@misc{40467, author = {{Nassar, Hamza}}, title = {{{Mergers on digital markets - An economic analysis}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40469, author = {{Sarsar, Abdelmajid}}, title = {{{Monopolbildung im Zuge der Globalisierung und Digitalisierung der GAFA-Unternehmen (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40474, author = {{Bas, Mikail}}, title = {{{Kartelle und technischen Absprachen zur Forschung und Entwicklung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse anhand der Automobilindustrie}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40472, author = {{Vikue, Baribuma Lucy}}, title = {{{Blockchain Technology and the Internet of Thing-Risks and Chances for Supply Chains}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40471, author = {{Taskin, Ibrahim}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von Kaiser's Tengelmann und EDEKA - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42525, author = {{Dubbert, Annika}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in Online-Märkten und die Herausforderungen für die Wettbewerbsbehörden - eine wettbewerbspolitische Betrachtung}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42526, author = {{Miftari, Ardita}}, title = {{{Zur Bekämpfung von Marktmachtmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten – Wettbewerbspolitische Maßnahmen im Vergleich}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42527, author = {{Minhaj, Noor}}, title = {{{Of the efficacy of competition law in dealing with challenges of digital markets - Selected cases of Facebook}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42528, author = {{Rayhan, Md. Sashi}}, title = {{{On the Efficacy of EU Competition Policy in the Context of Big Data}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42524, author = {{Busch, Anna Lisa}}, title = {{{On the privatization of hospitals - The case of Germany}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42948, author = {{Kuzuoglu, Muhammed Numan}}, title = {{{Der Marktplatz von Amazon - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{43057, author = {{Sowinski, Olivia}}, title = {{{Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf personalisierte Angebote in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{43056, author = {{Schmidt, Thomas}}, title = {{{Zu den Vor- und Nachteilen von Luftfahrtallianzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Perspektive auf den Alleingang von Emirates}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{43059, author = {{Yeboah, Amoabeng}}, title = {{{An Economic Analysis of Mergers and Aquisitions - The case of Facebook and WhatsApp}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42947, author = {{Hensel, Jason}}, title = {{{Zu Online-Vergleichsportalen und deren Auswirkungen auf den Markt - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{44091, abstract = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}}, author = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}}, keywords = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}}, pages = {{43}}, title = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{39351, author = {{Heinze, Erik}}, title = {{{Kollusion durch Plattformen - der Einfluss von Tank-Apps auf den Preiswettbewerb von Tankstellen in Deutschland}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{39358, author = {{Rayhan, Shahi}}, title = {{{Big Data in Digital Markets - Challenges for Competition Policy to Protect Consumer Welfare}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{39356, author = {{Joshan, Saeid}}, title = {{{Network Development of Low-Cost Carriers at German Airports}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{39962, author = {{Ajredini, Zurkani}}, title = {{{Plattformgestaltungen auf digitalen Märkten - eine Analyse der Wohlfahrtseffekte}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40465, author = {{Kanne, Niklas}}, title = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch digitaler Plattformen - eine Analyse anhand der zehnten Novelle des GWB}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40466, author = {{Klüppel, Pascal}}, title = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch von Google – Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40473, author = {{Yigitbas , Osman}}, title = {{{Preisabsprachen in der Automobilindustrie - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{40470, author = {{Schulte, Marcel}}, title = {{{Facebooks digitale Währung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @phdthesis{15824, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16273, abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17350, abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{641--660}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}}, volume = {{177}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39070, author = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39072, author = {{Schlegel, Manuela}}, title = {{{Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39079, author = {{Neibert, Katharina}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39077, author = {{Naseri, Gitti}}, title = {{{Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39073, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, title = {{{Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39081, author = {{Posmetni, Lena}}, title = {{{Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39346, author = {{Hensel, Jason}}, title = {{{Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{39347, author = {{Multani, Manjinder Singh}}, title = {{{Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{38098, author = {{Bellouchi, Houda}}, title = {{{Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{13148, abstract = {{This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions.}}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{469--485}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39056, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, title = {{{"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39059, author = {{Memon, Uzair Ahmed}}, title = {{{On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39067, author = {{Milczarek, André}}, title = {{{Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{37684, author = {{Heinrichs, Fabian}}, title = {{{Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38042, author = {{Fortmeier, Julia}}, title = {{{Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38045, author = {{Hagedorn, Carolin}}, title = {{{The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers}}}, year = {{2019}}, }