@misc{1067, author = {{Kersting, Florian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1068, author = {{Beichl, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{37703, author = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}}, title = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{83, author = {{Uden, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{86, author = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{51, author = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1055, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1056, author = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1069, author = {{Petersen, Henning Cornelius}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1070, author = {{Turan, Alparslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1071, author = {{Iding, Jerome}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1072, author = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1075, author = {{Laudage, Felix}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1076, author = {{Goebel, Marion}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1077, author = {{Wagemeyer, Marleen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1078, author = {{Shabani, Albana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{1079, author = {{Hamacher, Dustin Stefan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1083, abstract = {{In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, volume = {{110}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{196, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fußwallwunder Leicester City - Auch in der Bundesliga möglich? Ein ökonomischer Vergleich des Wettbewerbs in der Bundesliga mit der englischen Premier League}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{202, author = {{Dimant, Eugen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Economics of Corruption and Crime: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Behavioral Ethics}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{178, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{179, author = {{Pehlivan, Muhammet}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the abuse of market power - an economic perspective of Microsoft antitrust cases}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{182, author = {{Kesmen, Belma}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in der Internetökonomie - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{2252, abstract = {{We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas, Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, title = {{{Do talented women shy away from competition?}}}, volume = {{16-06}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{130, author = {{Kaczorkowski, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb im Internet - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des E-Commerce}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{256, author = {{Zindler, Finn}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Selektive Vertriebssysteme am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{282, author = {{Kirsch, Michelle}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Koordinierter Patentschutz in einer globalisierten Welt - Effizienz- und Anreizwirkungen auf die Arzneimittelversorgung in Entwicklungsländern}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{292, author = {{Osburg, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fusionen von gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen zu den Effizienz- und Wechselwirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{294, author = {{Materna, GinaJoanna}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - Eine neue Perspektive in der internationalen Handelspolitik}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{295, author = {{Goronczewski, Patricia}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fair Trade - An economic investigation of benefits and drawbacks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{298, author = {{Plonka, Dennis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entwicklung von Ablösesummen und Gehälter in der Fußball-Bundesliga - Salary Caps als mögliches Modell der Chancengleichheit}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{306, author = {{Kunisch, Christina}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{309, author = {{Topal, Barlas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{234, author = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{229, author = {{Schulz, Hannah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{330, author = {{Drigalsky, Liesa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{362, author = {{Kaiser, Sarah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2709, abstract = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0932-4569}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{225--248}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}}, doi = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{1923, abstract = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{644--664}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{392, author = {{Brummel, NinaMadeleine}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{413, author = {{Eusterholz, Fabian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{437, author = {{Wemhöner, Vanessa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @techreport{2249, abstract = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}}, volume = {{12-06}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{4157, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0313-5926}}, journal = {{Economic Analysis and Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{49--70}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Paying for Performance in Hospitals}}}, doi = {{10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2011}}, } @article{3418, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Wambach, Achim}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{853----858}}, title = {{{Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation}}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4154, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Possajennikov, Alex and Guse, Tobias}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{254--258}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011}}, volume = {{73}}, year = {{2010}}, }