--- _id: '17350' abstract: - lang: eng text: Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget. article_type: original author: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp - first_name: 'Odvar M. ' full_name: 'Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ' last_name: Kaarbøe citation: ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 177:641-660. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 apa: Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 177, 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 bibtex: '@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }' chicago: 'Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.): 641–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.' ieee: 'B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.' mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026. short: B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.) 641–660. date_created: 2020-07-01T07:50:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-29T17:04:14Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026 intvolume: ' 177' language: - iso: eng page: 641-660 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization publication_identifier: unknown: - 0167-2681 publication_status: accepted status: public title: Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets type: journal_article user_id: '37339' volume: 177 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39070' author: - first_name: Laura full_name: Niggemeyer, Laura last_name: Niggemeyer citation: ama: Niggemeyer L. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon.; 2020. apa: Niggemeyer, L. (2020). Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon. bibtex: '@book{Niggemeyer_2020, title={Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}, author={Niggemeyer, Laura}, year={2020} }' chicago: Niggemeyer, Laura. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon, 2020. ieee: L. Niggemeyer, Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon. 2020. mla: Niggemeyer, Laura. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon. 2020. short: L. Niggemeyer, Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:03:35Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:03:39Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39072' author: - first_name: Manuela full_name: Schlegel, Manuela last_name: Schlegel citation: ama: Schlegel M. Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers.; 2020. apa: Schlegel, M. (2020). Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers. bibtex: '@book{Schlegel_2020, title={Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers}, author={Schlegel, Manuela}, year={2020} }' chicago: Schlegel, Manuela. Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers, 2020. ieee: M. Schlegel, Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers. 2020. mla: Schlegel, Manuela. Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers. 2020. short: M. Schlegel, Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:06:56Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:07:05Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39079' author: - first_name: Katharina full_name: Neibert, Katharina last_name: Neibert citation: ama: Neibert K. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook.; 2020. apa: Neibert, K. (2020). Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook. bibtex: '@book{Neibert_2020, title={Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}, author={Neibert, Katharina}, year={2020} }' chicago: Neibert, Katharina. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook, 2020. ieee: K. Neibert, Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook. 2020. mla: Neibert, Katharina. Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook. 2020. short: K. Neibert, Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:11:48Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:11:55Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39077' author: - first_name: Gitti full_name: Naseri, Gitti last_name: Naseri citation: ama: Naseri G. Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company.; 2020. apa: Naseri, G. (2020). Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company. bibtex: '@book{Naseri_2020, title={Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company}, author={Naseri, Gitti}, year={2020} }' chicago: Naseri, Gitti. Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company, 2020. ieee: G. Naseri, Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company. 2020. mla: Naseri, Gitti. Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company. 2020. short: G. Naseri, Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:10:08Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:10:17Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39073' author: - first_name: Felix full_name: Laudage, Felix last_name: Laudage citation: ama: Laudage F. Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi.; 2020. apa: Laudage, F. (2020). Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi. bibtex: '@book{Laudage_2020, title={Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi}, author={Laudage, Felix}, year={2020} }' chicago: Laudage, Felix. Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi, 2020. ieee: F. Laudage, Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi. 2020. mla: Laudage, Felix. Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi. 2020. short: F. Laudage, Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:08:30Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:08:36Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39081' author: - first_name: Lena full_name: Posmetni, Lena last_name: Posmetni citation: ama: Posmetni L. Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung.; 2020. apa: Posmetni, L. (2020). Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. bibtex: '@book{Posmetni_2020, title={Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung}, author={Posmetni, Lena}, year={2020} }' chicago: Posmetni, Lena. Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung, 2020. ieee: L. Posmetni, Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. 2020. mla: Posmetni, Lena. Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. 2020. short: L. Posmetni, Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:14:03Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:14:10Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer title: Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39346' author: - first_name: Jason full_name: Hensel, Jason last_name: Hensel citation: ama: Hensel J. Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon.; 2020. apa: Hensel, J. (2020). Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon. bibtex: '@book{Hensel_2020, title={Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon}, author={Hensel, Jason}, year={2020} }' chicago: Hensel, Jason. Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon, 2020. ieee: J. Hensel, Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon. 2020. mla: Hensel, Jason. Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon. 2020. short: J. Hensel, Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:22:53Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:23:03Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '39347' author: - first_name: Manjinder Singh full_name: Multani, Manjinder Singh last_name: Multani citation: ama: Multani MS. Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten.; 2020. apa: Multani, M. S. (2020). Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten. bibtex: '@book{Multani_2020, title={Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}, author={Multani, Manjinder Singh}, year={2020} }' chicago: Multani, Manjinder Singh. Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten, 2020. ieee: M. S. Multani, Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten. 2020. mla: Multani, Manjinder Singh. Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten. 2020. short: M.S. Multani, Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:26:04Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:26:09Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '38098' author: - first_name: Houda full_name: Bellouchi, Houda last_name: Bellouchi citation: ama: Bellouchi H. Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay.; 2020. apa: Bellouchi, H. (2020). Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay. bibtex: '@book{Bellouchi_2020, title={Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}, author={Bellouchi, Houda}, year={2020} }' chicago: Bellouchi, Houda. Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay, 2020. ieee: H. Bellouchi, Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers’ skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay. 2020. mla: Bellouchi, Houda. Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay. 2020. short: H. Bellouchi, Information Asymmetry and the SEC Framework in Digital Markets - On the Role of Reputation Systems in Alleviating Buyers’ Skepticism and Inducing Their Willingness to Pay, 2020. date_created: 2023-01-23T11:41:53Z date_updated: 2023-01-23T11:42:05Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2020' ... --- _id: '1139' abstract: - lang: eng text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. author: - first_name: Daniel full_name: Kaimann, Daniel id: '18949' last_name: Kaimann - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer citation: ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141' apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141' bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }' chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.' ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.' mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.' short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57. date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '183' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z file_id: '5307' file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf file_size: 625230 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 26' issue: '1' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141 page: 54-57 project: - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4 - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 publication: Applied Economics Letters publication_status: epub_ahead publisher: Taylor and Francis Online status: public title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market' type: journal_article user_id: '18949' volume: 26 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2256' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges." author: - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer - first_name: Hans full_name: Haller, Hans last_name: Haller citation: ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }' chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.' ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019. mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011. short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163. date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011 intvolume: ' 162' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824 page: 146-163 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization publication_status: published status: public title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 162 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '80' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)." article_type: original author: - first_name: Angelika Elfriede full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede id: '48794' last_name: Endres - first_name: Sonja full_name: Recker, Sonja last_name: Recker - first_name: Behnud full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud id: '26032' last_name: Mir Djawadi orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912 - first_name: Britta full_name: Hoyer, Britta id: '42447' last_name: Hoyer citation: ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004' apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004' bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }' chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.' ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.' mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.' short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '179' - _id: '204' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: bhoyer date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z file_id: '5723' file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf file_size: 1569991 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 157' language: - iso: eng page: 708-734 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '8' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ' publication_status: epub_ahead status: public title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?' type: journal_article user_id: '42447' volume: 157 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '7630' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud. author: - first_name: Joachim Maria Josef full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef id: '53445' last_name: Heinzel citation: ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.' apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.' bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }' chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019. short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. date_created: 2019-02-12T08:18:02Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:42Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: jheinzel date_created: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z file_id: '7631' file_name: WP118.pdf file_size: 286367 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 118' jel: - D82 - I11 - L15 keyword: - credence goods - treatment efficiency - heterogeneous experts - overcharging language: - iso: eng place: Paderborn University project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: CIE Working Paper Series report_number: 2019-01 series_title: CIE Working Paper Series status: public title: Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts type: report user_id: '477' volume: 118 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '8873' abstract: - lang: eng text: We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians. author: - first_name: Joachim Maria Josef full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef id: '53445' last_name: Heinzel citation: ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.' apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.' bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }' chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019. short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. date_created: 2019-04-11T08:13:53Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:05Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' - _id: '200' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: jheinzel date_created: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z file_id: '8875' file_name: WP119.pdf file_size: 315297 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 119' jel: - D82 - I11 - L15 keyword: - credence goods - heterogeneous experts - fairness - overcharging language: - iso: eng place: Paderborn University project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: CIE Working Paper Series series_title: CIE Working Paper Series status: public title: Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts type: report user_id: '53445' volume: 119 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '13148' abstract: - lang: eng text: This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions. author: - first_name: Yiquan full_name: Gu, Yiquan last_name: Gu - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp - first_name: Wolfgang full_name: Leininger, Wolfgang last_name: Leininger citation: ama: 'Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019:469-485. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011' apa: 'Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., & Leininger, W. (2019). Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 469–485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011' bibtex: '@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2019, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2019}, pages={469–485} }' chicago: 'Gu, Yiquan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, 469–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.' ieee: 'Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, “Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, pp. 469–485, 2019.' mla: 'Gu, Yiquan, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, pp. 469–85, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.' short: Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2019) 469–485. date_created: 2019-09-06T09:28:46Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:29Z department: - _id: '280' doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011 language: - iso: eng page: 469-485 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization publication_identifier: issn: - 0167-2681 publication_status: published status: public title: 'Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation' type: journal_article user_id: '37953' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '10332' abstract: - lang: eng text: We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium. author: - first_name: Joachim Maria Josef full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef id: '53445' last_name: Heinzel citation: ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.' apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.' bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }' chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.' mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019. short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019. date_created: 2019-06-28T08:42:49Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:37Z ddc: - '330' department: - _id: '280' - _id: '475' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: jheinzel date_created: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z file_id: '10333' file_name: WP120.pdf file_size: 375054 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z has_accepted_license: '1' keyword: - retail bundling - leverage theory - double marginalization language: - iso: eng place: Paderborn University project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: CIE Working Paper Series status: public title: Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition type: report user_id: '53445' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '39056' author: - first_name: Dennis full_name: Lütkevedder, Dennis last_name: Lütkevedder citation: ama: Lütkevedder D. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.; 2019. apa: Lütkevedder, D. (2019). “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. bibtex: '@book{Lütkevedder_2019, title={“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Lütkevedder, Dennis}, year={2019} }' chicago: Lütkevedder, Dennis. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019. ieee: D. Lütkevedder, “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019. mla: Lütkevedder, Dennis. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019. short: D. Lütkevedder, “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019. date_created: 2023-01-24T08:49:54Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T08:50:04Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: '"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse' type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '39059' author: - first_name: Uzair Ahmed full_name: Memon, Uzair Ahmed last_name: Memon citation: ama: Memon UA. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law.; 2019. apa: Memon, U. A. (2019). On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law. bibtex: '@book{Memon_2019, title={On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}, author={Memon, Uzair Ahmed}, year={2019} }' chicago: Memon, Uzair Ahmed. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law, 2019. ieee: U. A. Memon, On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law. 2019. mla: Memon, Uzair Ahmed. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law. 2019. short: U.A. Memon, On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law, 2019. date_created: 2023-01-24T08:51:46Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T08:51:59Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law type: mastersthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '39067' author: - first_name: André full_name: Milczarek, André last_name: Milczarek citation: ama: Milczarek A. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.; 2019. apa: Milczarek, A. (2019). Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. bibtex: '@book{Milczarek_2019, title={Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Milczarek, André}, year={2019} }' chicago: Milczarek, André. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019. ieee: A. Milczarek, Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019. mla: Milczarek, André. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019. short: A. Milczarek, Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019. date_created: 2023-01-24T09:01:50Z date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:01:59Z department: - _id: '280' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901' - _id: '2' name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A' - _id: '7' name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3' status: public supervisor: - first_name: Burkhard full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard id: '37339' last_name: Hehenkamp title: Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '37953' year: '2019' ...