TY - GEN AU - Tiessen, Michelle ID - 43058 TI - Zur Effektivität des europäischen Kronzeugenprogramms - Der Fall des LKW-Kartells ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive. AU - Brosig-Koch, Jeannette AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 44092 JF - Health Economics KW - physician competition KW - patient characteristics KW - heterogeneity in quality responses KW - fee-for-service KW - laboratory experiment TI - Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics ER - TY - GEN AB - We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost. AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. ID - 44093 KW - Quality competition KW - Price regulation KW - Location choice KW - Product differentiation TI - Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation ER - TY - JOUR AU - Namujju, Lillian Donna AU - Acquah-Swanzy, Henrietta AU - Ngoti, Irene F. ID - 48500 JF - Energy Policy KW - Management KW - Monitoring KW - Policy and Law KW - General Energy SN - 0301-4215 TI - An IAD framework analysis of minigrid institutions for sustainable rural electrification in East Africa: A comparative study of Uganda and Tanzania VL - 182 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Straaten, Dirk ID - 30341 JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics KW - General Social Sciences KW - Economics and Econometrics KW - Applied Psychology SN - 2214-8043 TI - Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis VL - 98 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 31881 JF - International Journal of Game Theory TI - Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect ER - TY - THES AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede ID - 32856 TI - Essays on Industrial Organization and Networks: Retail Bundling, Exclusive Dealing, and Network Disruption ER - TY - GEN AU - Bas, Sahin ID - 39963 TI - Die Luftfahrt zwischen Liberalisierung und Konsolidierung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse von Low-Cost- und Networkairlines ER - TY - GEN AU - Erdogan, Yeliz ID - 40464 TI - Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse von Supermärkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann ER - TY - GEN AU - Perampalam, Abirame ID - 40468 TI - Zum Potenzial von Kryptowährungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse zu den Chancen und Risiken digitaler Währungen ER - TY - GEN AU - Nassar, Hamza ID - 40467 TI - Mergers on digital markets - An economic analysis ER - TY - GEN AU - Sarsar, Abdelmajid ID - 40469 TI - Monopolbildung im Zuge der Globalisierung und Digitalisierung der GAFA-Unternehmen (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Bas, Mikail ID - 40474 TI - Kartelle und technischen Absprachen zur Forschung und Entwicklung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse anhand der Automobilindustrie ER - TY - GEN AU - Vikue, Baribuma Lucy ID - 40472 TI - Blockchain Technology and the Internet of Thing-Risks and Chances for Supply Chains ER - TY - GEN AU - Taskin, Ibrahim ID - 40471 TI - Die Fusion von Kaiser's Tengelmann und EDEKA - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Dubbert, Annika ID - 42525 TI - Marktmissbrauch in Online-Märkten und die Herausforderungen für die Wettbewerbsbehörden - eine wettbewerbspolitische Betrachtung ER - TY - GEN AU - Miftari, Ardita ID - 42526 TI - Zur Bekämpfung von Marktmachtmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten – Wettbewerbspolitische Maßnahmen im Vergleich ER - TY - GEN AU - Minhaj, Noor ID - 42527 TI - Of the efficacy of competition law in dealing with challenges of digital markets - Selected cases of Facebook ER - TY - GEN AU - Rayhan, Md. Sashi ID - 42528 TI - On the Efficacy of EU Competition Policy in the Context of Big Data ER - TY - GEN AU - Busch, Anna Lisa ID - 42524 TI - On the privatization of hospitals - The case of Germany ER - TY - GEN AU - Kuzuoglu, Muhammed Numan ID - 42948 TI - Der Marktplatz von Amazon - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Sowinski, Olivia ID - 43057 TI - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf personalisierte Angebote in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Schmidt, Thomas ID - 43056 TI - Zu den Vor- und Nachteilen von Luftfahrtallianzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Perspektive auf den Alleingang von Emirates ER - TY - GEN AU - Yeboah, Amoabeng ID - 43059 TI - An Economic Analysis of Mergers and Aquisitions - The case of Facebook and WhatsApp ER - TY - GEN AU - Hensel, Jason ID - 42947 TI - Zu Online-Vergleichsportalen und deren Auswirkungen auf den Markt - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AB - We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare. AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Heinzel, Joachim ID - 44091 KW - Retail bundling KW - upstream market power KW - double marginalization KW - product differentiation TI - The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market ER - TY - GEN AU - Heinze, Erik ID - 39351 TI - Kollusion durch Plattformen - der Einfluss von Tank-Apps auf den Preiswettbewerb von Tankstellen in Deutschland ER - TY - GEN AU - Rayhan, Shahi ID - 39358 TI - Big Data in Digital Markets - Challenges for Competition Policy to Protect Consumer Welfare ER - TY - GEN AU - Joshan, Saeid ID - 39356 TI - Network Development of Low-Cost Carriers at German Airports ER - TY - GEN AU - Ajredini, Zurkani ID - 39962 TI - Plattformgestaltungen auf digitalen Märkten - eine Analyse der Wohlfahrtseffekte ER - TY - GEN AU - Kanne, Niklas ID - 40465 TI - Marktmachtmissbrauch digitaler Plattformen - eine Analyse anhand der zehnten Novelle des GWB ER - TY - GEN AU - Klüppel, Pascal ID - 40466 TI - Marktmachtmissbrauch von Google – Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Yigitbas , Osman ID - 40473 TI - Preisabsprachen in der Automobilindustrie - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - Schulte, Marcel ID - 40470 TI - Facebooks digitale Währung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse ER - TY - THES AU - Heinzel, Joachim ID - 15824 TI - Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling ER - TY - JOUR AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Huizen, Thomas AU - Keijzer, Linda AU - Rezaei, Sarah AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie AU - Westbrock, Bastian ID - 16273 JF - Labour Economics TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field ER - TY - JOUR AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 16334 JF - Games and Economic Behavior TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 121 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget. AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ID - 17350 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets VL - 177 ER - TY - GEN AU - Niggemeyer, Laura ID - 39070 TI - Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon ER - TY - GEN AU - Schlegel, Manuela ID - 39072 TI - Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers ER - TY - GEN AU - Neibert, Katharina ID - 39079 TI - Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook ER - TY - GEN AU - Naseri, Gitti ID - 39077 TI - Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company ER - TY - GEN AU - Laudage, Felix ID - 39073 TI - Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi ER - TY - GEN AU - Posmetni, Lena ID - 39081 TI - Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung ER - TY - GEN AU - Hensel, Jason ID - 39346 TI - Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon ER - TY - GEN AU - Multani, Manjinder Singh ID - 39347 TI - Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten ER - TY - GEN AU - Bellouchi, Houda ID - 38098 TI - Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay ER - TY - JOUR AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1139 IS - 1 JF - Applied Economics Letters TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market VL - 26 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Haller, Hans ID - 2256 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption VL - 162 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013). AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede AU - Recker, Sonja AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 80 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? VL - 157 ER -