@phdthesis{4793,
  author       = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}},
  title        = {{{Corruption in the health care sector : the influence of bribery and relative reciprocity on a physician's prescription decision}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@phdthesis{4797,
  author       = {{Wu, Xing}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-358}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4802,
  author       = {{Akcay, Yasemen}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4804,
  author       = {{Görken, Emre}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4805,
  author       = {{Dalkiran, Alpaslan}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4806,
  author       = {{Gräper, Gerrit}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4807,
  author       = {{Hammo, Hüssein}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4821,
  author       = {{Brachmann, Jessica}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4822,
  author       = {{Förstenberg, Niklas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4827,
  author       = {{Khan, Zohaib Ahmad}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions?}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{4828,
  author       = {{Kusch, Thomas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{4982,
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}},
  journal      = {{Games}},
  number       = {{4}},
  publisher    = {{MDPI}},
  title        = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}},
  volume       = {{9}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{1066,
  author       = {{Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{1067,
  author       = {{Kersting, Florian}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{1068,
  author       = {{Beichl, Philipp}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{1029,
  abstract     = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}},
  author       = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{502----527}},
  publisher    = {{SAGE Publications}},
  title        = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}},
  doi          = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}},
  volume       = {{63}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{37703,
  author       = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}},
  title        = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@misc{83,
  author       = {{Uden, Dennis}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{86,
  author       = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{51,
  author       = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}