, 39(3), 354–362. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909'
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Stroh-Maraun_Cox_2018, title={Variety in the video game
industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}, volume={39}, DOI={10.1002/mde.2909},
number={3}, journal={Managerial and Decision Economics}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell},
author={Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}, year={2018}, pages={354–362}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, Nadja Stroh-Maraun, and Joe Cox. “Variety in the Video
Game Industry: An Empirical Study of the Wundt Curve.” Managerial and Decision
Economics 39, no. 3 (2018): 354–62. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2909.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, and J. Cox, “Variety in the video game industry:
An empirical study of the Wundt curve,” Managerial and Decision Economics,
vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 354–362, 2018.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, et al. “Variety in the Video Game Industry: An Empirical
Study of the Wundt Curve.” Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 39,
no. 3, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 354–62, doi:10.1002/mde.2909.'
short: D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics 39
(2018) 354–362.
date_created: 2017-12-06T15:16:58Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:36Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '183'
doi: 10.1002/mde.2909
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:21:08Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:21:08Z
file_id: '3907'
file_name: Variety in the video game industry - An empirical study of the Wundt
curve.pdf
file_size: 434901
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:21:08Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 39'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 354 - 362
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
publication: Managerial and Decision Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0143-6570
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
status: public
title: 'Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve'
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 39
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5963'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: 'N N. Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in
Vertically Related Industries. Universität Paderborn; 2018.'
apa: 'N, N. (2018). Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining
in Vertically Related Industries. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under
Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
author={N, N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: 'N, N. Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining
in Vertically Related Industries. Universität Paderborn, 2018.'
ieee: 'N. N, Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining
in Vertically Related Industries. Universität Paderborn, 2018.'
mla: 'N, N. Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining
in Vertically Related Industries. Universität Paderborn, 2018.'
short: 'N. N, Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in
Vertically Related Industries, Universität Paderborn, 2018.'
date_created: 2018-11-28T12:00:49Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:16:03Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: 'Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically
Related Industries'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5962'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply
Chains. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten
Supply Chains}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: N, N. Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply
Chains. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in Vertikal Integrierten Supply Chains,
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:58:25Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:15:43Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5961'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich Effizienz Und Schwachstellen
Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich Effizienz und Schwachstellen
anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich Effizienz
und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: N, N. School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich Effizienz Und Schwachstellen
Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich Effizienz und Schwachstellen
anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich Effizienz Und Schwachstellen
Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, School-Choice Mechanismen Im Vergleich Effizienz Und Schwachstellen
Anhand von Beispielen Aus Theorie Und Praxis, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:55:27Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:18:52Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand
von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5958'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme
Als Lösungsansatz. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität
- Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität
- Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N,
N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: N, N. Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität -
Reputationssysteme Als Lösungsansatz. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme
als Lösungsansatz. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme
Als Lösungsansatz. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, Auswirkungen Asymmetrischer Information Auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme
Als Lösungsansatz, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:48:06Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:17:55Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme
als Lösungsansatz
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5959'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information
about Opponent. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information
about opponent. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with
no information about opponent}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N,
N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: N, N. Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information
about Opponent. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information
about opponent. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information
about Opponent. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, Automated Bilateral Multiple-Issue Negotiation with No Information
about Opponent, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:50:46Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:18:11Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5964'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: N, N. Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie, Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T12:02:55Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:19:08Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5960'
author:
- first_name: N
full_name: N, N
last_name: N
citation:
ama: N N. Anreize in Bewertungssysteme. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: N, N. (2018). Anreize in Bewertungssysteme. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N_2018, title={Anreize in Bewertungssysteme}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={N, N}, year={2018} }'
chicago: N, N. Anreize in Bewertungssysteme. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: N. N, Anreize in Bewertungssysteme. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: N, N. Anreize in Bewertungssysteme. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: N. N, Anreize in Bewertungssysteme, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:53:06Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:18:31Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Anreize in Bewertungssysteme
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...