TY - GEN AU - Kersting, Florian ID - 1067 TI - Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht ER - TY - GEN AU - Beichl, Philipp ID - 1068 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - GEN AU - Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth ID - 37703 TI - Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors ER - TY - GEN AU - Uden, Dennis ID - 83 TI - Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling ER - TY - GEN AU - Niggemeyer, Laura ID - 86 TI - Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland ER - TY - GEN AU - Winkelhake, Nikolai ID - 51 TI - Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - GEN AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 1055 TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Gu, Yiguan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 1056 TI - Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AU - Petersen, Henning Cornelius ID - 1069 TI - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Turan, Alparslan ID - 1070 TI - Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Iding, Jerome ID - 1071 TI - Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011) ER - TY - GEN AU - Lütkevedder, Dennis ID - 1072 TI - Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking ER - TY - GEN AU - Laudage, Felix ID - 1075 TI - Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive ER - TY - GEN AU - Goebel, Marion ID - 1076 TI - Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay ER - TY - GEN AU - Wagemeyer, Marleen ID - 1077 TI - Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet ER - TY - GEN AU - Shabani, Albana ID - 1078 TI - Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Hamacher, Dustin Stefan ID - 1079 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AB - In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 1083 TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 110 ER -