@misc{42527,
  author       = {{Minhaj, Noor}},
  title        = {{{Of the efficacy of competition law in dealing with challenges of digital markets - Selected cases of Facebook}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42528,
  author       = {{Rayhan, Md. Sashi}},
  title        = {{{On the Efficacy of EU Competition Policy in the Context of Big Data}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42524,
  author       = {{Busch, Anna Lisa}},
  title        = {{{On the privatization of hospitals - The case of Germany}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42948,
  author       = {{Kuzuoglu, Muhammed Numan}},
  title        = {{{Der Marktplatz von Amazon - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{43057,
  author       = {{Sowinski, Olivia}},
  title        = {{{Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf personalisierte Angebote in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{43056,
  author       = {{Schmidt, Thomas}},
  title        = {{{Zu den Vor- und Nachteilen von Luftfahrtallianzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Perspektive auf den Alleingang von Emirates}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{43059,
  author       = {{Yeboah, Amoabeng}},
  title        = {{{An Economic Analysis of Mergers and Aquisitions - The case of Facebook and WhatsApp}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42947,
  author       = {{Hensel, Jason}},
  title        = {{{Zu Online-Vergleichsportalen und deren Auswirkungen auf den Markt - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{44091,
  abstract     = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}},
  author       = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}},
  keywords     = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}},
  pages        = {{43}},
  title        = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{39351,
  author       = {{Heinze, Erik}},
  title        = {{{Kollusion durch Plattformen - der Einfluss von Tank-Apps auf den Preiswettbewerb von Tankstellen in Deutschland}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{39358,
  author       = {{Rayhan, Shahi}},
  title        = {{{Big Data in Digital Markets - Challenges for Competition Policy to Protect Consumer Welfare}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{39356,
  author       = {{Joshan, Saeid}},
  title        = {{{Network Development of Low-Cost Carriers at German Airports}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{39962,
  author       = {{Ajredini, Zurkani}},
  title        = {{{Plattformgestaltungen auf digitalen Märkten - eine Analyse der Wohlfahrtseffekte}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{40465,
  author       = {{Kanne, Niklas}},
  title        = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch digitaler Plattformen - eine Analyse anhand der zehnten Novelle des GWB}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{40466,
  author       = {{Klüppel, Pascal}},
  title        = {{{Marktmachtmissbrauch von Google – Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{40473,
  author       = {{Yigitbas , Osman}},
  title        = {{{Preisabsprachen in der Automobilindustrie - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{40470,
  author       = {{Schulte, Marcel}},
  title        = {{{Facebooks digitale Währung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@phdthesis{15824,
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16273,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda  and Rezaei, Sarah  and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }},
  journal      = {{Labour Economics}},
  title        = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16334,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  journal      = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  pages        = {{453 -- 481}},
  title        = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}