TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 7630 KW - credence goods KW - treatment efficiency KW - heterogeneous experts KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts VL - 118 ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 8873 KW - credence goods KW - heterogeneous experts KW - fairness KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts VL - 119 ER - TY - JOUR AB - This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions. AU - Gu, Yiquan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 13148 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization SN - 0167-2681 TI - Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 10332 KW - retail bundling KW - leverage theory KW - double marginalization TI - Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition ER - TY - GEN AU - Lütkevedder, Dennis ID - 39056 TI - "Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Memon, Uzair Ahmed ID - 39059 TI - On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law ER - TY - GEN AU - Milczarek, André ID - 39067 TI - Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Heinrichs, Fabian ID - 37684 TI - Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen ER - TY - GEN AU - Fortmeier, Julia ID - 38042 TI - Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Hagedorn, Carolin ID - 38045 TI - The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven mergers ER - TY - GEN AU - Ayyildiz, Berfin ID - 38097 TI - Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Shelepova, Ekaterina ID - 38093 TI - Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective ER - TY - GEN AU - Shanmugaratnam, Suganya ID - 38096 TI - Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten ER - TY - GEN AU - Faizan, Ahmed ID - 38099 TI - The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging Cartel Activities ER - TY - GEN AB - Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment. AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 3101 KW - Corruption KW - Reciprocity KW - Physician-Patient Relationship TI - The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment ER - TY - GEN AU - Aykanat, Cengiz ID - 8074 TI - Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht ER - TY - GEN AU - Suvorina, Tatiana ID - 8075 TI - Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants ER - TY - THES AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 4793 TI - Corruption in the health care sector : the influence of bribery and relative reciprocity on a physician's prescription decision ER - TY - THES AU - Wu, Xing ID - 4797 TI - Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Akcay, Yasemen ID - 4802 TI - Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb ER - TY - GEN AU - Görken, Emre ID - 4804 TI - Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern ER - TY - GEN AU - Dalkiran, Alpaslan ID - 4805 TI - Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen ER - TY - GEN AU - Gräper, Gerrit ID - 4806 TI - The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour ER - TY - GEN AU - Hammo, Hüssein ID - 4807 TI - Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft ER - TY - GEN AU - Brachmann, Jessica ID - 4821 TI - Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Förstenberg, Niklas ID - 4822 TI - Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Khan, Zohaib Ahmad ID - 4827 TI - How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions? ER - TY - GEN AU - Kusch, Thomas ID - 4828 TI - Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 4982 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment VL - 9 ER - TY - GEN AU - Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad ID - 1066 TI - How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature ER - TY - GEN AU - Kersting, Florian ID - 1067 TI - Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht ER - TY - GEN AU - Beichl, Philipp ID - 1068 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - GEN AU - Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth ID - 37703 TI - Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors ER - TY - GEN AU - Uden, Dennis ID - 83 TI - Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling ER - TY - GEN AU - Niggemeyer, Laura ID - 86 TI - Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland ER - TY - GEN AU - Winkelhake, Nikolai ID - 51 TI - Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - GEN AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 1055 TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Gu, Yiguan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 1056 TI - Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AU - Petersen, Henning Cornelius ID - 1069 TI - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Turan, Alparslan ID - 1070 TI - Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Iding, Jerome ID - 1071 TI - Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011) ER - TY - GEN AU - Lütkevedder, Dennis ID - 1072 TI - Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking ER - TY - GEN AU - Laudage, Felix ID - 1075 TI - Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive ER - TY - GEN AU - Goebel, Marion ID - 1076 TI - Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay ER - TY - GEN AU - Wagemeyer, Marleen ID - 1077 TI - Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet ER - TY - GEN AU - Shabani, Albana ID - 1078 TI - Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Hamacher, Dustin Stefan ID - 1079 TI - Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AB - In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 1083 TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 110 ER -