@article{50719, abstract = {{We propose an indicator for detecting anomalous stock market valuation in real time such that market participants receive timely signals so as to be able to take stabilizing action. Unlike existing approaches, our anomaly indicator introduces three methodological novelties. First, we use an endogenous, purely data-driven, nonparametric trend identification method to separate long-term market movements from more short-term ones. Second, we apply SETAR models that allow for asymmetric expansions and contractions around the long-term trend and find systematic stock price cycles. Third, we implement these findings in our indicator and conduct real-time market forecasts, which have so far been neglected in the literature. Applications of our indicator using monthly S&P 500 stock data from 1970 to the end of 2022 show that short-term anomalous market movements can be identified in real time up to one year ahead. We predict all major anomalies, including the 1987 Bubble and the initial phase of the Financial Crisis that began in 2007. In total, our anomaly indicator identifies more than 80% of all – even minor – anomalous episodes. Thus, smoothing market exaggerations through early signaling seems possible.}}, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Wiechers, Lukas}}, issn = {{1469-7688}}, journal = {{Quantitative Finance}}, keywords = {{General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Finance}}, pages = {{1--14}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{An early indicator for anomalous stock market performance}}}, doi = {{10.1080/14697688.2023.2281529}}, year = {{2024}}, } @article{35637, abstract = {{Individual cognitive functioning declines over time. We seek to understand how adverse physical health shocks in older ages contribute to this development. By use of event-study methods and data from the USA, England, and several countries in Continental Europe, we find evidence that health shocks lead to an immediate and persistent decline in cognitive functioning. This robust finding holds in all regions representing different health insurance systems and seems to be independent of underlying individual demographic characteristics such as sex and age. We also ask whether variables that are susceptible to policy action can reduce the negative consequences of a health shock. Our results suggest that neither compulsory education nor retirement regulations moderate the effects, thus emphasizing the importance for cognitive functioning of maintaining good physical health in old age.}}, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{European Economic Review}}, title = {{{Understanding cognitive decline in older ages: The role of health shocks}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104320}}, volume = {{151}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{42638, abstract = {{ We propose a new method to estimate and isolate the localization of knowledge spillovers due to the physical presence of a person, using after-application but pre-grant deaths of differently located coinventors of the same patent. The approach estimates the differences in local citations between the deceased and still-living inventors at increasingly distant radii. Patents receive 26 percent fewer citations from within a radius of 20 miles around the deceased, relative to still-living coinventors. Differences attenuate with time and distance, are stronger when still-living coinventors live farther from the deceased, and hold for a subsample of possibly premature deaths. (JEL O31, O33, O34, R32) }}, author = {{Balsmeier, Benjamin and Fleming, Lee and Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{2640-205X}}, journal = {{American Economic Review: Insights}}, keywords = {{Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Geography, Planning and Development}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{21--33}}, publisher = {{American Economic Association}}, title = {{{Isolating Personal Knowledge Spillovers: Coinventor Deaths and Spatial Citation Differentials}}}, doi = {{10.1257/aeri.20210275}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{44092, abstract = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.}}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}}, title = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4689}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{44093, abstract = {{We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, keywords = {{Quality competition, Price regulation, Location choice, Product differentiation}}, title = {{{Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{46534, abstract = {{We study the effect of education on health (hospital stays, number of diagnosed conditions, self-rated poor health, and obesity) over the life-cycle in Germany, using compulsory schooling reforms as a source of exogenous variation. Our results suggest a positive correlation of health and education which increases over the life-cycle. We do not, however, find any positive local average treatment effects of an additional year of schooling on health or health care utilization for individuals up to age 79. An exception is obesity, where positive effects of schooling start to be visible around age 60 and become very large in age group 75-79. The results in age group 75-79 need to be interpreted with caution, however, due to small sample size and possible problems of attrition.}}, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Tawiah, Beatrice Baaba}}, keywords = {{Education, health, life-cycle effects, compulsory schooling}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{Life-cycle health effects of compulsory schooling}}}, volume = {{1006}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{46521, author = {{Freise, Diana and Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{1556-5068}}, keywords = {{General Earth and Planetary Sciences, General Environmental Science}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Housing Situations and Local COVID-19 Infection Dynamics – A Case Study With Small-Area Data}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.4372490}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{46536, abstract = {{We study the effect of education on vaccination against COVID-19 and influenza in Germany and Europe. Our identification strategy makes use of changes in compulsory schooling laws and allows to estimate local average treatment effects for individuals between 59 and 91 years of age. We find no significant effect of an additional year of schooling on vaccination status in Germany. Pooling data from Europe, we conclude that schooling increases the likelihood to vaccinate against COVID by an economically negligible effect of one percentage point (zero for influenza). However, we find indications that additional schooling increases fear of side effects from COVID vaccination.}}, author = {{Monsees, Daniel and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, keywords = {{COVID, influenza, vaccination, education, compulsory schooling}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{The effect of compulsory schooling on vaccination against COVID and Influenza}}}, volume = {{1011}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{34114, abstract = {{Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}}, journal = {{Journal of International Management}}, keywords = {{Qualitative comparative analysis, Banzhaf power index, causality, explanatory power}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{30341, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}}, issn = {{2214-8043}}, journal = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}}, keywords = {{General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology}}, pages = {{101869}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{32106, abstract = {{We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}}, keywords = {{Asymmetric bargaining power, Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution}}, pages = {{17}}, title = {{{Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}}}, volume = {{148}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{31881, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, journal = {{International Journal of Game Theory}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33221, abstract = {{AbstractNon-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures.}}, author = {{Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{0922-680X}}, journal = {{Journal of Regulatory Economics}}, keywords = {{Economics and Econometrics}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11149-022-09452-9}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33220, abstract = {{AbstractWe provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim}}, issn = {{2510-5019}}, journal = {{Journal for Labour Market Research}}, keywords = {{General Medicine}}, number = {{1}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Modelling artificial intelligence in economics}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s12651-022-00319-2}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33219, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Müller, Veronika and Jost, John T.}}, issn = {{1047-840X}}, journal = {{Psychological Inquiry}}, keywords = {{General Psychology}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{65--83}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1080/1047840x.2022.2065128}}, volume = {{33}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{44091, abstract = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}}, author = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}}, keywords = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}}, pages = {{43}}, title = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42326, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42322, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42324, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42318, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42319, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42323, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42320, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{School choice with reserves and quotas}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42325, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Organisation von Zeitbörsen}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30940, abstract = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, issn = {{0347-0520}}, journal = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}}, keywords = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{403--440}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}}, volume = {{125}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33458, abstract = {{We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.}}, author = {{Freise, Diana and Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, title = {{{Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102689}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30235, author = {{Westphal, Matthias and Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Economic Journal}}, number = {{646}}, pages = {{2231--2272}}, title = {{{Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment}}}, doi = {{10.1093/ej/ueac021}}, volume = {{132}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{15073, abstract = {{ In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime. }}, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schiele, Valentin}}, issn = {{0034-6535}}, journal = {{The Review of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{165--176}}, title = {{{Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety}}}, doi = {{10.1162/rest_a_00873}}, volume = {{103}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{29152, abstract = {{AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{1434-4742}}, journal = {{Review of Economic Design}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{22715, abstract = {{AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Zehra, Moonum}}, issn = {{1488-3473}}, journal = {{Journal of International Migration and Integration}}, title = {{{Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s12134-021-00863-9}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{23594, abstract = {{AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.}}, author = {{Redlin, Margarete and Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, title = {{{Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-021-03764-0}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42317, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Aufteilung der Barentsseegebiete mithilfe des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42315, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Versionisierung von Serviceleistungen auf Videoplattformen}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42321, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kindergarten Allocation through Matching Mechanisms}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42309, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Faire Profitverteilung in Energienetzwerken - eine spieltheoretische Analyse von Microgrids}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42311, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{"First-Party-Content" auf zweiseitigen Märkten}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42314, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stability in many-to-many matchings with contracts}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42313, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Preissetzungsstrategien für Neuprodukte}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42310, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Co-opetition in Two-Sided Markets}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42312, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching mit Minderheiten}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42316, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Piracy and Visioning}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @misc{42303, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Revenue Sharing Contracts: Horizontale Koordination in der E-Commerce-Logistik}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{45640, abstract = {{I study a dynamic variant of the Dixit–Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, issn = {{1573-2878}}, journal = {{Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Dynamic Monopolistic Competition}}}, volume = {{189}}, year = {{2021}}, } @techreport{46540, abstract = {{Individual cognitive functioning declines over time. We seek to understand how adverse physical health shocks in older ages contribute to this development. By use of event-study methods and data from the USA, England and several countries in Continental Europe we find evidence that health shocks lead to an immediate and persistent decline in cognitive functioning. This robust finding holds in all regions representing different health insurance systems and seems to be independent of underlying individual demographic characteristics such as sex and age. We also ask whether variables that are susceptible to policy action can reduce the negative consequences of a health shock. Our results suggest that neither compulsory education nor retirement regulations moderate the effects, thus emphasizing the importance of maintaining good physical health in old age for cognitive functioning.}}, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, keywords = {{Cognitive decline, health shocks, retirement, education, event study}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{Understanding cognitive decline in older ages: The role of health shocks}}}, volume = {{919}}, year = {{2021}}, } @techreport{46537, abstract = {{We study effects of retirement on cognitive abilities (up to ten years after retirement) using data from 21 countries in Continental Europe, England, and the US, and exploiting early-retirement thresholds for identification. For this purpose, combines event-study estimations with the marginal treatment effect framework to allow for effect heterogeneity. This helps to decompose event-study estimates into true medium-run effects of retirement and effects driven by differential retirement preferences. Our results suggest considerable negative effects of retirement on cognitive abilities. We also detect substantial effect heterogeneity: Those who retire as early as possible are not affected while those who retire later exhibit negative effects.}}, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, keywords = {{Cognitive abilities, retirement, event study, marginal treatment effects}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{The dynamic and heterogeneous effects of retirement on cognitive decline}}}, volume = {{918}}, year = {{2021}}, } @inproceedings{22218, author = {{Krauter, Stefan and Böcker, Joachim and Freitag, Christine and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Hilleringmann, Ulrich and Temmen, Katrin and Klaus, Tobias and Rohrer, Nicolaus and Lehmann, Sven}}, booktitle = {{Tagungsband des 36. PV-Symposiums, 18.-26 Mai 2021}}, isbn = {{978-3-948176-14-3}}, keywords = {{Art-D, Afrika, Resilienz, Resilience, Grid stability, robustness, microgrids}}, location = {{Staffelstein / online}}, pages = {{305--309}}, publisher = {{Conexio}}, title = {{{Projekt Art-D Grids: Nachhaltige und stabile Microgrids in Afrika - eine Plattform für Forschung und Lehre für die Entwicklung}}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{17072, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}}, issn = {{1048-5252}}, journal = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}}, pages = {{510--533}}, title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17074, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, issn = {{1363-6669}}, journal = {{Review of Development Economics}}, pages = {{644--667}}, title = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}}, doi = {{10.1111/rode.12663}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16273, abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{30234, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}}, issn = {{1057-9230}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{766--777}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4018}}, volume = {{29}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{31802, abstract = {{ Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. }}, author = {{Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{0025-1909}}, journal = {{Management Science}}, keywords = {{Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{2677--2685}}, publisher = {{Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}}, title = {{{Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}}}, doi = {{10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}}, volume = {{66}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{34115, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{0943-0180}}, journal = {{Homo Oeconomicus}}, keywords = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}}, number = {{1-2}}, pages = {{1--6}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17350, abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{641--660}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}}, volume = {{177}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17086, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, pages = {{923--944}}, title = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42278, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42307, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42308, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42301, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42299, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42304, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42298, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42306, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42300, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42302, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42292, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42294, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{46541, abstract = {{Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.}}, author = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, keywords = {{prudence, risk preferences, prevention, vaccination, screening}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}}}, volume = {{863}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{2808, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{129--170}}, title = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12140}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{9920, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, pages = {{47--50}}, title = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}}, volume = {{181}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{6734, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}}, journal = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{62--78}}, title = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}}, doi = {{10.1111/obes.12267}}, volume = {{81}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15202, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}}, volume = {{128}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15204, abstract = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}}, author = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}}, keywords = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{10090, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0569-4345}}, journal = {{The American Economist}}, title = {{{A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0569434519846477}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{15075, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-4367}}, journal = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{415--449}}, title = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jori.12219}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2727, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{309--323}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42296, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Intermediaries in Networks}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42286, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42290, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42289, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42291, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42288, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42295, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42293, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42284, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42280, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42285, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42281, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{41926, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42277, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42283, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Student's school matching mechanisms in the US}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2814, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of International Development}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{493--506}}, title = {{{Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jid.3104}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{2831, abstract = {{We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-5916-0}}, location = {{Irvine, California, USA}}, pages = {{5:1--5:6}}, title = {{{Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}}}, doi = {{10.1145/3230654.3230659}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2565, abstract = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, keywords = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}}, volume = {{112}}, year = {{2018}}, }