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Universität Paderborn.","bibtex":"@book{Menne_2015, title={Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Menne, Maria Reinhild}, year={2015} }","ama":"Menne MR. <i>Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2015.","mla":"Menne, Maria Reinhild. <i>Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:37Z","type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"title":"Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG","year":"2015","status":"public","author":[{"last_name":"Menne","first_name":"Maria Reinhild","full_name":"Menne, Maria Reinhild"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:52Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","_id":"234","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"user_id":"42447"},{"_id":"229","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","user_id":"42447","status":"public","title":"Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse","year":"2015","author":[{"full_name":"Schulz, Hannah","first_name":"Hannah","last_name":"Schulz"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:43Z","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:36Z","type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"citation":{"mla":"Schulz, Hannah. <i>Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","apa":"Schulz, H. (2015). <i>Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ieee":"H. Schulz, <i>Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","chicago":"Schulz, Hannah. <i>Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","short":"H. Schulz, Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ama":"Schulz H. <i>Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2015.","bibtex":"@book{Schulz_2015, title={Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Schulz, Hannah}, year={2015} }"},"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}]},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:09Z","author":[{"first_name":"Liesa","last_name":"Drigalsky","full_name":"Drigalsky, Liesa"}],"title":"Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse","status":"public","year":"2014","user_id":"42447","_id":"330","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"citation":{"apa":"Drigalsky, L. (2014). <i>Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ieee":"L. Drigalsky, <i>Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","short":"L. Drigalsky, Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse, Universität Paderborn, 2014.","chicago":"Drigalsky, Liesa. <i>Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","mla":"Drigalsky, Liesa. <i>Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","ama":"Drigalsky L. <i>Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Drigalsky_2014, title={Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drigalsky, Liesa}, year={2014} }"},"department":[{"_id":"280"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:56Z"},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"citation":{"mla":"Kaiser, Sarah. <i>Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Kaiser_2014, title={Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kaiser, Sarah}, year={2014} }","ama":"Kaiser S. <i>Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","ieee":"S. Kaiser, <i>Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","apa":"Kaiser, S. (2014). <i>Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al</i>. Universität Paderborn.","short":"S. Kaiser, Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al, Universität Paderborn, 2014.","chicago":"Kaiser, Sarah. <i>Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &#38; Holt und Kübler et. al</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014."},"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","id":"37339"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:02Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:27Z","title":"Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al","year":"2014","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Sarah","last_name":"Kaiser","full_name":"Kaiser, Sarah"}],"user_id":"42447","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","_id":"362","language":[{"iso":"ger"}]},{"status":"public","volume":170,"user_id":"37339","_id":"2709","publisher":"Mohr Siebeck","page":"225-248","citation":{"ieee":"Y. Gu and B. Hehenkamp, “Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency,” <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE</i>, vol. 170, no. 2, pp. 225–248, 2014.","apa":"Gu, Y., &#38; Hehenkamp, B. (2014). Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE</i>, <i>170</i>(2), 225–248. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392\">https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392</a>","short":"Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE 170 (2014) 225–248.","chicago":"Gu, Yiquan, and Burkhard Hehenkamp. “Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency.” <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE</i> 170, no. 2 (2014): 225–48. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392\">https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392</a>.","mla":"Gu, Yiquan, and Burkhard Hehenkamp. “Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency.” <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE</i>, vol. 170, no. 2, Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 225–48, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392\">10.1628/093245614x13895979380392</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_2014, title={Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}, volume={170}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392\">10.1628/093245614x13895979380392</a>}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}, publisher={Mohr Siebeck}, author={Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}, year={2014}, pages={225–248} }","ama":"Gu Y, Hehenkamp B. Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE</i>. 2014;170(2):225-248. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13895979380392\">10.1628/093245614x13895979380392</a>"},"article_type":"original","intvolume":"       170","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:33Z","author":[{"last_name":"Gu","first_name":"Yiquan","full_name":"Gu, Yiquan"},{"id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0932-4569"]},"title":"Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency","year":"2014","doi":"10.1628/093245614x13895979380392","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. "}],"issue":"2","publication":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-05-08T17:37:21Z"},{"title":"Collective action and the common enemy effect","year":"2014","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1024-2694","1476-8267"]},"author":[{"last_name":"De Jaegher","first_name":"Kris","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris"},{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:00Z","intvolume":"        27","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2014.925676","publication":"Defence and Peace Economics","issue":"5","abstract":[{"text":"How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-03-28T11:43:04Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"status":"public","page":"644-664","publisher":"Informa UK Limited","_id":"1923","user_id":"42447","volume":27,"citation":{"mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common Enemy Effect.” <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>, vol. 27, no. 5, Informa UK Limited, 2014, pp. 644–64, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676\">10.1080/10242694.2014.925676</a>.","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Collective action and the common enemy effect. <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>. 2014;27(5):644-664. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676\">10.1080/10242694.2014.925676</a>","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2014, title={Collective action and the common enemy effect}, volume={27}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676\">10.1080/10242694.2014.925676</a>}, number={5}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2014}, pages={644–664} }","apa":"De Jaegher, K., &#38; Hoyer, B. (2014). Collective action and the common enemy effect. <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>, <i>27</i>(5), 644–664. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676\">https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676</a>","ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Collective action and the common enemy effect,” <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i>, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 644–664, 2014.","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Collective Action and the Common Enemy Effect.” <i>Defence and Peace Economics</i> 27, no. 5 (2014): 644–64. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676\">https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.925676</a>.","short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Defence and Peace Economics 27 (2014) 644–664."}},{"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"citation":{"mla":"Brummel, NinaMadeleine. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Brummel_2014, title={On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brummel, NinaMadeleine}, year={2014} }","ama":"Brummel N. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","ieee":"N. Brummel, <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","apa":"Brummel, N. (2014). <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn.","chicago":"Brummel, NinaMadeleine. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","short":"N. Brummel, On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry, Universität Paderborn, 2014."},"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:08Z","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"type":"mastersthesis","author":[{"first_name":"NinaMadeleine","last_name":"Brummel","full_name":"Brummel, NinaMadeleine"}],"status":"public","year":"2014","title":"On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:54Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","_id":"392","user_id":"42447"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:00:22Z","author":[{"last_name":"Eusterholz","first_name":"Fabian","full_name":"Eusterholz, Fabian"}],"status":"public","title":"Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes","year":"2014","user_id":"42447","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"_id":"413","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"citation":{"ama":"Eusterholz F. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Eusterholz_2014, title={Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Eusterholz, Fabian}, year={2014} }","mla":"Eusterholz, Fabian. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","chicago":"Eusterholz, Fabian. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","short":"F. Eusterholz, Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes, Universität Paderborn, 2014.","apa":"Eusterholz, F. (2014). <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ieee":"F. Eusterholz, <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014."},"supervisor":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:12Z"},{"department":[{"_id":"280"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:17Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard"}],"citation":{"apa":"Wemhöner, V. (2014). <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ieee":"V. Wemhöner, <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","chicago":"Wemhöner, Vanessa. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","short":"V. Wemhöner, Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells, Universität Paderborn, 2014.","mla":"Wemhöner, Vanessa. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","ama":"Wemhöner V. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Wemhöner_2014, title={Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Wemhöner, Vanessa}, year={2014} }"},"user_id":"42447","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","_id":"437","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:00:59Z","author":[{"full_name":"Wemhöner, Vanessa","last_name":"Wemhöner","first_name":"Vanessa"}],"year":"2014","title":"Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells","status":"public"},{"series_title":"TKI Working Paper Series","_id":"2249","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.uu.nl/en/files/rebousedp201212062pdf","open_access":"1"}],"volume":"12-06","user_id":"42447","author":[{"id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher","first_name":"Kris"}],"status":"public","year":"2012","title":"Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:34Z","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:44:14Z","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"oa":"1","type":"working_paper","citation":{"chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. <i>Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect</i>. Vol. 12–06. TKI Working Paper Series, 2012.","short":"B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect, 2012.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, <i>Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect</i>, vol. 12–06. 2012.","apa":"Hoyer, B., &#38; De Jaegher, K. (2012). <i>Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect</i> (Vol. 12–06).","bibtex":"@book{Hoyer_De Jaegher_2012, series={TKI Working Paper Series}, title={Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}, volume={12–06}, author={Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}, year={2012}, collection={TKI Working Paper Series} }","ama":"Hoyer B, De Jaegher K. <i>Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect</i>. Vol 12-06.; 2012.","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Kris De Jaegher. <i>Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect</i>. Vol. 12–06, 2012."},"abstract":[{"text":"The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent,\r\nalthough they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the \"common enemy\r\neffect\". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build\r\na network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links\r\nwithin the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the\r\nnetwork. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of\r\nstable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.","lang":"eng"}]},{"citation":{"short":"B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, Economic Analysis and Policy 41 (2011) 49–70.","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar Kaarboe. “Paying for Performance in Hospitals.” <i>Economic Analysis and Policy</i> 41, no. 1 (2011): 49–70. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9\">https://doi.org/10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9</a>.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarboe, O. (2011). Paying for Performance in Hospitals. <i>Economic Analysis and Policy</i>, <i>41</i>(1), 49–70. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9\">https://doi.org/10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9</a>","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, “Paying for Performance in Hospitals,” <i>Economic Analysis and Policy</i>, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 49–70, 2011.","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarboe O. 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Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, (3), 853--858.","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Wambach_2010, title={Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Wambach, Achim}, year={2010}, pages={853--858} }","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Achim Wambach. “Survival at the Center—the Stability of Minimum Differentiation.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, no. 3 (2010): 853--858.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, A. Wambach, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization (2010) 853--858.","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Wambach A. 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Peer Pressure in Teams.” <i>FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis</i> 62, no. 1 (2006): 124–48. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1628/001522106776667040\">https://doi.org/10.1628/001522106776667040</a>.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 62 (2006) 124–148.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, “When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams,” <i>FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis</i>, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 124–148, 2006.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarboe, O. (2006). When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? 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Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>. 2004;20(4):1045-1057. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002\">10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002</a>","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Leininger_Possajennikov_2004, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}, volume={20}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002\">10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002</a>}, number={4}, journal={European Journal of Political Economy}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}, year={2004}, pages={1045–1057} }","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation.” <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>, vol. 20, no. 4, Elsevier BV, 2004, pp. 1045–57, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002\">10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002</a>."},"status":"public","page":"1045-1057","publisher":"Elsevier BV","_id":"4160","user_id":"37339","volume":20},{"doi":"10.1142/s0219198903001045","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:00:26Z","intvolume":"         5","year":"2003","title":"Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model","author":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard","id":"37339"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0219-1989","1793-6675"]},"type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_created":"2018-08-27T15:14:34Z","extern":"1","issue":"03","publication":"International Game Theory Review","user_id":"37339","volume":"05","page":"249-262","_id":"4161","publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","status":"public","citation":{"mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 05, no. 03, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt, 2003, pp. 249–62, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>.","ama":"Hehenkamp B. Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>. 2003;05(03):249-262. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_2003, title={Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}, volume={05}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>}, number={03}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard}, year={2003}, pages={249–262} }","apa":"Hehenkamp, B. (2003). Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, <i>05</i>(03), 249–262. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp, “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model,” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 05, no. 03, pp. 249–262, 2003.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, International Game Theory Review 05 (2003) 249–262.","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i> 05, no. 03 (2003): 249–62. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>."}}]