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Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026\">10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026</a>.","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 177:641-660. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026\">10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026</a>","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026\">10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026\">10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026</a>."},"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"intvolume":"       177","article_type":"original","date_updated":"2022-01-29T17:04:14Z","publication_status":"accepted","publication_identifier":{"unknown":["0167-2681"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"},{"full_name":"Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ","first_name":"Odvar M. ","last_name":"Kaarbøe"}],"title":"Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets","year":"2020","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2020-07-01T07:50:45Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget."}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization"},{"type":"mastersthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"date_created":"2023-01-24T09:03:35Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard"}],"citation":{"ieee":"L. Niggemeyer, <i>Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon</i>. 2020.","apa":"Niggemeyer, L. (2020). <i>Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon</i>.","short":"L. 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Schlegel, <i>Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers</i>. 2020.","apa":"Schlegel, M. (2020). <i>Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers</i>.","chicago":"Schlegel, Manuela. <i>Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers</i>, 2020.","short":"M. Schlegel, Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers, 2020."},"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}]},{"user_id":"37953","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"_id":"39079","date_updated":"2023-01-24T09:11:55Z","year":"2020","status":"public","title":"Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook","author":[{"last_name":"Neibert","first_name":"Katharina","full_name":"Neibert, Katharina"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"date_created":"2023-01-24T09:11:48Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","id":"37339"}],"citation":{"mla":"Neibert, Katharina. <i>Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook</i>. 2020.","bibtex":"@book{Neibert_2020, title={Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}, author={Neibert, Katharina}, year={2020} }","ama":"Neibert K. <i>Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook</i>.; 2020.","ieee":"K. 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Hensel, Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon, 2020.","chicago":"Hensel, Jason. <i>Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon</i>, 2020.","apa":"Hensel, J. (2020). <i>Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon</i>.","ieee":"J. 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S. (2020). <i>Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten</i>.","ieee":"M. S. Multani, <i>Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten</i>. 2020.","chicago":"Multani, Manjinder Singh. <i>Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten</i>, 2020.","short":"M.S. Multani, Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten, 2020.","mla":"Multani, Manjinder Singh. <i>Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten</i>. 2020.","ama":"Multani MS. <i>Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten</i>.; 2020.","bibtex":"@book{Multani_2020, title={Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}, author={Multani, Manjinder Singh}, year={2020} }"},"type":"bachelorsthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"date_created":"2023-01-24T09:26:04Z"},{"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"citation":{"mla":"Bellouchi, Houda. <i>Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay</i>. 2020.","ama":"Bellouchi H. <i>Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay</i>.; 2020.","bibtex":"@book{Bellouchi_2020, title={Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}, author={Bellouchi, Houda}, year={2020} }","apa":"Bellouchi, H. (2020). <i>Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay</i>.","ieee":"H. Bellouchi, <i>Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay</i>. 2020.","short":"H. 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Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.","lang":"eng"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","creator":"ups","file_id":"5307","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","file_size":625230,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z"}],"date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","page":"54-57","_id":"1139","publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","user_id":"18949","ddc":["000"],"volume":26,"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","citation":{"mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>","ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","apa":"Kaimann, D., &#38; Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, <i>26</i>(1), 54–57. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i> 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57."},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"}]},{"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","apa":"Hoyer, B., &#38; Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, <i>162</i>, 146–163. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i> 162 (2019): 146–63. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 2019;162:146-163. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>"},"status":"public","user_id":"477","volume":162,"page":"146-163","_id":"2256","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","intvolume":"       162","title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption","year":"2019","author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","id":"42447"},{"first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Haller","full_name":"Haller, Hans"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"volume":157,"page":"708-734","_id":"80","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","citation":{"chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i> 157 (2019): 708–34. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  157 (2019) 708–734.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., &#38; Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, <i>157</i>, 708–734. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>","bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>. 2019;157:708-734. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>."},"publication_status":"epub_ahead","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","article_type":"original","intvolume":"       157","year":"2019","title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","author":[{"full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres","id":"48794"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"},{"full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","first_name":"Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"file_size":1569991,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5723","creator":"bhoyer","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z"}],"date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z"},{"has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"status":"public","volume":118,"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"7630","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"report_number":"2019-01","citation":{"chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i> (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","place":"Paderborn University","intvolume":"       118","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","author":[{"id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef"}],"year":"2019","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud."}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"type":"report","date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","file":[{"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","creator":"jheinzel","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"7631","file_size":286367,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP118.pdf","date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","relation":"main_file"}]},{"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"intvolume":"       119","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:04:05Z","author":[{"full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","last_name":"Heinzel","id":"53445"}],"year":"2019","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"type":"report","keyword":["credence goods","heterogeneous experts","fairness","overcharging"],"date_created":"2019-04-11T08:13:53Z","file":[{"file_size":315297,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP119.pdf","date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"8875","creator":"jheinzel","date_created":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.","lang":"eng"}],"volume":119,"user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"8873","has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"status":"public","place":"Paderborn University","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"citation":{"short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i> (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>, vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"file_date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z"},{"date_created":"2019-09-06T09:28:46Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","citation":{"mla":"Gu, Yiquan, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 2019, pp. 469–85, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>.","ama":"Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 2019:469-485. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>","bibtex":"@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2019, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2019}, pages={469–485} }","apa":"Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Leininger, W. (2019). Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 469–485. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>","ieee":"Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, “Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, pp. 469–485, 2019.","chicago":"Gu, Yiquan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 2019, 469–85. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>.","short":"Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization (2019) 469–485."},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions."}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"page":"469-485","_id":"13148","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011","user_id":"37953","title":"Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation","year":"2019","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Yiquan","last_name":"Gu","full_name":"Gu, Yiquan"},{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard","id":"37339"},{"first_name":"Wolfgang","last_name":"Leininger","full_name":"Leininger, Wolfgang"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0167-2681"]},"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:29Z","publication_status":"published"},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","citation":{"ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"place":"Paderborn University","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","ddc":["330"],"user_id":"53445","_id":"10332","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.","lang":"eng"}],"type":"report","keyword":["retail bundling","leverage theory","double marginalization"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"10333","access_level":"closed","file_size":375054,"file_name":"WP120.pdf","date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","creator":"jheinzel"}],"date_created":"2019-06-28T08:42:49Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:37Z","year":"2019","title":"Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition","author":[{"last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","id":"53445"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"department":[{"_id":"280"}],"type":"mastersthesis","date_created":"2023-01-24T08:49:54Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"citation":{"short":"D. Lütkevedder, “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019.","chicago":"Lütkevedder, Dennis. <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>, 2019.","apa":"Lütkevedder, D. (2019). <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>.","ieee":"D. Lütkevedder, <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>. 2019.","ama":"Lütkevedder D. <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>.; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Lütkevedder_2019, title={“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Lütkevedder, Dennis}, year={2019} }","mla":"Lütkevedder, Dennis. <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>. 2019."},"supervisor":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"}],"user_id":"37953","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"_id":"39056","date_updated":"2023-01-24T08:50:04Z","author":[{"first_name":"Dennis","last_name":"Lütkevedder","full_name":"Lütkevedder, Dennis"}],"status":"public","title":"\"Data-Driven Mergers\" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse","year":"2019"},{"date_updated":"2023-01-24T08:51:59Z","author":[{"last_name":"Memon","first_name":"Uzair Ahmed","full_name":"Memon, Uzair Ahmed"}],"year":"2019","status":"public","title":"On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law","user_id":"37953","_id":"39059","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"37339","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard"}],"citation":{"short":"U.A. Memon, On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law, 2019.","chicago":"Memon, Uzair Ahmed. <i>On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law</i>, 2019.","apa":"Memon, U. A. (2019). <i>On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law</i>.","ieee":"U. A. 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