@misc{39079, author = {{Neibert, Katharina}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39077, author = {{Naseri, Gitti}}, title = {{{Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39073, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, title = {{{Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39081, author = {{Posmetni, Lena}}, title = {{{Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39346, author = {{Hensel, Jason}}, title = {{{Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39347, author = {{Multani, Manjinder Singh}}, title = {{{Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{38098, author = {{Bellouchi, Houda}}, title = {{{Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{13148, abstract = {{This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions.}}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{469--485}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39056, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, title = {{{"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39059, author = {{Memon, Uzair Ahmed}}, title = {{{On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39067, author = {{Milczarek, André}}, title = {{{Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{37684, author = {{Heinrichs, Fabian}}, title = {{{Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38042, author = {{Fortmeier, Julia}}, title = {{{Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38045, author = {{Hagedorn, Carolin}}, title = {{{The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38097, author = {{Ayyildiz, Berfin}}, title = {{{Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38093, author = {{Shelepova, Ekaterina}}, title = {{{Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38096, author = {{Shanmugaratnam, Suganya}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38099, author = {{Faizan, Ahmed}}, title = {{{The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging Cartel Activities}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{3101, abstract = {{Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.}}, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, keywords = {{Corruption, Reciprocity, Physician-Patient Relationship}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8074, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8075, author = {{Suvorina, Tatiana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{4793, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, title = {{{Corruption in the health care sector : the influence of bribery and relative reciprocity on a physician's prescription decision}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{4797, author = {{Wu, Xing}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-358}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4802, author = {{Akcay, Yasemen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4804, author = {{Görken, Emre}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4805, author = {{Dalkiran, Alpaslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4806, author = {{Gräper, Gerrit}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4807, author = {{Hammo, Hüssein}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4821, author = {{Brachmann, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4822, author = {{Förstenberg, Niklas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4827, author = {{Khan, Zohaib Ahmad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions?}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4828, author = {{Kusch, Thomas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1066, author = {{Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1067, author = {{Kersting, Florian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1068, author = {{Beichl, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{37703, author = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}}, title = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{83, author = {{Uden, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{86, author = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{51, author = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1055, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1056, author = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1069, author = {{Petersen, Henning Cornelius}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1070, author = {{Turan, Alparslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1071, author = {{Iding, Jerome}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1072, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1075, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1076, author = {{Goebel, Marion}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1077, author = {{Wagemeyer, Marleen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1078, author = {{Shabani, Albana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1079, author = {{Hamacher, Dustin Stefan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1083, abstract = {{In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, volume = {{110}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{196, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fußwallwunder Leicester City - Auch in der Bundesliga möglich? Ein ökonomischer Vergleich des Wettbewerbs in der Bundesliga mit der englischen Premier League}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{202, author = {{Dimant, Eugen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Economics of Corruption and Crime: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Behavioral Ethics}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{178, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{179, author = {{Pehlivan, Muhammet}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the abuse of market power - an economic perspective of Microsoft antitrust cases}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{182, author = {{Kesmen, Belma}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in der Internetökonomie - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{2252, abstract = {{We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas, Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, title = {{{Do talented women shy away from competition?}}}, volume = {{16-06}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{130, author = {{Kaczorkowski, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb im Internet - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des E-Commerce}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{256, author = {{Zindler, Finn}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Selektive Vertriebssysteme am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{282, author = {{Kirsch, Michelle}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Koordinierter Patentschutz in einer globalisierten Welt - Effizienz- und Anreizwirkungen auf die Arzneimittelversorgung in Entwicklungsländern}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{292, author = {{Osburg, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fusionen von gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen zu den Effizienz- und Wechselwirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{294, author = {{Materna, GinaJoanna}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - Eine neue Perspektive in der internationalen Handelspolitik}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{295, author = {{Goronczewski, Patricia}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - An economic investigation of benefits and drawbacks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{298, author = {{Plonka, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entwicklung von Ablösesummen und Gehälter in der Fußball-Bundesliga - Salary Caps als mögliches Modell der Chancengleichheit}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{306, author = {{Kunisch, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{309, author = {{Topal, Barlas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{234, author = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{229, author = {{Schulz, Hannah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{330, author = {{Drigalsky, Liesa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{362, author = {{Kaiser, Sarah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2709, abstract = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0932-4569}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{225--248}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}}, doi = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{1923, abstract = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{644--664}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{392, author = {{Brummel, NinaMadeleine}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{413, author = {{Eusterholz, Fabian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{437, author = {{Wemhöner, Vanessa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @techreport{2249, abstract = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}}, volume = {{12-06}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{4157, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0313-5926}}, journal = {{Economic Analysis and Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{49--70}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Paying for Performance in Hospitals}}}, doi = {{10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2011}}, } @article{3418, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Wambach, Achim}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{853----858}}, title = {{{Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation}}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4154, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Possajennikov, Alex and Guse, Tobias}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{254--258}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011}}, volume = {{73}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4155, author = {{Angerhausen, Julia and Bayer, Christian and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{439--461}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Strategic Unemployment}}}, volume = {{166}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4156, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, issn = {{0165-1889}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{1357--1380}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.001}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2008}}, } @article{4158, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0043-6275}}, journal = {{Wirtschaftsdienst}}, number = {{11}}, pages = {{768--772}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Die Grundlagen der Mechanismus-Design-Theorie}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10273-007-0732-z}}, volume = {{87}}, year = {{2007}}, } @article{4159, author = {{Guse, T. and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0048-5829}}, journal = {{Public Choice}}, number = {{3-4}}, pages = {{323--352}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11127-006-9033-0}}, volume = {{129}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4163, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0015-2218}}, journal = {{FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{124--148}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams}}}, doi = {{10.1628/001522106776667040}}, volume = {{62}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4160, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1045--1057}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4161, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{03}}, pages = {{249--262}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}}, volume = {{05}}, year = {{2003}}, } @article{4162, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0899-8256}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{44--76}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox}}}, doi = {{10.1006/game.2001.0902}}, volume = {{40}}, year = {{2002}}, } @article{3410, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, issn = {{0936-9937}}, journal = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{367--371}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s001910050087}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{1999}}, } @article{3417, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles}}, issn = {{0936-9937}}, journal = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{211--224}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s001910050081}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{1999}}, }