[{"doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","publication_status":"epub_ahead","intvolume":"        26","title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market","year":"2019","author":[{"full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949"},{"first_name":"Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","id":"42447"}],"type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"creator":"ups","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"closed","file_size":625230,"file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5307"}],"date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","abstract":[{"text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.","lang":"eng"}],"issue":"1","publication":"Applied Economics Letters","ddc":["000"],"user_id":"18949","volume":26,"page":"54-57","publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","_id":"1139","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","citation":{"apa":"Kaimann, D., &#38; Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, <i>26</i>(1), 54–57. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>","ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i> 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>.","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>.","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141\">10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141</a>}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }"}},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 2019;162:146-163. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i> 162 (2019): 146–63. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","apa":"Hoyer, B., &#38; Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, <i>162</i>, 146–163. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>"},"volume":162,"user_id":"477","_id":"2256","page":"146-163","status":"public","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"intvolume":"       162","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","publication_status":"published","author":[{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"Haller, Hans","first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption","year":"2019"},{"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"80","page":"708-734","volume":157,"user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"citation":{"chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i> 157 (2019): 708–34. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  157 (2019) 708–734.","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., &#38; Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, <i>157</i>, 708–734. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>. 2019;157:708-734. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>","bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization </i>, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004\">10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004</a>."},"file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"author":[{"id":"48794","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja"},{"id":"26032","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud"},{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","year":"2019","article_type":"original","intvolume":"       157","publication_status":"epub_ahead","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."}],"date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","file":[{"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","file_size":1569991,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"5723","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"bhoyer","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article"},{"keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"type":"report","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","creator":"jheinzel","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"7631","access_level":"closed","file_size":286367,"file_name":"WP118.pdf","date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud."}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","intvolume":"       118","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","year":"2019","author":[{"id":"53445","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef"}],"place":"Paderborn University","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"report_number":"2019-01","file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","citation":{"mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i> (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","volume":118,"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"7630","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","jel":["D82","I11","L15"]},{"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians."}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"type":"report","keyword":["credence goods","heterogeneous experts","fairness","overcharging"],"date_created":"2019-04-11T08:13:53Z","file":[{"file_name":"WP119.pdf","file_size":315297,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","file_id":"8875","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"creator":"jheinzel","date_created":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z"}],"intvolume":"       119","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:04:05Z","author":[{"full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","id":"53445"}],"year":"2019","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"citation":{"short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i> (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>, vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts</i>. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"file_date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","place":"Paderborn University","has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"status":"public","volume":119,"user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"8873"},{"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011","user_id":"37953","page":"469-485","_id":"13148","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:29Z","publication_status":"published","status":"public","title":"Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation","year":"2019","author":[{"last_name":"Gu","first_name":"Yiquan","full_name":"Gu, Yiquan"},{"id":"37339","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard"},{"full_name":"Leininger, Wolfgang","first_name":"Wolfgang","last_name":"Leininger"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0167-2681"]},"type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"date_created":"2019-09-06T09:28:46Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions."}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","citation":{"ieee":"Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, “Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, pp. 469–485, 2019.","apa":"Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Leininger, W. (2019). Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 469–485. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>","short":"Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization (2019) 469–485.","chicago":"Gu, Yiquan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 2019, 469–85. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>.","mla":"Gu, Yiquan, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, 2019, pp. 469–85, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2019, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2019}, pages={469–485} }","ama":"Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 2019:469-485. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011</a>"}},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","id":"53445"}],"title":"Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition","year":"2019","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:37Z","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:42:49Z","file":[{"file_name":"WP120.pdf","file_size":375054,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","file_id":"10333","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"jheinzel","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["retail bundling","leverage theory","double marginalization"],"type":"report","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.","lang":"eng"}],"_id":"10332","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","place":"Paderborn University","citation":{"ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition</i>. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"file_date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]},{"date_created":"2023-01-24T08:49:54Z","type":"mastersthesis","department":[{"_id":"280"}],"citation":{"mla":"Lütkevedder, Dennis. <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>. 2019.","ama":"Lütkevedder D. <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>.; 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Lütkevedder_2019, title={“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Lütkevedder, Dennis}, year={2019} }","apa":"Lütkevedder, D. (2019). <i>“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>.","ieee":"D. 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