---
_id: '1139'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms.
Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing
behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information
of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical
evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal
to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands
lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects
even after price increase.
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57.
doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model:
The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters,
26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand
model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141},
number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis
Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand
Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics
Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model:
The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters,
vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.
date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '183'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
file_id: '5307'
file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf
file_size: 625230
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 26'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
page: 54-57
project:
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
publication: Applied Economics Letters
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Taylor and Francis Online
status: public
title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile
discount market'
type: journal_article
user_id: '18949'
volume: 26
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2256'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat
members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise
have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information
network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris
paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within
the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto
this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections
model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation
and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external
threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect.
For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network
can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat
whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat,
a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected
networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Hans
full_name: Haller, Hans
last_name: Haller
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta
and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.
162, pp. 146–163, 2019.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network
Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.
short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162
(2019) 146–163.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
intvolume: ' 162'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824
page: 146-163
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 162
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '80'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential
of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network
formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any
experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally
study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat
by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed
behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer
are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary
who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes,
we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium
network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was
more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness
on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that
while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium
networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment,
predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally,
we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on
whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two
robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify
the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment
observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions
by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Angelika Elfriede
full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede
id: '48794'
last_name: Endres
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption
- An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network
Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157},
DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika
Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019},
pages={708–734} }'
chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta
Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks
Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019):
708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.'
mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment:
Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '179'
- _id: '204'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
file_id: '5723'
file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf
file_size: 1569991
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 157'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 708-734
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization '
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks
too complex?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 157
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '7630'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care
market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians
and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate
the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the
patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more
efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases
only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’
cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change
the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different
changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost
physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol
118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts
(Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper
Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019},
collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous
Experts. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working
Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts,
vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous
Experts. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working
Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-02-12T08:18:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:42Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
file_id: '7631'
file_name: WP118.pdf
file_size: 286367
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 118'
jel:
- D82
- I11
- L15
keyword:
- credence goods
- treatment efficiency
- heterogeneous experts
- overcharging
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
report_number: 2019-01
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts
type: report
user_id: '477'
volume: 118
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '8873'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated
prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns.
The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair
physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from
being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the
physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second
opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on
the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of
the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial
fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search
level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare
is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently
large share of fair physicians.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts.
Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic
Experts (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper
Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019},
collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and
Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts,
vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic
Experts. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-04-11T08:13:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:05Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
file_id: '8875'
file_name: WP119.pdf
file_size: 315297
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 119'
jel:
- D82
- I11
- L15
keyword:
- credence goods
- heterogeneous experts
- fairness
- overcharging
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts
type: report
user_id: '53445'
volume: 119
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '13148'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where
players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation
probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population
evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show
that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation
probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous
entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort
under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation
can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with
concave impact functions.
author:
- first_name: Yiquan
full_name: Gu, Yiquan
last_name: Gu
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Wolfgang
full_name: Leininger, Wolfgang
last_name: Leininger
citation:
ama: 'Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with
stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization. 2019:469-485. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011'
apa: 'Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., & Leininger, W. (2019). Evolutionary equilibrium
in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 469–485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011'
bibtex: '@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2019, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in
contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Gu, Yiquan
and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2019}, pages={469–485}
}'
chicago: 'Gu, Yiquan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. “Evolutionary
Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, 469–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.'
ieee: 'Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, “Evolutionary equilibrium in contests
with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation,” Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, pp. 469–485, 2019.'
mla: 'Gu, Yiquan, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation:
Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
2019, pp. 469–85, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.'
short: Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
(2019) 469–485.
date_created: 2019-09-06T09:28:46Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:29Z
department:
- _id: '280'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011
language:
- iso: eng
page: 469-485
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0167-2681
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry,
effort and overdissipation'
type: journal_article
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10332'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail
bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic
manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas
the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is
a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second
product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or
to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization
problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in
prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer
as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the
manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling
is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable
bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition.
Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail
Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a
Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series},
author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with
Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition.
Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail
Competition. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-06-28T08:42:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:37Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
file_id: '10333'
file_name: WP120.pdf
file_size: 375054
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- retail bundling
- leverage theory
- double marginalization
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition
type: report
user_id: '53445'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '39056'
author:
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Lütkevedder, Dennis
last_name: Lütkevedder
citation:
ama: Lütkevedder D. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse.; 2019.
apa: Lütkevedder, D. (2019). “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine
wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.
bibtex: '@book{Lütkevedder_2019, title={“Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Lütkevedder, Dennis}, year={2019}
}'
chicago: Lütkevedder, Dennis. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine
wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019.
ieee: D. Lütkevedder, “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
mla: Lütkevedder, Dennis. “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
short: D. Lütkevedder, “Data-Driven Mergers” in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-24T08:49:54Z
date_updated: 2023-01-24T08:50:04Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: '"Data-Driven Mergers" in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '39059'
author:
- first_name: Uzair Ahmed
full_name: Memon, Uzair Ahmed
last_name: Memon
citation:
ama: Memon UA. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big Data,
Market Power, Competition Law.; 2019.
apa: Memon, U. A. (2019). On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy
- Big data, Market power, Competition law.
bibtex: '@book{Memon_2019, title={On the Implications of Big Data for Competition
Policy - Big data, Market power, Competition law}, author={Memon, Uzair Ahmed},
year={2019} }'
chicago: Memon, Uzair Ahmed. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition
Policy - Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law, 2019.
ieee: U. A. Memon, On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big
data, Market power, Competition law. 2019.
mla: Memon, Uzair Ahmed. On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy
- Big Data, Market Power, Competition Law. 2019.
short: U.A. Memon, On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big
Data, Market Power, Competition Law, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-24T08:51:46Z
date_updated: 2023-01-24T08:51:59Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: On the Implications of Big Data for Competition Policy - Big data, Market power,
Competition law
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '39067'
author:
- first_name: André
full_name: Milczarek, André
last_name: Milczarek
citation:
ama: Milczarek A. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten -
eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.; 2019.
apa: Milczarek, A. (2019). Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.
bibtex: '@book{Milczarek_2019, title={Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen
Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Milczarek, André}, year={2019}
}'
chicago: Milczarek, André. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019.
ieee: A. Milczarek, Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019.
mla: Milczarek, André. Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse. 2019.
short: A. Milczarek, Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten -
eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-24T09:01:50Z
date_updated: 2023-01-24T09:01:59Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Risiken und Gefahren von Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '37684'
author:
- first_name: Fabian
full_name: Heinrichs, Fabian
last_name: Heinrichs
citation:
ama: Heinrichs F. Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht
und die Bildung von Kartellen.; 2019.
apa: Heinrichs, F. (2019). Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data
auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen.
bibtex: '@book{Heinrichs_2019, title={Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von
Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen}, author={Heinrichs, Fabian},
year={2019} }'
chicago: Heinrichs, Fabian. Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data
auf Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen, 2019.
ieee: F. Heinrichs, Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht
und die Bildung von Kartellen. 2019.
mla: Heinrichs, Fabian. Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf
Marktmacht und die Bildung von Kartellen. 2019.
short: F. Heinrichs, Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht
und die Bildung von Kartellen, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-20T10:22:41Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T09:06:32Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Digitale Märkte - Zu den Auswirkungen von Big Data auf Marktmacht und die Bildung
von Kartellen
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38042'
author:
- first_name: Julia
full_name: Fortmeier, Julia
last_name: Fortmeier
citation:
ama: Fortmeier J. Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse.; 2019.
apa: Fortmeier, J. (2019). Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse.
bibtex: '@book{Fortmeier_2019, title={Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse}, author={Fortmeier, Julia}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Fortmeier, Julia. Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse, 2019.
ieee: J. Fortmeier, Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
mla: Fortmeier, Julia. Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
short: J. Fortmeier, Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T08:55:55Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T09:05:55Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Anreizwirkungen der Bonusregelung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38045'
author:
- first_name: Carolin
full_name: Hagedorn, Carolin
last_name: Hagedorn
citation:
ama: Hagedorn C. The Intersection of Privacy and Competition Law - Lessons from
Data-Driven Mergers.; 2019.
apa: Hagedorn, C. (2019). The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons
from data-driven mergers.
bibtex: '@book{Hagedorn_2019, title={The intersection of privacy and competition
law - Lessons from data-driven mergers}, author={Hagedorn, Carolin}, year={2019}
}'
chicago: Hagedorn, Carolin. The Intersection of Privacy and Competition Law -
Lessons from Data-Driven Mergers, 2019.
ieee: C. Hagedorn, The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons
from data-driven mergers. 2019.
mla: Hagedorn, Carolin. The Intersection of Privacy and Competition Law - Lessons
from Data-Driven Mergers. 2019.
short: C. Hagedorn, The Intersection of Privacy and Competition Law - Lessons from
Data-Driven Mergers, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T09:22:37Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T09:24:30Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: The intersection of privacy and competition law - Lessons from data-driven
mergers
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38097'
author:
- first_name: Berfin
full_name: Ayyildiz, Berfin
last_name: Ayyildiz
citation:
ama: Ayyildiz B. Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse.; 2019.
apa: Ayyildiz, B. (2019). Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine
wettbewerbspolitische Analyse.
bibtex: '@book{Ayyildiz_2019, title={Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google
- eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, author={Ayyildiz, Berfin}, year={2019}
}'
chicago: Ayyildiz, Berfin. Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine
wettbewerbspolitische Analyse, 2019.
ieee: B. Ayyildiz, Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
mla: Ayyildiz, Berfin. Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse. 2019.
short: B. Ayyildiz, Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T11:39:35Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T11:39:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Die Akquisition von Double Click durch Google - eine wettbewerbspolitische
Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38093'
author:
- first_name: Ekaterina
full_name: Shelepova, Ekaterina
last_name: Shelepova
citation:
ama: Shelepova E. Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy
Perspective.; 2019.
apa: Shelepova, E. (2019). Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic
Policy Perspective.
bibtex: '@book{Shelepova_2019, title={Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An
Economic Policy Perspective}, author={Shelepova, Ekaterina}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Shelepova, Ekaterina. Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic
Policy Perspective, 2019.
ieee: E. Shelepova, Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy
Perspective. 2019.
mla: Shelepova, Ekaterina. Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic
Policy Perspective. 2019.
short: E. Shelepova, Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy
Perspective, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T11:34:00Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T11:34:15Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Merger Analysis in Data-Driven Markets - An Economic Policy Perspective
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38096'
author:
- first_name: Suganya
full_name: Shanmugaratnam, Suganya
last_name: Shanmugaratnam
citation:
ama: Shanmugaratnam S. Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten.; 2019.
apa: Shanmugaratnam, S. (2019). Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten.
bibtex: '@book{Shanmugaratnam_2019, title={Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten}, author={Shanmugaratnam,
Suganya}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Shanmugaratnam, Suganya. Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten, 2019.
ieee: S. Shanmugaratnam, Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten. 2019.
mla: Shanmugaratnam, Suganya. Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten. 2019.
short: S. Shanmugaratnam, Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T11:36:24Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T11:36:29Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Marktmacht in digitalen Märkten
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '38099'
author:
- first_name: Ahmed
full_name: Faizan, Ahmed
last_name: Faizan
citation:
ama: Faizan A. The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging
Cartel Activities.; 2019.
apa: Faizan, A. (2019). The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing
in Discouraging Cartel Activities.
bibtex: '@book{Faizan_2019, title={The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing
in Discouraging Cartel Activities}, author={Faizan, Ahmed}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Faizan, Ahmed. The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing
in Discouraging Cartel Activities, 2019.
ieee: A. Faizan, The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in
Discouraging Cartel Activities. 2019.
mla: Faizan, Ahmed. The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing
in Discouraging Cartel Activities. 2019.
short: A. Faizan, The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging
Cartel Activities, 2019.
date_created: 2023-01-23T11:43:52Z
date_updated: 2023-01-23T11:48:33Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs and Whistleblowing in Discouraging Cartel
Activities
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '3101'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Focusing on a physician''s relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment
analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician''s treatment decision. We conduct
a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole
experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched
every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity
between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally
we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants.
We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment
physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity
between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences
in the participants'' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in
our experiment.'
author:
- first_name: Vanessa
full_name: Hilleringmann, Vanessa
id: '34491'
last_name: Hilleringmann
citation:
ama: Hilleringmann V. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series;
2018.
apa: Hilleringmann, V. (2018). The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series.
bibtex: '@book{Hilleringmann_2018, title={The Influence of Bribery and Relative
Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series}, author={Hilleringmann, Vanessa}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
ieee: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on
a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series,
2018.
mla: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
short: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment, CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.
date_created: 2018-06-07T07:42:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
keyword:
- Corruption
- Reciprocity
- Physician-Patient Relationship
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription
Decision - An Experiment
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '8074'
author:
- first_name: Cengiz
full_name: Aykanat, Cengiz
last_name: Aykanat
citation:
ama: Aykanat C. Sharing Economy - Chancen Und Risiken Aus Ökonomischer Sicht.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Aykanat, C. (2018). Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer
Sicht. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Aykanat_2018, title={Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer
Sicht}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Aykanat, Cengiz}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Aykanat, Cengiz. Sharing Economy - Chancen Und Risiken Aus Ökonomischer
Sicht. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: C. Aykanat, Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Aykanat, Cengiz. Sharing Economy - Chancen Und Risiken Aus Ökonomischer
Sicht. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: C. Aykanat, Sharing Economy - Chancen Und Risiken Aus Ökonomischer Sicht,
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2019-02-22T09:40:39Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '8075'
author:
- first_name: Tatiana
full_name: Suvorina, Tatiana
last_name: Suvorina
citation:
ama: Suvorina T. Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants. Universität
Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Suvorina, T. (2018). Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Suvorina_2018, title={Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Suvorina, Tatiana}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Suvorina, Tatiana. Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: T. Suvorina, Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants. Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Suvorina, Tatiana. Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: T. Suvorina, Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants, Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2019-02-22T09:47:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2018'
...