@misc{40465, author = {{Kanne, Niklas}}, title = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch digitaler Plattformen - eine Analyse anhand der zehnten Novelle des GWB}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40466, author = {{Klüppel, Pascal}}, title = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch von Google – Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40473, author = {{Yigitbas , Osman}}, title = {{{Preisabsprachen in der Automobilindustrie - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40470, author = {{Schulte, Marcel}}, title = {{{Facebooks digitale Währung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @phdthesis{15824, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16273, abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17350, abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{641--660}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}}, volume = {{177}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39070, author = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39072, author = {{Schlegel, Manuela}}, title = {{{Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers}}}, year = {{2020}}, }