TY - GEN AU - Neibert, Katharina ID - 39079 TI - Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook ER - TY - GEN AU - Naseri, Gitti ID - 39077 TI - Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company ER - TY - GEN AU - Laudage, Felix ID - 39073 TI - Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi ER - TY - GEN AU - Posmetni, Lena ID - 39081 TI - Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung ER - TY - GEN AU - Hensel, Jason ID - 39346 TI - Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon ER - TY - GEN AU - Multani, Manjinder Singh ID - 39347 TI - Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten ER - TY - GEN AU - Bellouchi, Houda ID - 38098 TI - Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay ER - TY - JOUR AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1139 IS - 1 JF - Applied Economics Letters TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market VL - 26 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Haller, Hans ID - 2256 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption VL - 162 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013). AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede AU - Recker, Sonja AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 80 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? VL - 157 ER - TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 7630 KW - credence goods KW - treatment efficiency KW - heterogeneous experts KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts VL - 118 ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 8873 KW - credence goods KW - heterogeneous experts KW - fairness KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts VL - 119 ER - TY - JOUR AB - This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions. AU - Gu, Yiquan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 13148 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization SN - 0167-2681 TI - Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 10332 KW - retail bundling KW - leverage theory KW - double marginalization TI - Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition ER - TY - GEN AU - Lütkevedder, Dennis ID - 39056 TI - "Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Memon, Uzair Ahmed ID - 39059 TI - On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law ER - TY - GEN AU - Milczarek, André ID - 39067 TI - Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Heinrichs, Fabian ID - 37684 TI - Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen ER - TY - GEN AU - Fortmeier, Julia ID - 38042 TI - Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Hagedorn, Carolin ID - 38045 TI - The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers ER - TY - GEN AU - Ayyildiz, Berfin ID - 38097 TI - Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Shelepova, Ekaterina ID - 38093 TI - Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective ER - TY - GEN AU - Shanmugaratnam, Suganya ID - 38096 TI - Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten ER - TY - GEN AU - Faizan, Ahmed ID - 38099 TI - The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging Cartel Activities ER - TY - GEN AB - Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment. AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 3101 KW - Corruption KW - Reciprocity KW - Physician-Patient Relationship TI - The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment ER - TY - GEN AU - Aykanat, Cengiz ID - 8074 TI - Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht ER - TY - GEN AU - Suvorina, Tatiana ID - 8075 TI - Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants ER - TY - THES AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 4793 TI - Corruption in the health care sector : the influence of bribery and relative reciprocity on a physician's prescription decision ER - TY - THES AU - Wu, Xing ID - 4797 TI - Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Akcay, Yasemen ID - 4802 TI - Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb ER - TY - GEN AU - Görken, Emre ID - 4804 TI - Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern ER - TY - GEN AU - Dalkiran, Alpaslan ID - 4805 TI - Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen ER - TY - GEN AU - Gräper, Gerrit ID - 4806 TI - The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour ER - TY - GEN AU - Hammo, Hüssein ID - 4807 TI - Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft ER - TY - GEN AU - Brachmann, Jessica ID - 4821 TI - Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Förstenberg, Niklas ID - 4822 TI - Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Khan, Zohaib Ahmad ID - 4827 TI - How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions? ER - TY - GEN AU - Kusch, Thomas ID - 4828 TI - Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 4982 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment VL - 9 ER - TY - GEN AU - Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad ID - 1066 TI - How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature ER - TY - GEN AU - Kersting, Florian ID - 1067 TI - Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht ER - TY - GEN AU - Beichl, Philipp ID - 1068 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - GEN AU - Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth ID - 37703 TI - Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors ER - TY - GEN AU - Uden, Dennis ID - 83 TI - Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling ER - TY - GEN AU - Niggemeyer, Laura ID - 86 TI - Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland ER - TY - GEN AU - Winkelhake, Nikolai ID - 51 TI - Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - GEN AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 1055 TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Gu, Yiguan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 1056 TI - Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AU - Petersen, Henning Cornelius ID - 1069 TI - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Turan, Alparslan ID - 1070 TI - Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Iding, Jerome ID - 1071 TI - Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011) ER - TY - GEN AU - Lütkevedder, Dennis ID - 1072 TI - Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking ER - TY - GEN AU - Laudage, Felix ID - 1075 TI - Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive ER - TY - GEN AU - Goebel, Marion ID - 1076 TI - Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay ER - TY - GEN AU - Wagemeyer, Marleen ID - 1077 TI - Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet ER - TY - GEN AU - Shabani, Albana ID - 1078 TI - Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Hamacher, Dustin Stefan ID - 1079 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AB - In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 1083 TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 110 ER - TY - GEN AU - Aykanat, Cengiz ID - 196 TI - Fußwallwunder Leicester City - Auch in der Bundesliga möglich? Ein ökonomischer Vergleich des Wettbewerbs in der Bundesliga mit der englischen Premier League ER - TY - THES AU - Dimant, Eugen ID - 202 TI - Economics of Corruption and Crime: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Behavioral Ethics ER - TY - GEN AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede ID - 178 TI - On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation ER - TY - GEN AU - Pehlivan, Muhammet ID - 179 TI - On the abuse of market power - an economic perspective of Microsoft antitrust cases ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 1919 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory SN - 1097-3923 TI - Strategic Network Disruption and Defense VL - 18 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails. AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1922 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 0022-5193 TI - By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model VL - 393 ER - TY - GEN AU - Kesmen, Belma ID - 182 TI - Marktmissbrauch in der Internetökonomie - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AB - We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Huizen, Tomas AU - Keijzer, Linda AU - Rezai Khavas, Tahere AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 2252 TI - Do talented women shy away from competition? VL - 16-06 ER - TY - GEN AU - Kaczorkowski, Jessica ID - 130 TI - Wettbewerb im Internet - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des E-Commerce ER - TY - GEN AU - Zindler, Finn ID - 256 TI - Selektive Vertriebssysteme am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung ER - TY - GEN AU - Kirsch, Michelle ID - 282 TI - Koordinierter Patentschutz in einer globalisierten Welt - Effizienz- und Anreizwirkungen auf die Arzneimittelversorgung in Entwicklungsländern ER - TY - GEN AU - Osburg, Christina ID - 292 TI - Fusionen von gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen zu den Effizienz- und Wechselwirkungen ER - TY - GEN AU - Materna, GinaJoanna ID - 294 TI - Fair Trade - Eine neue Perspektive in der internationalen Handelspolitik ER - TY - GEN AU - Goronczewski, Patricia ID - 295 TI - Fair Trade - An economic investigation of benefits and drawbacks ER - TY - GEN AU - Plonka, Dennis ID - 298 TI - Entwicklung von Ablösesummen und Gehälter in der Fußball-Bundesliga - Salary Caps als mögliches Modell der Chancengleichheit ER - TY - GEN AU - Kunisch, Christina ID - 306 TI - Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks ER - TY - GEN AU - Topal, Barlas ID - 309 TI - Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen ER - TY - GEN AU - Menne, Maria Reinhild ID - 234 TI - Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG ER - TY - GEN AU - Schulz, Hannah ID - 229 TI - Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Drigalsky, Liesa ID - 330 TI - Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Kaiser, Sarah ID - 362 TI - Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts & Holt und Kübler et. al ER - TY - JOUR AB - This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. AU - Gu, Yiquan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 2709 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE SN - 0932-4569 TI - Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency VL - 170 ER - TY - JOUR AB - How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1923 IS - 5 JF - Defence and Peace Economics SN - 1024-2694 TI - Collective action and the common enemy effect VL - 27 ER - TY - GEN AU - Brummel, NinaMadeleine ID - 392 TI - On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry ER - TY - GEN AU - Eusterholz, Fabian ID - 413 TI - Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes ER - TY - GEN AU - Wemhöner, Vanessa ID - 437 TI - Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells ER - TY - GEN AB - The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 2249 TI - Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect VL - 12-06 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 4157 IS - 1 JF - Economic Analysis and Policy SN - 0313-5926 TI - Paying for Performance in Hospitals VL - 41 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Wambach, Achim ID - 3418 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Possajennikov, Alex AU - Guse, Tobias ID - 4154 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization SN - 0167-2681 TI - On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations VL - 73 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Angerhausen, Julia AU - Bayer, Christian AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4155 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) TI - Strategic Unemployment VL - 166 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. ID - 4156 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control SN - 0165-1889 TI - Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment VL - 32 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4158 IS - 11 JF - Wirtschaftsdienst SN - 0043-6275 TI - Die Grundlagen der Mechanismus-Design-Theorie VL - 87 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Guse, T. AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4159 IS - 3-4 JF - Public Choice SN - 0048-5829 TI - The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests VL - 129 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 4163 IS - 1 JF - FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis SN - 0015-2218 TI - When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams VL - 62 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, W. AU - Possajennikov, A. ID - 4160 IS - 4 JF - European Journal of Political Economy SN - 0176-2680 TI - Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation VL - 20 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4161 IS - 03 JF - International Game Theory Review SN - 0219-1989 TI - Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model VL - 05 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4162 IS - 1 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 0899-8256 TI - Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox VL - 40 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 3410 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Evolutionary Economics SN - 0936-9937 TI - A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium VL - 9 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Qin, Cheng-Zhong AU - Stuart, Charles ID - 3417 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Evolutionary Economics SN - 0936-9937 TI - Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings VL - 9 ER -