@techreport{2252,
  abstract     = {{We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort
of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield
experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in
competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm
that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears,
however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high
school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact,
the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers
who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our
task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a
signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception
of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later
on in life.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas, Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}},
  title        = {{{Do talented women shy away from competition?}}},
  volume       = {{16-06}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{130,
  author       = {{Kaczorkowski, Jessica}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Wettbewerb im Internet - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des E-Commerce}}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

@misc{256,
  author       = {{Zindler, Finn}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Selektive Vertriebssysteme am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{282,
  author       = {{Kirsch, Michelle}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Koordinierter Patentschutz in einer globalisierten Welt - Effizienz- und Anreizwirkungen auf die Arzneimittelversorgung in Entwicklungsländern}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{292,
  author       = {{Osburg, Christina}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Fusionen von gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen zu den Effizienz- und Wechselwirkungen}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{294,
  author       = {{Materna, GinaJoanna}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Fair Trade - Eine neue Perspektive in der internationalen Handelspolitik}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{295,
  author       = {{Goronczewski, Patricia}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Fair Trade - An economic investigation of benefits and drawbacks}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{298,
  author       = {{Plonka, Dennis}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Entwicklung von Ablösesummen und Gehälter in der Fußball-Bundesliga - Salary Caps als mögliches Modell der Chancengleichheit}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{306,
  author       = {{Kunisch, Christina}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{309,
  author       = {{Topal, Barlas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{234,
  author       = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{229,
  author       = {{Schulz, Hannah}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{330,
  author       = {{Drigalsky, Liesa}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@misc{362,
  author       = {{Kaiser, Sarah}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2709,
  abstract     = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }},
  author       = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0932-4569}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{225--248}},
  publisher    = {{Mohr Siebeck}},
  title        = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}},
  doi          = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}},
  volume       = {{170}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{1923,
  abstract     = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}},
  author       = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}},
  issn         = {{1024-2694}},
  journal      = {{Defence and Peace Economics}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{644--664}},
  publisher    = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  title        = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}},
  volume       = {{27}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@misc{392,
  author       = {{Brummel, NinaMadeleine}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@misc{413,
  author       = {{Eusterholz, Fabian}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@misc{437,
  author       = {{Wemhöner, Vanessa}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@techreport{2249,
  abstract     = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent,
although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy
effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build
a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links
within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the
network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of
stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}},
  title        = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}},
  volume       = {{12-06}},
  year         = {{2012}},
}