TY - GEN AU - Kanne, Niklas ID - 40465 TI - Marktmachtmissbrauch digitaler Plattformen - eine Analyse anhand der zehnten Novelle des GWB ER - TY - GEN AU - Klüppel, Pascal ID - 40466 TI - Marktmachtmissbrauch von Google – Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Yigitbas , Osman ID - 40473 TI - Preisabsprachen in der Automobilindustrie - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Schulte, Marcel ID - 40470 TI - Facebooks digitale Währung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - THES AU - Heinzel, Joachim ID - 15824 TI - Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling ER - TY - JOUR AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Huizen, Thomas AU - Keijzer, Linda AU - Rezaei, Sarah AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie AU - Westbrock, Bastian ID - 16273 JF - Labour Economics TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field ER - TY - JOUR AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 16334 JF - Games and Economic Behavior TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 121 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget. AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ID - 17350 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets VL - 177 ER - TY - GEN AU - Niggemeyer, Laura ID - 39070 TI - Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon ER - TY - GEN AU - Schlegel, Manuela ID - 39072 TI - Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers ER -