@misc{42304, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42298, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42306, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42300, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42302, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42292, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{42294, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @techreport{46541, abstract = {{Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.}}, author = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, keywords = {{prudence, risk preferences, prevention, vaccination, screening}}, publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}}, title = {{{Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}}}, volume = {{863}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{2808, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{129--170}}, title = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12140}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{9920, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, pages = {{47--50}}, title = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}}, volume = {{181}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{6734, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}}, journal = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{62--78}}, title = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}}, doi = {{10.1111/obes.12267}}, volume = {{81}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15202, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}}, volume = {{128}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15204, abstract = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}}, author = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}}, keywords = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{10090, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0569-4345}}, journal = {{The American Economist}}, title = {{{A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0569434519846477}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{15075, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-4367}}, journal = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{415--449}}, title = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jori.12219}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2727, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{309--323}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42296, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Intermediaries in Networks}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42286, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42290, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42289, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42291, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42288, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42295, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42293, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42284, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42280, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42285, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42281, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{41926, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42277, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42283, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Student's school matching mechanisms in the US}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2814, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of International Development}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{493--506}}, title = {{{Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jid.3104}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{2831, abstract = {{We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-5916-0}}, location = {{Irvine, California, USA}}, pages = {{5:1--5:6}}, title = {{{Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}}}, doi = {{10.1145/3230654.3230659}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2565, abstract = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, keywords = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}}, volume = {{112}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2933, abstract = {{We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}}, keywords = {{Bargaining problem, CES Function, Normalized CES Function, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, Egalitarian Solution.}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}}}, volume = {{113}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{3098, abstract = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy.}}, author = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, booktitle = {{Studies in Economic Design}}, editor = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}}, issn = {{2510-3970}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}}, volume = {{(n.d.)}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{3101, abstract = {{Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.}}, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, keywords = {{Corruption, Reciprocity, Physician-Patient Relationship}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4564, abstract = {{ In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{905--932}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3081, author = {{Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health services research}}, number = {{4}}, title = {{{New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}}}, doi = {{10.111/1475-6773.12840}}, volume = {{53}}, year = {{2018}}, }