@misc{234, author = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{229, author = {{Schulz, Hannah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{330, author = {{Drigalsky, Liesa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{362, author = {{Kaiser, Sarah}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2709, abstract = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0932-4569}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{225--248}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}}, doi = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{1923, abstract = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{644--664}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{392, author = {{Brummel, NinaMadeleine}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{413, author = {{Eusterholz, Fabian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{437, author = {{Wemhöner, Vanessa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @techreport{2249, abstract = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}}, volume = {{12-06}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{4157, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0313-5926}}, journal = {{Economic Analysis and Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{49--70}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Paying for Performance in Hospitals}}}, doi = {{10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2011}}, } @article{3418, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Wambach, Achim}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{853----858}}, title = {{{Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation}}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4154, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Possajennikov, Alex and Guse, Tobias}}, issn = {{0167-2681}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{254--258}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011}}, volume = {{73}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4155, author = {{Angerhausen, Julia and Bayer, Christian and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{439--461}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Strategic Unemployment}}}, volume = {{166}}, year = {{2010}}, } @article{4156, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, issn = {{0165-1889}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{1357--1380}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.001}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2008}}, } @article{4158, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0043-6275}}, journal = {{Wirtschaftsdienst}}, number = {{11}}, pages = {{768--772}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Die Grundlagen der Mechanismus-Design-Theorie}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10273-007-0732-z}}, volume = {{87}}, year = {{2007}}, } @article{4159, author = {{Guse, T. and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0048-5829}}, journal = {{Public Choice}}, number = {{3-4}}, pages = {{323--352}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11127-006-9033-0}}, volume = {{129}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4163, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0015-2218}}, journal = {{FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{124--148}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams}}}, doi = {{10.1628/001522106776667040}}, volume = {{62}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4160, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1045--1057}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4161, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{03}}, pages = {{249--262}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}}, volume = {{05}}, year = {{2003}}, }