@misc{43058, author = {{Tiessen, Michelle}}, title = {{{Zur Effektivität des europäischen Kronzeugenprogramms - Der Fall des LKW-Kartells}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{44092, abstract = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.}}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}}, title = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4689}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{44093, abstract = {{We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, keywords = {{Quality competition, Price regulation, Location choice, Product differentiation}}, title = {{{Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{48500, author = {{Namujju, Lillian Donna and Acquah-Swanzy, Henrietta and Ngoti, Irene F.}}, issn = {{0301-4215}}, journal = {{Energy Policy}}, keywords = {{Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, General Energy}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{An IAD framework analysis of minigrid institutions for sustainable rural electrification in East Africa: A comparative study of Uganda and Tanzania}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113742}}, volume = {{182}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{30341, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}}, issn = {{2214-8043}}, journal = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}}, keywords = {{General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology}}, pages = {{101869}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{31881, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, journal = {{International Journal of Game Theory}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}}, year = {{2022}}, } @phdthesis{32856, author = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede}}, title = {{{Essays on Industrial Organization and Networks: Retail Bundling, Exclusive Dealing, and Network Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-1581}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{39963, author = {{Bas, Sahin}}, title = {{{Die Luftfahrt zwischen Liberalisierung und Konsolidierung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse von Low-Cost- und Networkairlines}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40464, author = {{Erdogan, Yeliz}}, title = {{{Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse von Supermärkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40468, author = {{Perampalam, Abirame}}, title = {{{Zum Potenzial von Kryptowährungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse zu den Chancen und Risiken digitaler Währungen}}}, year = {{2022}}, }