@techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{13148, abstract = {{This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions.}}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{469--485}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39056, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, title = {{{"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39059, author = {{Memon, Uzair Ahmed}}, title = {{{On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{39067, author = {{Milczarek, André}}, title = {{{Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{37684, author = {{Heinrichs, Fabian}}, title = {{{Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38042, author = {{Fortmeier, Julia}}, title = {{{Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38045, author = {{Hagedorn, Carolin}}, title = {{{The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38097, author = {{Ayyildiz, Berfin}}, title = {{{Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38093, author = {{Shelepova, Ekaterina}}, title = {{{Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38096, author = {{Shanmugaratnam, Suganya}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{38099, author = {{Faizan, Ahmed}}, title = {{{The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging Cartel Activities}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{3101, abstract = {{Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.}}, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, keywords = {{Corruption, Reciprocity, Physician-Patient Relationship}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8074, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8075, author = {{Suvorina, Tatiana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{4793, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, title = {{{Corruption in the health care sector : the influence of bribery and relative reciprocity on a physician's prescription decision}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{4797, author = {{Wu, Xing}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-358}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4802, author = {{Akcay, Yasemen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4804, author = {{Görken, Emre}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4805, author = {{Dalkiran, Alpaslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4806, author = {{Gräper, Gerrit}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4807, author = {{Hammo, Hüssein}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4821, author = {{Brachmann, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4822, author = {{Förstenberg, Niklas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4827, author = {{Khan, Zohaib Ahmad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions?}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4828, author = {{Kusch, Thomas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1066, author = {{Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1067, author = {{Kersting, Florian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1068, author = {{Beichl, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{37703, author = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}}, title = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{83, author = {{Uden, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{86, author = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{51, author = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1055, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1056, author = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1069, author = {{Petersen, Henning Cornelius}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1070, author = {{Turan, Alparslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1071, author = {{Iding, Jerome}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1072, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1075, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1076, author = {{Goebel, Marion}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1077, author = {{Wagemeyer, Marleen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1078, author = {{Shabani, Albana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1079, author = {{Hamacher, Dustin Stefan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1083, abstract = {{In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, volume = {{110}}, year = {{2017}}, }