TY - GEN AU - Tiessen, Michelle ID - 43058 TI - Zur Effektivität des europäischen Kronzeugenprogramms - Der Fall des LKW-Kartells ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive. AU - Brosig-Koch, Jeannette AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 44092 JF - Health Economics KW - physician competition KW - patient characteristics KW - heterogeneity in quality responses KW - fee-for-service KW - laboratory experiment TI - Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics ER - TY - GEN AB - We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost. AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. ID - 44093 KW - Quality competition KW - Price regulation KW - Location choice KW - Product differentiation TI - Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation ER - TY - JOUR AU - Namujju, Lillian Donna AU - Acquah-Swanzy, Henrietta AU - Ngoti, Irene F. ID - 48500 JF - Energy Policy KW - Management KW - Monitoring KW - Policy and Law KW - General Energy SN - 0301-4215 TI - An IAD framework analysis of minigrid institutions for sustainable rural electrification in East Africa: A comparative study of Uganda and Tanzania VL - 182 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Straaten, Dirk ID - 30341 JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics KW - General Social Sciences KW - Economics and Econometrics KW - Applied Psychology SN - 2214-8043 TI - Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis VL - 98 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 31881 JF - International Journal of Game Theory TI - Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect ER - TY - THES AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede ID - 32856 TI - Essays on Industrial Organization and Networks: Retail Bundling, Exclusive Dealing, and Network Disruption ER - TY - GEN AU - Bas, Sahin ID - 39963 TI - Die Luftfahrt zwischen Liberalisierung und Konsolidierung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse von Low-Cost- und Networkairlines ER - TY - GEN AU - Erdogan, Yeliz ID - 40464 TI - Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse von Supermärkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann ER - TY - GEN AU - Perampalam, Abirame ID - 40468 TI - Zum Potenzial von Kryptowährungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse zu den Chancen und Risiken digitaler Währungen ER -